The second last verse of Surah Ha Mim Sajdah reads, “We will show them Our Signs in the universe and also in their own psyche and consciousness until it becomes manifest to them that the Quran is the Truth.” (Al Quran 41:53)
It goes without saying that our knowledge of our solar system, our universe, cosmology, physics and mathematics that supports it, has multiplied a billion fold from the seventh century Arabia to the 21st century global village.
For the understanding of our universe you could be watching any number of good documentaries produced by the reputable Western companies. I will share only one here:
Likewise our understanding of the human psychology has increased in so many different ways.
I believe that any good commentary of the Quran can never be written in stone. Please see our collection below about scope and style of the Quran.
Therefore, verses about sociology, legislation and host of other subjects that change with the changing societies have to be understood and read in contemporary terms.
The fundamentalist then ask is there any thing fixed in the Quran? Yes, the main themes of theology. Monotheism and our accountability, in the hereafter, are written in stone.
I believe that the two fundamental beliefs in Islam, which it shares with Judaism and Christianity are belief in the Transcendent God and accountability in the life after death. (87:16-19) The former is discussed at some length in the commentary of Surah Al Fatihah and the latter in the commentary of Surah Al Waqi’ah. This is why each and every prophet of God was sent and this indeed is the very purpose of the holy Quran, as it often uses the first creation as a proof for the second creation, namely our accountability in the hereafter.
Suggested reading for knowing the Creator of our universe
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Written and collected by Zia H Shah MD, Chief Editor of the Muslim Times
In the very beginning of Surah Saff, chapter 61 of the Quran, we read: “Whatever is in the heavens and the earth glorifies Allah, He is the Mighty, the Wise.”
There are several other verses of the Quran on this theme that it can be considered almost a Quranic refrain.
Allah is making a very profound claim here that literally every thing that we see around, under the microscope or through the telescope, glorifies Him.
Now, if you resort to reading the commentary or lecture of a given Muslim scholar about such verses, you are going to be short changed, for the theologian has spend his life studying theology and different details of the Shariah and has had very little time to master the scientific beauties of our universe.
The last verse of Sura Hashar, chapter 59 of the Quran, states: He is Allah, the Creator, the Maker, the Fashioner. His are the most beautiful names. All that is in the heavens and the earth glorifies Him, and He is the Mighty, the Wise.”
So, to fully appreciate the attributes, the Creator, the Maker, the Fashioner, may I respectfully suggest that you may need to recognize the Muslim Times as a good source and benefit from the following:
A Meccan surah. The disbelievers often asked incredulously about the Resurrection, this is mentioned in the first five verses of the surah. This surah gives evidence of God’s power in verses 6-16, then explains what will happen on the Day of Resurrection, and the respective fates of believers and disbelievers in the rest of the surah.
It follows the theme of several other surahs, where God’s first creation is presented as evidence for second creation or Resurrection.
So, this surah is another exhibit for our repeated assertion that the two most fundamental theses of the Quran are belief in the Creator and Loving God and our accountability to Him in the hereafter.
We believe the two fundamental beliefs in Islam, which it shares with Judaism and Christianity are belief in the Transcendent God and accountability in the life after death. (87:16-19) The former is discussed at some length in the commentary of Surah Al Fatihah and the latter in the commentary of Surah Al Waqi’ah. This is why each and every prophet of God was sent and this indeed is the very purpose of the holy Quran. In the worldly and human sphere the goal of the Quran is to create just and compassionate individuals and society.
بِسْمِ اللَّـهِ الرَّحْمَـٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.
78:1. What are they asking about?
78:2. Is it about the momentous announcement, the Day of Judgment?
عَنِ النَّبَإِ الْعَظِيمِ
78:3. About which they differ.
الَّذِي هُمْ فِيهِ مُخْتَلِفُونَ
78:4. They will find out.
78:5. In the end they will find out.
ثُمَّ كَلَّا سَيَعْلَمُونَ
78:6. Did We not make the earth a flat bed,
أَلَمْ نَجْعَلِ الْأَرْضَ مِهَادًا
78:7. and make the mountains to keep it stable?
78:8. Did We not create you in pairs,
78:9. give you sleep as a source of rest,
وَجَعَلْنَا نَوْمَكُمْ سُبَاتًا
78:10. the night as a cover,
وَجَعَلْنَا اللَّيْلَ لِبَاسًا
78:11. and the day for your livelihood?
وَجَعَلْنَا النَّهَارَ مَعَاشًا
78:12. Did We not build seven strong heavens above you,
وَبَنَيْنَا فَوْقَكُمْ سَبْعًا شِدَادًا
78:13. and make sun a blazing lamp?
وَجَعَلْنَا سِرَاجًا وَهَّاجًا
78:14. Did We not send water pouring down from the clouds
وَأَنزَلْنَا مِنَ الْمُعْصِرَاتِ مَاءً ثَجَّاجًا
78:15. to bring forth with it grain, vegetations,
لِّنُخْرِجَ بِهِ حَبًّا وَنَبَاتًا
78:16. and luxuriant gardens?
78:17. A time has been appointed for the Day of Judgment:
إِنَّ يَوْمَ الْفَصْلِ كَانَ مِيقَاتًا
78:18. a Day when the Trumpet will sound and you will come forward in crowds,
78:40. Indeed, We have warned you of an imminent torment, on the Day when every person will see what their own hands have sent ahead for them, when the disbeliever will say, ‘If only I were mere dust!’
Written and collected by Zia H Shah MD, Chief Editor of the Muslim Times
If my articles are boring to you, it may be that you need to read more of them, as was suggested by John Cage, one of the most influential American composers of the 20th century, “If something is boring after two minutes, try it for four. If still boring, then eight. Then sixteen. Then thirty-two. Eventually one discovers that it is not boring at all.”
He (Allah) is the First and the Last, and the Manifest and the Hidden, and He knows every little detail fully well. (Al Quran 57:3/4)
Quantum physics has come to symbolize complexity among other things and most of us try to shy away from it. But, the fundamental reality is that if we put the mathematics aside and find the right teachers, following arguments in Quantum physics is not any harder than any other scientific, religious, philosophical, logical and political argument. Often what it means is picking up, which expert is giving a fair and balanced understanding and which one is blinded by his or her ideological concerns.
Napoleon, in one of the most notable conversations in the history of science, asked the French scientist Pierre Simon Laplace about the role of God in his scientific world view. It is said that Laplace had presented Napoleon with a copy of his work, who had heard that the book contained no mention of God. Napoleon, who was fond of imposing embarrassment, received it with the remark, “Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe, and have never even mentioned its Creator.” Laplace is said to have replied, “Sir, I have no need of that hypothesis.” And so it goes. The apparent so called self-sufficiency of our physical universe has caused many a scientist to move away from the idea of a Creator of the universe or the God Hypothesis. But is it really so?
Laplace is one of the seventy two people to have their names on the Eiffel Tower. So strong was his belief in determinism and the scientific process that he said that given the knowledge of every atomic motion, the entire future of the universe could be mapped out. This was precisely the reason why Einstein did not believe in free will or accountability except for the horrific crimes of the Nazis. Laplace wrote:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.
Atheist physicist and philosophers want to continue to read determinism in physics despite the discoveries of Quantum physics, in the twentieth century, to rule out human soul, human free will and Providence of God. Read Carl Sagan as he rightfully sings praises of science, but, implies to rule out prayer and Providence, by bracketing them with quackery and witchcraft:
You can go to the witch doctor to lift the spell that causes your pernicious anemia, or you can take vitamin B12. If you want to save your child from polio, you can pray or you can inoculate. If you’re interested in the sex of your unborn child, you can consult plumb-bob danglers all you want (leftright, a boy; forward-back, a girl-or maybe it’s the other way around), but they’ll be right, on average, only one time in two. If you want real accuracy (here, ninety-nine percent accuracy), try amniocentesis and sonograms. Try science.
If our world is deterministic then the claims of atheist scientists are true. There is no room for Islam or Christianity or any other religion. If hard determinism is true then God does not exist and our claims about human soul are no more than those in previous decades about Santa Clause and in previous centuries about witches. Encyclopedia Britannica tells us about determinism and its implications:
Determinism, in philosophy, theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes. Determinism is usually understood to preclude free will because it entails that humans cannot act otherwise than they do. The theory holds that the universe is utterly rational because complete knowledge of any given situation assures that unerring knowledge of its future is also possible. Pierre-Simon, Marquis de Laplace, in the 18th century framed the classical formulation of this thesis. For him, the present state of the universe is the effect of its previous state and the cause of the state that follows it. If a mind, at any given moment, could know all of the forces operating in nature and the respective positions of all its components, it would thereby know with certainty the future and the past of every entity, large or small. The Persian poet Omar Khayyam expressed a similar deterministic view of the world in the concluding half of one of his quatrains: “And the first Morning of Creation wrote / What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.”
So, if determinism is true there is no need to invoke human soul, human free will and Providence of God. These three become agents that simply cannot influence our world. In Wikipedia we can read:
Determinism is a philosophy stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen. Different versions of this theory depend upon various alleged connections, and interdependencies of things and events, asserting that these hold without exception. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have sprung from diverse motives and considerations, some of which overlap. They can be understood in relation to their historical significance and alternative theories. Some forms of determinism can be tested empirically with ideas stemming from physics and the philosophy of physics. The opposite of determinism is some kind of indeterminism (otherwise called nondeterminism). Determinism is often contrasted with free will.Determinism is often taken to mean simply causal determinism: an idea known in physics as cause-and-effect. It is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. This can be distinguished from other varieties of determinism mentioned below. Other debates often concern the scope of determined systems, with some maintaining that the entire universe (or multiverse) is a single determinate system and others identifying other more limited determinate systems. Within numerous historical debates, many varieties and philosophical positions on the subject of determinism exist. This includes debates concerning human action and free will, where opinions might be sorted as compatibilistic and incompatibilistic.
I as a Muslim believe in free will and deny Hard Determinism. The Philosophers have created four different combinations of belief or disbelief in free will and determinism. They have argued that either Determinism is true or Indeterminism is true, but also that Free Will either exists or it does not. This creates four possible positions. Compatibilism refers to the view that free will is, in some sense, compatible with Determinism. The three Incompatibilist positions, on the other hand, deny this possibility. They instead suggest there is a dichotomy between determinism and free will (only one can be true).
To the Incompatibilists, one must choose either free will or Determinism, and maybe even reject both. The result is one of three positions:
Hard Indeterminism (No Determinism, and no free will either).
According to this classification, I am arguing for Metaphysical Libertarianism; I believe in free will and deny determinism. I believe that for that to be true, we need proper understanding of Quantum physics, otherwise we cannot argue for it.
Like dominoes fall in a deterministic fashion, if Laplace or causal determinism is true then our choices are predetermined and we are not free to make them and hence do not have free will. But, I believe that the twentieth century physics, as opposed to earlier physics has shown us that our world is indeterministic. Quantum physics developed in the first 3-4 decades of twentieth century provides explanation and avenue not only for our free will but also for God’s Providence.
The Miracle of Light – An Every Day Metaphor to Appreciate Quantum Physics
God said let there be light and there was the Holy Quran! The Quran describes Allah as Manifest as well as Transcendent and Hidden at the same time, in the verse quoted in the beginning. It is in this duality that the relationship of religion and science is to be understood. If Laplace had been right in predicting the future accurately, not only there would have been no Personal God but also no ‘free will’ for mankind. But something beautiful yet common place, namely, each and every ray of light, defies the tall claims of Laplace.
The scientific conflict between particle and wave models of light has permeated the history of science for several centuries. The issue dates back to at least Newton. His careful investigations into the properties of light in the 1660s led to his discovery that white light consists of a mixture of colors. He struggled with a formulation of the nature of light, ultimately asserting in Opticks (1704) that light consists of a stream of ‘corpuscles,’ or particles. The wave model explains certain observed phenomena but the photoelectric phenomena are best explained by ‘corpuscle’ nature of light.
If you have ever held a metal wire over a gas flame, you have borne witness to one of the great secrets of the universe. As the wire gets hotter, it begins to glow, to give off light. And the color of that light changes with temperature. A cooler wire gives off a reddish glow, while the hottest wires shine with a blue-white brilliance. What you are watching, as any high school physics student can tell you, is the transformation of one kind of energy (heat) into another (light). As the wire gets hotter and hotter, it gets brighter. That’s because if there is more heat energy available, more light energy can be given off, which makes sense.
Why does the color of that light change with temperature? Throughout the nineteenth century, that deceptively simple question baffled the best minds of classical physics. As the wire gets hotter and hotter, the atoms within it move more rapidly. Maybe that causes the color (the wavelength) of the light to change? Well, that’s true, but there’s more to it. Every time classical physicists used their understanding of matter and energy to try to predict exactly which wavelengths of light should be given off by a hot wire, they got it wrong. At high temperatures, those classical predictions were dramatically wrong. Something didn’t make sense.
Max Planck, a German physicist, found a way to solve the problem. Physicists had always assumed that light, being a wave, could be emitted from an object at any wavelength and in any amount. Planck realized that for this phenomenon the particulate nature as suggested by Newton was the key. He proposed that light could only be released in little packets containing a precise amount of energy. He called these packets or ‘corpuscles’ of Newton as ‘quanta.’ All of a sudden, everything fell into place.
It was known that when some solids were struck by light, they emitted electrons. This phenomenon is called the photoelectric effect. Albert Einstein offered the best explanation of the photoelectric effect in a brilliant paper that eventually won him his Nobel Prize. He seized on the dual nature of light. Light was not only a waveform but is composed of individual quanta later called photons. This understanding of the dual nature of light was needed to explain some of the phenomena that had been observed in study of light. The wave theory of light did not explain the photoelectric effect but conceptualizing the light to be also particle, beautifully solved this riddle. Einstein proposed that the energy to eject a single electron from the plate came from a single quantum of light. That’s why a more intense light (more quanta) just ejects more electrons. But the energy in each of those packets, the quantum wallop if you will, is determined by the wavelength, the color, of the light. With one stroke, of genius, Einstein had shown that Planck’s quanta were not just theoretical constructs. Light really could behave as if it were made of a stream of particles, today known as photons. He was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize for Physics for this work.
Prof. Kenneth R Miller wrote in his popular book, Finding Darwin’s God:
All of this might have been sensible and comforting were it not for the fact that light was already known to behave as if it were a wave! So many experiments already had shown that light could be diffracted, that light had a frequency and a wavelength, that light spread out like a wave on the surface of a pond. Could all those experiments be wrong? No, they were not. All of those experiments were right. Light was both a particle and a wave. It was both a continuous stream and a shower of discrete quantum packets. And that nonsensical result was just the beginning.
Classical physics had prepared everyone to think of physical events as governed by fixed laws, but the quantum revolution quickly destroyed this Newtonian certainty. An object as simple as a mirror can show us why. A household mirror reflects about ninety-five percent of light hitting it. The other five percent passes right through. As long as we think of light as a Wave, a continuous stream of energy, it’s easy to visualize ninety-five percent reflection. But photons are indivisible-each individual photon must either be reflected or pass through the surface of the mirror. That means that for one hundred photons fired at the surface, ninety-five will bounce off but five will pass right through.
If we fire a series of one hundred photons at the mirror, can we tell in advance which will be the five that are going to pass through? Absolutely not. All photons of a particular wavelength are identical; there is nothing to distinguish one from the other. If we rig up an experiment in which we fire a single photon at our mirror, we cannot predict in advance what will happen, no matter how precise our knowledge of the system might be. Most of the time, that photon is going to come bouncing off; but one time out of twenty, on average, it’s going to go right through the mirror. There is nothing we can do, not even in principle, to figure out when that one chance in twenty is going to come up. It means that the outcome of each individual experiment is unpredictable in principle.”
Any hopes that the strange uncertainty of quantum behavior would be confined to light were quickly destroyed when it became clear that the quantum theory had to be applied to explain the behavior of electrons also. Their behavior in any individual encounter, just like the photon fired at the mirror, cannot be predicted, not even in principle. The photo electric effect was leading the physics community to quantum mechanics.
Just as the invention of the telescope dramatically broadened exploration of the Cosmos, so too the invention of the microscope opened the intricate world of the cell. The analysis of the frequencies of light emitted and absorbed by atoms was a principal impetus for the development of quantum mechanics. What had begun as a tiny loose end, a strange little problem in the relationship between heat and light, now is understood to mean that nothing is quite the way it had once seemed. The unfolding of quantum mechanics was and still is a drama of high suspense, as Heisenberg himself wrote:
I remember discussions with Bohr (in 1927) which went through many hours till very late at night and ended almost in despair, and when at the end of the discussion I went alone for a walk in the neighboring park, I repeated to myself again and again the question: ‘Can nature possibly be absurd as it seemed to us in these atomic experiments?’
One hundred years after the discovery of the quantum, we can say that the answer is yes, that is exactly what nature is like. Just because science can explain so many unknowns doesn’t mean that it can explain everything, or that it can vanquish the unknowable. At its very core, in the midst of the ultimate constituents of matter and energy, the predictable causality that once formed the heart of classical physics breaks down. Deep down the nature is unknowable as the Transcendent God is Unknowable. It may be, this is where the finite meets the Infinite, and by the very nature of the meeting point, it is hidden in mystery and awe, an enigma or a riddle never to be solved!
Double slit experiment: An easy way to appreciate the mysteries of the Quantum world
In the basic version of the experiment, a coherent light source such as a laser beam illuminates a thin plate pierced by two parallel slits, and the light passing through the slits is observed on a screen behind the plate. The wave nature of light causes the light waves passing through the two slits to interfere, producing bright and dark bands on the screen — a result that would not be expected if light consisted strictly of particles. However, on the screen, the light is always found to be absorbed as though it were composed of discrete particles or photons.
This result establishes the principle known as wave–particle duality. Additionally, the detection of individual photons is observed to be inherently probabilistic, which is inexplicable using classical mechanics.
The following short video, in a very easy manner, not only explains the double split experiment, but, its implications on the indeterminacy of our quantum world. After all there are limits to what humans can know and those limits will not go away with technological advances, Double Slit Experiment explained! by Jim Al-Khalili:
Lot of time the complexity that Quantum physicist have to deal with is calculations for each electron based on Schrödinger equation, which gives the first time derivative of the quantum state. That is, it explicitly and uniquely predicts the development of the wave function with time.
The complexity of the equation is obvious at the first glance, but if we can bypass this then life is not too tough to bear.
At one time, it was assumed in the physical sciences that if the behavior observed in a system cannot be predicted, the problem is due to lack of fine-grained information, so that a sufficiently detailed investigation would eventually result in a deterministic theory (“If you knew exactly all the forces acting on the dice, you would be able to predict which number comes up”).
The double-slit experiment (and its variations), conducted with individual particles, has become a classic thought experiment for its clarity in expressing the central puzzles of quantum mechanics. Because it demonstrates the fundamental limitation of the observer to predict experimental results, Richard Feynman called it “a phenomenon which is impossible … to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it contains the only mystery [of quantum mechanics].”, and was fond of saying that all of quantum mechanics can be gleaned from carefully thinking through the implications of this single experiment. Časlav Brukner and Anton Zeilinger have succinctly expressed this limitation as follows:
[T]he observer can decide whether or not to put detectors into the interfering path. That way, by deciding whether or not to determine the path through the two-slit experiment, he/she can decide which property can become reality. If he/she chooses not to put the detectors there, then the interference pattern will become reality; if he/she does put the detectors there, then the beam path will become reality. Yet, most importantly, the observer has no influence on the specific element of the world that becomes reality. Specifically, if he/she chooses to determine the path, then he/she has no influence whatsoever over which of the two paths, the left one or the right one, nature will tell him/her is the one in which the particle is found. Likewise, if he/she chooses to observe the interference pattern, then he/she has no influence whatsoever over where in the observation plane he/she will observe a specific particle. Both outcomes are completely random.
In the three great monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, God is viewed as a supreme, transcendent being, beyond matter space and time, and yet the foundation of all that meets our senses that is described in terms of matter, space, and time. That is the Al Batin or the Hidden God of monotheism. Furthermore, this God is not the god of deism, who created the world and then left it alone, or the god of pantheism, who is equated with all of existence. The Islamic and the Judeo-Christian God is a nanosecond-by-nanosecond participant in each event that takes place in every cubic nanometer of the universe. He has full knowledge of all things. God listens to every thought and participates in each action of his very special creation, a minute bit of organized matter called humanity that moves around on the surface of a tiny pebble in a vast universe. The Holy Quran declares:
Allah’s is the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth; and to Allah are all affairs returned for final judgment. (Al Quran 57:5/6)
Whereas the nineteenth century physics was about to frame God out of physical understanding of the universe, the twentieth century physics has turned the tables in favor of Monotheism.
To the atheists design in the universe is apparent but not real. For the theists, enlightened in science, the converse is true, the self sufficiency of the universe based on the laws of nature is apparent and perceived only and is not real. God is the Law Giver and sustainer of the universe. Both positions may be argued to some degree from modern science. However, only theism can offer a holistic approach, not only explaining our universe, but also human morality and ethics, our history and personal experience.
When we approach science from this theistic perspective we find that our religion and science become one and our psyche finds unification.
If there is a ‘Personal God’ that hears human prayers then there has to be a way for the Deity to influence the physical world without breaking the laws of nature and making the study of science futile. Quantum physics may be the magical wand, whereby ‘Personal God’ can influence our world, without breaking the laws of nature. In His infinite wisdom, the Omniscient God provided for infinite means, at the quantum level, to maintain His divinity! He says in the Holy Quran, in Sura Hadid:
He (Allah) is the First and the Last, and the Manifest and the Hidden, and He knows every little detail fully well. (Al Quran 57:3/4)
Quantum physics is the magical wand, by which Allah has established His divinity on each and every quark, photon and boson. In so doing He has not only provided for His Providence but also for our free will, while ensuring predictability and reign of laws of nature at macroscopic level. If Laplace had been right, he would have not only ruled out God, but, also our free will and personal responsibility.
Javed Ahmed Ghamidi was born on 7 April 1952 to a Kakazai family in a village called Jivan Shah (near Pakpattan) in District Sahiwal, Punjab, Pakistan. His family village settlement was Dawud in Sialkot. His father, Muhammad Tufayl Junaydi, was a landowner, involved in medicine and a committed follower of tasawwuf until his death in 1986.
Ghamidi and his two elder sisters grew up in a Sufi household. His early education included a modern path (matriculating from Islamia High School, Pakpattan), as well as a traditional path (Arabic and Persian languages, and the Qur’an with Nur Ahmad of Nang Pal). His father wanted him to have both traditional and modern education, splitting his time between school and learning Arabic and Persian.
During his excursions to the library he stumbled on the works of Hamiduddin Farahi, a scholar of Quran. In this work he found a mention of Amin Ahsan Islahi, the torchbearer of Farahi’s thought. Knowing that Amin Ahsan Islahi was resident in Lahore during those days, he set out to meet him the very day he had first read his mention. The meeting changed Ghamidi from a man of philosophy and literature to a man of religion. In 1973, he came under the tutelage of Amin Ahsan Islahi (d. 1997), who was destined to who have a deep impact on him. He was also associated with scholar and revivalist Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi (d. 1979) for several years. He started working with them on various Islamic disciplines particularly exegesis and Islamic law.
In his book, Maqamat (مقامات), Ghamidi starts with an essay “My Name” (میرا نام) to describe the story behind his surname, which sounds somewhat alien in the context of the Indian Subcontinent. He describes a desire during his childhood years to establish a name linkage to his late grandfather Noor Elahi, after learning of his status as the one people of the area turned to, to resolve disputes. This reputation also led to his (grandfather’s) reputation as a peacemaker (مصلح). Subsequently, one of the visiting Sufi friends of his father narrated a story of the patriarch of the Arab tribe Banu Ghamid who earned the reputation of being a great peacemaker. He writes, that the temporal closeness of these two events clicked in his mind and he decided to add the name Ghamidi to his given name, Javed Ahmed. Taxila.
Some of the works of Ghamidi
Ghamidi’s conclusions and understanding of Islam, including the Sharia, has been presented concisely in his book Mizan with the intention of presenting the religion in its pure shape, cleansed from tasawwuf, qalam, fiqh, all philosophies and any other contaminants.
Ghamidi’s non-traditionalist approach to the religion has parted him from the conservative understanding on a large number of issues. However, Ghamidi argues that his dissenting conclusions are at times based on traditional foundations set by classical scholars. In his arguments, there is no reference to the Western sources, human rights or current philosophies of crime and punishment. Nonetheless, employing the traditional Islamic framework, he reaches conclusions which are similar to those of Islamic modernists and progressives on the subject.
Ghamidi believes that there are certain directives of the Qur’an pertaining to war which were specific only to Prophet Muhammad and certain specified peoples of his times (particularly the progeny of Abraham: the Ishmaelites, the Israelites, and the Nazarites). Thus, Muhammad and his designated followers waged a war against divinely specified peoples of their time (the polytheists and the Israelites and Nazarites of Arabia and some other Jews, Christians, et al.) as a form of divine punishment and asked the polytheists of Arabia for submission to Islam as a condition for exoneration and the others for jizya and submission to the political authority of the Muslims for exemption from death punishment and for military protection as the dhimmis of the Muslims. Therefore, after Muhammad and his companions, there is no concept in Islam obliging Muslims to wage war for propagation or implementation of Islam.
The only valid basis for jihad through arms is to end oppression when all other measures have failed. According to him Jihad can only be waged by an organised Islamic state, that too only where a leader has been nominated by the previous leader or by the consensus of the ulema if the state is newly established. No person, party or group can take arms into their hands (for the purpose of waging Jihad) under any circumstances. Another corollary, in his opinion, is that death punishment for apostasy was also specifically for the recipients of the same Divine punishment during Muhammad’s times—for they had persistently denied the truth of Muhammad’s mission even after it had been made conclusively evident to them by God through Muhammad.
According to Ghamidi, the formation of an Islamic state is not a religious obligation upon the Muslims per se. However, if and when Muslims do happen to form a state of their own, Islam does impose certain religious obligations on its rulers as establishment of the institutions of salat (obligatory prayer), zakah (mandatory charity), and ‘amr bi’l-ma’ruf wa nahi ‘ani’l-munkar (preservation and promotion of society’s good conventions and customs and eradication of social vices); this, in Ghamidi’s opinion, should be done in modern times through courts, police, etc. in accordance with the law of the land which, as the government itself, must be based on the opinion of the majority.
Ghamidi argues that the Qur’an states norms for male-female interaction in SurahAn-Nur, while in SurahAl-Ahzab, there are special directives for Muhammad’s wives and directives given to Muslim women to distinguish themselves when they were being harassed in Medina. He further claims that the Qur’an has created a distinction between men and women only to maintain family relationships.
According to Ghamidi:
The Islamic punishments of hudud (Islamic law) are maximum pronouncements that can be mitigated by a court of law on the basis of extenuating circumstances.
The shariah (Divine law) does not stipulate any fixed amount for the diyya (monetary compensation for unintentional murder); the determination of the amount—for the unintentional murder of a man or a woman—has been left to the conventions of society.
Ceteris paribus (all other things being equal), a woman’s testimony is equal to that of a man’s.
Rape is hirabah and deserves severe punishments as mentioned in Quran 5:33. It doesn’t require four witnesses to register the case as in the case of Zina (Arabic) (consensual sex). Those who were punished by stoning (rajm) in Muhammad’s time were also punished under hirabah for raping, sexually assaulting women, and spreading vulgarity in society through prostitution.
Sources of Islam
According to Ghamidi, all that is Islam is constituted by the Qur’an and Sunnah. Nothing besides these two is Islam or can be regarded as part of it. Just like Quran, Sunnah (the way of the prophet) is only what the Muslim nation received through ijma (consensus of companions of the prophet) and tawatur (perpetual adherence of the Muslim nation). Unlike Quran and Sunnah, ahadith only explain and elucidate what is contained in these two sources and also describe the exemplary way in which Muhammad followed Islam. The Sharia is distinguished from fiqh, the latter being collections of interpretations and applications of the Sharia by Muslim jurists. Fiqh is characterised as a human exercise, and therefore subject to human weakness and differences of opinion. A Muslim is not obliged to adhere to a school of fiqh.
The Taliban say that democracy is a concept alien to Islam. The ideal way to set up an Islamic government in our times is the one that they adopted for Mullah Omar’s government in Afghanistan. The constitution, the parliament, and elections are nothing but modern day shams. … I can say with full confidence on the basis of my study of Islam that this viewpoint and this strategy are not acceptable to the Qur’ān. It prescribes democracy as the way to run the affairs of the state. The Qur’ān (42:38) says: amruhum shūrā baynahum (the affairs of the Muslims are run on the basis of their consultation). ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) said: “Whosoever pledges allegiance to anyone without the collective consent of the Muslims presents himself for the death sentence.” It is true that, in Muslim history, monarchy and dictatorship have often been accepted forms of government. Some people also believe that the head of government should be a nominee of God Himself. However, the principle the Qur’ān spells out is very clear.— Javed A. Ghamidi, Islam and the Taliban
Morals and ethics
Ghamidi writes on moral and ethical issues in Islam. He states:
After faith, the second important requirement of religion is purification of morals. This means that a person should cleanse his attitude both towards his Creator and towards his fellow human beings. This is what is termed as a righteous deed. All the sharī‘ah is its corollary. With the change and evolution in societies and civilizations, the sharī‘ah has indeed changed; however faith and righteous deeds, which are the foundations of religion, have not undergone any change. The Qur’an is absolutely clear that any person who brings forth these two things before the Almighty on the Day of Judgement will be blessed with Paradise which shall be his eternal abode.
Interaction with other Islamic scholars
Like Wahiduddin Khan, Maulana Naeem Siddiqui, Israr Ahmed and Dr. Khazir Yasin, Ghamidi also worked closely with Maulana Syed Abul Ala Maududi (alternative spelling SyedMaudoodi; often referred to as Maulana Maududi) (1903–1979) and Amin Ahsan Islahi. His work with Maududi continued for about nine years before he voiced his first differences of opinion, which led to his subsequent expulsion from Mawdudi’s political party, Jamaat-e-Islami in 1977. Later, he developed his own view of religion based on hermeneutics and ijtihad under the influence of his mentor, Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904–1997), a well-known exegete of the Indian sub-continent who is author of Tadabbur-i-Qur’an, a Tafsir (exegeses of Qur’an). Ghamidi’s critique of Mawdudi’s thought is an extension of Wahid al-Din Khan‘s criticism of Mawdudi. Khan (1925– ) was amongst the first scholars from within the ranks of Jamaat-e-Islami to present a full-fledged critique of Mawdudi’s understanding of religion. Khan’s contention is that Mawdudi has completely inverted the Qur’anic worldview. Ghamidi, for his part, agreed with Khan that the basic obligation in Islam is not the establishment of an Islamic world order but servitude to God, and that it is to help and guide humans in their effort to fulfill that obligation for which religion is revealed. Therefore, Islam never imposed the obligation on its individual adherents or on the Islamic state to be constantly in a state of war against the non-Islamic world. In fact, according to Ghamidi, even the formation of an Islamic state is not a basic religious obligation for Muslims. Despite such extraordinary differences and considering Maududi’s interpretation of “political Islam” as incorrect, Ghamidi in one of his 2015 interviews said that he still respects his former teacher like a father.
Ghamidi’s thought and discourse community has received some academic attention in the recent past by Pakistani scholar Dr. Husnul Amin whose critical analysis of Ghamidi’s thought movement has received academic attention. Amin traces the history of secessionist tendencies within the mainstream Islamism, and its ruptures, and then critically examines Ghamidi’s emergence and proliferation in society as an unprecedented phenomenon. Ghamidi’s views and discourse on Islam and democracy have also been examined in another cited research paper.
Awards and recognition
In 2009, Ghamidi was awarded Sitara-i-Imtiaz, the third highest civilian honor of Pakistan.
Ghamidi resigned in September 2006 from the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a constitutional body responsible for providing legal advice on Islamic issues to the Pakistani government. His resignation was ‘accepted’ by the President of Pakistan. Ghamidi’s resignation was prompted by the Pakistani government’s formation of a separate committee of ulema to review a Bill involving women’s rights; the committee was formed after extensive political pressure was applied by the MMA. Ghamidi argued that this was a breach of the CII’s jurisdiction, since the very purpose of the council is to ensure that Pakistan’s laws do not conflict with the teachings of Islam. He also said that the amendments in the bill proposed by the Ulema committee were against the injunctions of Islam. This event occurred when the MMA threatened to resign from the provincial and national assemblies if the government amended the Hudood Ordinance, which came into being under Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization. The Hudood Ordinances have been criticised for, among other things, a reportedly difficult procedure to prove allegations of rape.
Ghamidi has appeared regularly on dedicated television programs. His television audience consists of educated, urban-based middle-class men and women between the ages of 20–35, as well as lay Islamic intellectuals and professionals. Ghamidi’s religiously oriented audience tends to be dissatisfied with the positions of traditional ulema and Western-educated secular-liberal elite, and find his interventions and ideas more sensible, moderate, and relevant.
Ghamidi has earned criticism from all traditional Islamic scholars in Pakistan and abroad for his interpretation of certain Islamic values. Some books highly critical of Ghamidi are, Fitna-e-Ghamdiyat (فِتنئہ غامدیت) by Hafiz Salahuddin Yusuf and Fitna-e-Ghamdiyat ka Ilmi Muhasbah (فِتنئہ غامدیّت کا عِلمی محاسبہ) by Maulana Muhammad Rafiq.
In one interview, when asked his opinion about being branded as a liberal, Ghamidi replied that he does not care about such things and his objectives are not affected by such terms.
Ghamidi left Pakistan in 2010 as a result of opposition to his work and threat to his life and his closed ones. In a 2015 interview with Voice of America, Ghamidi explained his reason for departure was to safeguard the lives of people near him including his neighbours who had begun to fear for their safety. Some of his close associates had already been killed like Muhammad Farooq Khan and Dr. Habib-ur-Rehman. Ghamidi maintained that his work of education was not affected by his departure because of modern communication. Ghamidi, also regularly appears on Ilm-o-Hikmat, a Pakistani Dunya News show. He has stated his desire to return in the future when circumstances change.
Ghamidi moved to Dallas, Texas, USA as of July 2019, to support establishment of Ghamidi Center of Islamic Learning, an initiative of Al-Mawrid US and an educational institute named after himself.
Ghamidi, Javed (2000). Burhan (PDF) (in Urdu). Danish Sara. OCLC50518567. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 5 December 2006. – A dissertation in which contemporary religious thoughts have been critically analysed
Ghamidi, Javed (2000). Al-Bayan. Danish Sara.—An annotated translation of the Divine message with a view to unfold its coherence
Iftikhar, Asif (2005). Jihad and the Establishment of Islamic Global Order: A Comparative Study of the Interpretative Approaches and Worldviews of Abu al-A’la Mawdudi and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi. (Master’s Thesis). Montreal: McGill University. OCLC61742999.
^ Ghamidi, Javed Ahmed. Qanun-i-Jihad (The Islamic Shari’ah of Jihad). Lahore, Pakistan: al-Mawrid. p. 45. ISBN978-9698799083. It is obvious…that jihad becomes obligatory only in the presence of a ruler…whose political authority has been established either through nomination by the previous ruler similar to how Abu Bakr transferred the reins [of his Khilafah to Umar] or through the pledging of allegiance by the ulema
Allah did not create Jinn or Men but to worship Him. (Al Quran 51:56)
That one should not set up equals unto God (2:22) or ascribe partners unto God (4:36; 7:33) is among the most predominant themes of the Quran; see. 4:48c; 6:151—52c. Regarding the present verse, al-Ghazzali writes, “One who does not see God in everything sees something other than Him. And if there is something other than God to which one gives attention, this attention involves an element of hidden idolatry (al-shirk al-khaﬁ). Rather, pure monotheism (al-rawhide al-Khalis) consists in seeing only God in everything” (Ihya’, K. Qira’at al-Qur’an).
Suggested reading and viewing by Zia H Shah MD, Chief Editor of the Muslim Times for the Creator God of the Abrahamic Faiths
Written and collected by Zia H Shah MD, Chief Editor of the Muslim Times
Thanksgiving Day is a national holiday celebrated in Canada, the United States, some of the Caribbean islands, and Liberia. It began as a day of giving thanks for the blessing of the harvest and of the preceding year. Similarly named festival holidays occur in Germany and Japan. Thanksgiving is celebrated on the second Monday of October in Canada and on the fourth Thursday of November in the United States, and around the same part of the year in other places. Although Thanksgiving has historical roots in religious and cultural traditions, it has long been celebrated as a secular holiday as well.
Surah Fatihah the opening surah of the Quran, describes four fundamental attributes of Allah; Al-Rahman, the Gracious or the Lord of Mercy and Compassion, is one of them. The commentary of the third verse of Surah Al Fatihah: The Opening, discusses the attribute of the Gracious in some detail.
In Surah Rahman, which is the 55th chapter of the holy Quran, Allah cites many examples from the created world, for example, the sun, the moon, water, different fruits and tress and corals and pearls to remind mankind of different favors He has bestowed on us, even without our asking or any effort on our part.
The ﬁrst section of the surah (vv. 1-25) discusses the nature of the Compassionate as Creator, Teacher, and Revealer and the blessings He provides in the created world. It then transitions into an extended discussion of the blessings of Heaven and its many Gardens. The duality between Heaven and earth and the dualities within them are present throughout the surah. This thematic structure is reﬂected in the grammatical structure, which employs the dual form in many of the verbs and pronouns and in the refrain, addressed to both human beings and jinn, So which of your Lord’s booms do you two deny? This duality is offset by the discussion of the Compassionate in vv. 1-10 and by vv. 26-27, which emphasize that God remains while all else fades away. Appearing in the middle of the surah, these verses imply that God’s Essence is the center that lies at the heart of and yet transcends all dualities, even those in the Gardens of Heaven. V. 27 is then echoed in the last verse (v. 78), showing that just as God transcends the blessings of this earth, so too does He transcend the blessings of Heaven.
Allah wants the believers to direct their gratitude for His beneficence into mutual compassion for each other, leading to the all important verse in this surah: “Is the reward of goodness anything but goodness?” (55:60/61)
This surah not only advises about Divine and human compassion, but delivers a very profound message of justice in human affairs. It says that if there was no balance or justice in the laws of nature, our universe or solar system could not exist: “The sun and the moon follow their calculated courses, the plants and the trees submit to His design. And the sky, Allah raised up high, and He set up the balance for every thing. That you may not disturb the balance, so weigh with justice, balance and equity and don’t fall short in the measure!” (55:5-9/6-10)
Incidentally, these verses also deliver a very powerful message for preserving our environment and fighting the global warming together as one human family.
The chorus or refrain, فَبِأَيِّ آلَاءِ رَبِّكُمَا تُكَذِّبَانِ “Which then of the bounties of your Lord will you deny?” is repeated 31 times in this surah. We respond in gratitude by saying, there are countless bounties of the Lord of Mercy that have gone into making our universe a suitable aboard or biophylic for us. To paraphrase Stephen Hawking’s recent book that he has co-authored with Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design, judging by the number of possible universes in our multiverse, there may be ten raised to the power 500 variables that make our universe biophylic, which are as many reasons to believe in and pay homage to and worship our Gracious God. Here is a suggested reading to explore these variables further: Ten Raised to Five Hundred Reasons for Our Gracious God.
Allah it is Who has sent down to you (Muhammad) the Book; in it there are verses that are fundamental or decisive in meaning — these are the corner stone of the Book — and there are others that are susceptible of different interpretations. But those in whose hearts is perversity pursue those that are susceptible of different interpretations, seeking discord and wrong interpretation of such ambiguous verses. And none knows their right interpretation except Allah and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge; they say, ‘We believe in it; the whole is from our Lord.’ — And none heed except those gifted with understanding. (3:7/8)
I believe that the most important verse of surahQamar is: “Indeed We have made the Qur’an easy to understand and to remember. But is there anyone who would receive admonition?” (54:17/18)
It is repeated a total of four times in this surah. But, many of us don’t find it easy and struggle with the understanding of the holy Quran. So what is the catch?
Most of us continue to struggle with the understanding of the holy Quran as we have not clearly thought through how to understand or read the Divine Scripture.
Different commentators highlight different criteria for commentary of the Quran. But, ultimately as the particular scholar or commentator is the judge of how to apply those criteria for his or her commentary, it is reasonable to say that all commentaries ultimately are based on the judgment or opinion of the commentator.
It is self evident that all commentators or commentaries are not created equal. Ultimately it boils down to the vision or judgment of the person commenting on the holy scripture.
It has been said that the most important teaching of the holy Quran is Monotheism and it is also claimed that a third of the Quran is about the One God of the Abrahamic faiths. These claims are self evident to most of the Muslims and will not be discussed any further here.
The Quranic verse 3:7/8 is seminal and fundamental in my opinion as it lays out a very important principle that any writing should be examined and understood in light of its fundamental claims and subjects and not peripheral ones. The verse claims that those who have an axe to grind stress verses that allow them to put forward their agenda even though in so doing they distort the Quranic message.
The corollary that follows is that which ever verses or message we choose as pivotal or central, begin to define the whole of our understanding of the Quran. So, the quality of any commentary of the Quran can be judged from what verses of the Quran he or she picks as the core or the most fundamental crux and then explains rest of the text in the light of the core.
For me, I have taken Monotheism, human accountability and the message of compassion and justice as the core of the Quran and tried to see every thing else through that prism.
Before the next seminal verse, let me suggest to the open minded readers, to read on and in the words of Sir Francis Bacon, “Read not to contradict … but to weigh and consider.”
The reason I have found the verse 4:82/83 as core and fundamental is because it invites us to resolve all possible contradictions in our understanding of the Quran. It has freed me from the bondage of the previous commentators, regardless of their repute or imagined station in the Muslim history, as human presentations do present periodic contradictions.
If the Quran is to be understood by every student and we are accountable to All Knowing God, in the Hereafter, how we understood His message and implemented in our lives, then each one of us also has the freedom to freely understand the Divine message. Based on the message of this verse, we can infer that every prior commentary or commentator would have human limitations and his message in some respects may be contradictory, while the Quran is not so, as it is from an All Knowing source. So, whenever we find the past commentaries to be lacking or contradictory, within themselves or when compared to others, I find those as fertile opportunities to come with better and more satisfying and internally consistent understanding of the Divine message.
So, in that sense this verse has become a litmus test for my understanding of the different verses and their commentaries. In other words as students it is our job to understand the Quran in holistic terms that are free of contradictions. As we pursue that goal to resolve contradictions, our understanding will embellish and continue to become more comprehensive and consistent.
As the human societies continue to evolve and human information and knowledge keeps growing at an unprecedented pace, the Quranic understanding should also continue to evolve and it certainly has in the past fourteen centuries.
I believe that if we keep these two verses in the forefront of our mind then the claim in Surah Qamar, “Indeed We have made the Qur’an easy to understand and to remember. But is there anyone who would receive admonition,” will become true. Inshallah!
Additional reading: Scope, Style and Preservation of the Quran
My understanding of the Quran is not borrowed from one teacher or commentator, no matter how much popularity he may have enjoyed in his time in any group. The Quran is a book of All Knowing God and of infinite wisdom and to be fair and just with the book, I learn from teachers of all walks of life and all different sects of Islam and even non-Muslim scholars.
Having said that the first question in the following video that is in Urdu talks about commentary of a verse of the holy Quran that talks about the age of the prophet Noah and then goes into discussion of the verse 3:7 talked above. This adds useful metaphors to discussion at hand how to read and understand the Quran:
I, at an age of sixty, have been a student of the holy Quran for the last forty years. I have found that most Muslims including the commentators and scholars read the Quran in light of very rigid guidelines or instructions or in the light of the old commentaries that have followed those principles.
So, the lenses that they use lead to certain interpretations of the Quran and I have not found ways and means to invite my fellow brethren and sisters to more progressive and liberal ways of understanding and reading the Quran.
Today, I believe that I have found a key or shall we call it a magical wand, which is the concept of ‘Jizya’ and is mentioned in Surah Taubah of the holy Quran, hoping and praying, to open a few rigid minds.
If we the Muslims can pursue this subject and explain to ourselves and the critics how they would read the relevant verse about ‘Jizya’ in the Quran in the contemporary world, then whatever principles they use here to understand the eternal message of the Quran, including Surah Taubah, will become a magical wand to open our minds to more progressive and contemporary reading of the Quran, for all of its more than 6000 verses and its 114 chapters.
With that in mind I reproduce here an introduction to a new commentary (theQuran.Love) and ‘Jizya’ as described in the Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica.
The reason why I am presenting all the details about Jizya from Wikipedia below is so that conservative scholars don’t take the short cut of explaining their own simplified version of Jizya, rather explain how the Quranic verse about it played out for several centuries in the Islamic Empire, in all its different manifestations.
The concessions that the conservatives will make for commentary of this verse and lay out the principles to understand the verse, will go a long way to help the progressive and liberal students of the Quran in establishing how they want to read all the verses and chapters of the holy Quran.
The progressives read the Quran as a living and breathing document and not as a dead one. Suggested reading to explaining what is meant here by a living or a dead document:
The Quran and hadiths mention jizya without specifying its rate or amount. However, scholars largely agree that early Muslim rulers adapted existing systems of taxation and tribute that were established under previous rulers of the conquered lands, such as those of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires.
The application of jizya varied in the course of Islamic history. Together with kharāj, a term that was sometimes used interchangeably with jizya, taxes levied on non-Muslim subjects were among the main sources of revenues collected by some Islamic polities, such as the Ottoman Empire and Indian Muslim Sultanates. Jizya rate was usually a fixed annual amount depending on the financial capability of the payer. Sources comparing taxes levied on Muslims and jizya differ as to their relative burden depending on time, place, specific taxes under consideration, and other factors.
Historically, the jizya tax has been understood in Islam as a fee for protection provided by the Muslim ruler to non-Muslims, for the exemption from military service for non-Muslims, for the permission to practice a non-Muslim faith with some communal autonomy in a Muslim state, and as material proof of the non-Muslims’ submission to the Muslim state and its laws. Jizya has also been understood by some as a badge or state of humiliation of the non-Muslims in a Muslim state for not converting to Islam, a substantial source of revenue for at least some times and places (such as the Umayyad era), while others argue that if it were meant to be a punishment for the dhimmis’ unbelief then monks and the clergy wouldn’t have been exempted.
The term appears in the Quran referring to a tax or tribute from People of the Book, specifically Jews and Christians. Followers of other religions like Zoroastrians and Hindus too were later integrated into the category of dhimmis and required to pay jizya. In the Indian Subcontinent the practice was eradicated by the 18th century. It almost vanished during the 20th century with disappearance of Islamic states and spread of religious tolerance. The tax is no longer imposed by nation states in the Islamic world, although there are reported cases of organizations such as the Pakistani Taliban and ISIS attempting to revive the practice.
Some modern Islamic scholars have argued that jizya should be paid by non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic state, offering different rationales. For example, Sayyid Qutb saw it as punishment for “polytheism”, while Abdul Rahman Doi viewed it as a counterpart of the zakat tax paid by Muslims. According to Khaled Abou El Fadl, moderate Muslims reject the dhimma system, which encompasses jizya, as inappropriate for the age of nation-states and democracies.
WRITTEN BY Asma Afsaruddin Professor, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, Indiana University. Her publications include Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought (2013) and The…See Article History
Jizyah, also spelled jizya, historically, a tax (the term is often incorrectly translated as a “head tax” or “poll tax”) paid by non-Muslim populations to their Muslim rulers.
The jizyah is described in the Qurʾān as a tax that is imposed on a certain erring faction from among the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb; non-Muslim groups such as Christians and Jews recognized in the Qurʾān as possessing a divine scripture) who violate their own religious and ethical principles (9:29). Early exegetes understood the faction in this verse to be the hostile Byzantines, whose rumoured invasion of Muslim lands precipitated the military campaign of Tabūk in 630. During the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, the jizyah was not imposed on non-Muslim tribes consistently. For example, the Nubians of North Africa, despite being non-Muslim, were exempted; instead they entered into a trade agreement (baqt) with Muslims.
In the period following Muhammad’s death, the jizyah was levied on non-Muslim Arab tribes in lieu of military service. Performance of military service earned an exemption; for example, under the second caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the Jarājimah tribe was exempted when it agreed to serve in the army. The non-Muslim poor, the elderly, women, serfs, religious functionaries, and the mentally ill generally did not pay any taxes. Early sources state that under the first caliphs poor Christians and Jews were instead awarded stipends from the state treasury, which was funded largely by monies derived from the zakat, the obligatory tax paid by Muslim men and women of financial means, and from the jizyah paid by non-Muslim men of means.
In return for payment of the jizyah, non-Muslim populations—specifically Jews and Christians—were granted protection of life and property and the right to practice their religion. Under this policy they were called dhimmīs (protected people). If Muslim authorities were militarily unable to defend the dhimmīs in the event of an attack by an external aggressor, the former were required to return the jizyah to the latter. ʿUmar thus famously returned the jizyah he had collected from an Arab Christian tribe when he was unable to protect them from a military attack by the Byzantines. The rate of taxation and methods of collection varied greatly from province to province and were influenced by local pre-Islamic customs.Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content.Subscribe Now
The status of dhimmī was also extended to the Zoroastrians of Persia and later to the Hindus and Buddhists of India, who, like Jews and Christians, could pay a tax to the Muslim authorities in return for protection of their lives and property and the right to practice their religion unmolested. However, increasingly after roughly the 8th century, earlier tolerant attitudes toward non-Muslims began to harden, and payment of the jizyah began to be conceptualized by a number of influential jurists as a marker of inferior socio-legal status for the non-Muslim. Classical jurists sometimes provided explicit instructions on how the jizyah should be collected so as to remind the dhimmīs of their lower status. Taxes at times could be high, and unscrupulous rulers would deposit these funds into their private treasuries.
The jizyah is not collected in modern Muslim nation-states, since citizenship is no longer defined in religious terms and there is typically a standing national army, which all male adult citizens are free to join. Recognizing that the dhimmī system is obsolete in the modern era, in 2016 Muslim scholars from more than 100 countries signed the Marrakesh Declaration, a document that called for a new Islamic jurisprudence based on modern nation-based notions of citizenship.
Commentators disagree on the definition and derivation of the word jizya. Ann Lambton writes that the origins of jizya are extremely complex, regarded by some jurists as “compensation paid by non-Muslims for being spared from death” and by others as “compensation for living in Muslim lands.”
Al-Raghib al-Isfahani (d. 1108), a classical Muslim lexicographer, writing that jizya is a “tax that is levied on Dhimmis, and it is so named because it is in return for the protection they are guaranteed.” He points out that derivatives of the word appear in some Qurʾānic verses as well, such as:
“Such is the reward (jazāʾ) of those who purify themselves” (Q 20:76)
“While those who believed and did good deeds will have the best of rewards” (Q 18:88)
“And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it, but whoever pardons and makes reconciliation – his reward is [due] from God” (Q 42:40)
“And will reward them for what they patiently endured [with] a garden [in Paradise] and silk [garments]” (Q 76:12)
“and be repaid only according to your deeds (Q 37:39)
Muhammad Abdel-Haleem states that the term poll tax does not translate the Arabic word jizya, being also inaccurate in light of the exemptions granted to children, women, etc., unlike a poll tax, which by definition is levied on every individual (poll = head) regardless of gender, age, or ability to pay. He further adds that the root verb of jizya is j-z-y, which means ‘to reward somebody for something’, ‘to pay what is due in return for something’ and adds that it is in return for the protection of the Muslim state with all the accruing benefits and exemption from military service, and such taxes on Muslims as zakat.
Historian al-Tabari and the hadith scholaral-Bayhaqi relate that some members of the Christian community asked ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab if they could refer to the jizya as sadaqah, literally ‘charity’, which he agreed to. Based on this historical event, the majority of jurists from Shāfiʿīs, Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs state that it is lawful to take the jizya from ahl al-dhimmah by name of zakāt or ṣadaqah, meaning it is not necessary to call the tax that is taken from them by jizya, and also based on the known legal maxim that states, “consideration is granted to objectives and meanings and not to terms and specific wordings.”
According to Lane’s Lexicon, jizya is the tax that is taken from the free non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic government, whereby they ratify the pact that ensures them protection.
[The emergence of] protected status and the definition of jizya as the poll tax on non-Muslim subjects appears to have been achieved only by the early eighth century. This came as a result of growing suspicions about the loyalty of the non-Muslim population during the second civil war and of the literalist interpretation of the Quran by pious Muslims.
Jane Dammen McAuliffe states that jizya, in early Islamic texts, was an annual tribute expected from non-Muslims, and not a poll tax. Similarly, Thomas Walker Arnold writes that jizya originally denoted tribute of any type paid by the non-Muslim subjects of the Arab empire, but that it came later on to be used for the capitation-tax, “as the fiscal system of the new rulers became fixed.”
Arthur Stanley Tritton states that both jizya in west, and kharaj in the east Arabia meant ‘tribute’. It was also called jawali in Jerusalem. Shemesh says that Abu Yusuf, Abu Ubayd, Qudama, Khatib and Yahya used the terms Jizya, Kharaj, Ushr and Tasq as synonyms.
Most Muslim jurists and scholars regard the jizya as a special payment collected from certain non-Muslims in return for the responsibility of protection fulfilled by Muslims against any type of aggression, as well as for non-Muslims being exempt from military service, and in exchange for the aid provided to poor dhimmis. In a treaty made by Khalid with some towns in the neighborhood of Hirah, he writes: “If we protect you, then jizya is due to us; but if we do not, then it is not due.” Early Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf writes:
‘After Abu ʿUbaydah concluded a peace treaty with the people of Syria and had collected from them the jizya and the tax for agrarian land (kharāj), he was informed that the Romans were readying for battle against him and that the situation had become critical for him and the Muslims. Abu ʿUbaydah then wrote to the governors of the cities with whom pacts had been concluded that they must return the sums collected from jizya and kharāj and say to their subjects: “We return to you your money because we have been informed that troops are being raised against us. In our agreement you stipulated that we protect you, but we are unable to do so. Therefore, we now return to you what we have taken from you, and we will abide by the stipulation and what has been written down, if God grants us victory over them.”‘
In accordance with this order, enormous sums were paid back out of the state treasury, and the Christians called down blessings on the heads of the Muslims, saying, “May God give you rule over us again and make you victorious over the Romans; had it been they, they would not have given us back anything, but would have taken all that remained with us.” Similarly, during the time of the Crusades, Saladin returned the jizya to the Christians of Syria when he was compelled to retract from it. Moreover, the Christian tribe of al-Jurajima, in the neighborhood of Antioch, made peace with the Muslims, promising to be their allies and fight on their side in battle, on condition that they should not be called upon to pay jizya and should receive their proper share of the booty. The orientalistThomas Walker Arnold writes that even Muslims were made to pay a tax if they were exempted from military service, like non-Muslims. Thus, the Shafi’i scholar al-Khaṭīb ash-Shirbīniy states: “Military service is not obligatory for non-Muslims – especially for dhimmis since they give jizya so that we protect and defend them, and not so that he defends us.”Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani states that there is a consensus amongst Islamic jurists that jizya is in exchange for military service. In the case of war, jizya is seen as an option to end hostilities. According to Abu Kalam Azad, one of the main objectives of jizya was to facilitate a peaceful solution to hostility, since non-Muslims who engaged in fighting against Muslims were thereby given the option of making peace by agreeing to pay jizya. In this sense, jizya is seen as a means by which to legalize the cessation of war and military conflict with non-Muslims. In a similar vein, Mahmud Shaltut states that “jizya was never intended as payment in return for one’s life or retaining one’s religion, it was intended as a symbol to signify yielding, an end of hostility and a participation in shouldering the burdens of the state.”
The second rationale offered by Islamic scholars for the imposition of Jizya tax on non-Muslims is that it was a substitute to the requirement of zakat tax from Muslims.
Thirdly, jizya created a place for the inclusion of a non-Muslim dhimmi in a land owned and ruled by a Muslim, where routine payment of jizya was a tool of social stratification and treasury’s revenue.[not specific enough to verify]
Finally, jizya created a financial and political incentive for dhimmis to convert to Islam.[need quotation to verify] The Muslim jurist and theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi suggested in his interpretation of Q.9:29 that jizya is an incentive to convert. Taking it is not intended to preserve the existence of disbelief (kufr) in the world. Rather, he argues, jizya allows the non-Muslim to live amongst Muslims and take part in Islamic civilization in the hope that the non-Muslim will convert to Islam.
In the Qur’an
Jizya is sanctioned by the Qur’an based on the following verse:
Fight those who believe not in God and in the Last Day, and who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who follow not the Religion of Truth among those who were given the Book, till they pay the jizyah with a willing hand, being humbled.
[T]he verse commands qitāl (قتال) and not qatl (قتل), and it is known that there is a big distinction between these two words…. For you say “qataltu (قتلت)so-and-so” if you initiated the fighting, while you say“qātaltu (قاتلت) him” if you resisted his effort to fight you by a reciprocal fight, or if you forestalled him in that so that he would not get at you unawares.”
Muhammad Abdel-Haleem writes that there is nothing in the Qur’an to say that not believing in God and the Last Day is in itself grounds for fighting anyone. Whereas Abū Ḥayyān states “they are so described because their way [of acting] is the way of those who do not believe in God,” Ahmad Al-Maraghī comments:
[F]ight those mentioned when the conditions which necessitate fighting are present, namely, aggression against you or your country, oppression and persecution against you on account of your faith, or threatening your safety and security, as was committed against you by the Byzantines, which was what lead to Tabuk.
2. Do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden (wa-lā yuḥarrimūna mā ḥarrama-llāhu wa-rasūluh)
The closest and most viable cause must relate to jizya, that is, unlawfully consuming what belongs to the Muslim state, which, al-Bayḍāwī explains, “it has been decided that they should give,” since their own scriptures and prophets forbid breaking agreements and not paying what is due to others. His Messenger in this verse has been interpreted by exegetes as referring to Muḥammad or the People of the Book‘s own earlier messengers, Moses or Jesus. According to Abdel-Haleem, the latter must be the correct interpretation as it is already assumed that the People of the Book did not believe in Muḥammad or forbid what he forbade, so that they are condemned for not obeying their own prophet, who told them to honour their agreements.
3. Who do not embrace the true faith // Who do not behave according to the rule of justice (wa-lā yadīnūna dīna’l-ḥaqq)
A number of translators have rendered the text as “those who do not embrace the true faith/follow the religion of truth” or some variation thereof.Muhammad Abdel-Haleem argues against this translation, preferring instead to render dīna’l-ḥaqq as ‘rule of justice’.
The main meaning of the Arabic dāna is ‘he obeyed’, and one of the many meanings of dīn is ‘behaviour’ (al-sīra wa’l-ʿāda). The famous Arabic lexicographerFayrūzabādī (d. 817/1415), gives more than twelve meanings for the word dīn, placing the meaning ‘worship of God, religion’ lower in the list.Al-Muʿjam al-wasīṭ gives the following definition: “‘dāna’ is to be in the habit of doing something good or bad; ‘dāna bi- something’ is to take it as a religion and worship God through it.” Thus, when the verb dāna is used in the sense of ‘to believe’ or ‘to practise a religion’, it takes the preposition bi– after it (e.g. dāna bi’l-Islām) and this is the only usage in which the word means religion. The jizya verse does not say lā yadīnūna bi-dīni’l-ḥaqq, but rather lā yadīnūna dīna’l-ḥaqq. Abdel-Haleem thus concludes that the meaning that fits the jizya verse is thus ‘those who do not follow the way of justice (al-ḥaqq)’, i.e. by breaking their agreement and refusing to pay what is due.
4. Until they pay jizya with their own hands (ḥattā yu’ṭū-l-jizyata ‘an yadin).
Here ʿan yad (from/for/at hand), is interpreted by some to mean that they should pay directly, without intermediary and without delay. Others say that it refers to its reception by Muslims and means “generously” as in “with an open hand,” since the taking of the jizya is a form of munificence that averted a state of conflict. al-Ṭabarī gives only one explanation: that ‘it means “from their hands to the hands of the receiver” just as we say “I spoke to him mouth to mouth”, we also say, “I gave it to him hand to hand”‘.M.J. Kister understands ‘an yad to be a reference to the “ability and sufficient means” of the dhimmi. Similarly, Rashid Rida takes the word Yad in a metaphorical sense and relates the phrase to the financial ability of the person liable to pay jizya.
5. While they are subdued (wa-hum ṣāghirūn).
Mark R. Cohen writes that ‘while they are subdued’ was interpreted by many to mean “humiliated state of the non-Muslims”. According to Ziauddin Ahmed, in the view of the majority of Fuqahā (Islamic jurists), the jizya was levied on non-Muslims in order to humiliate them for their unbelief. In contrast, Abdel-Haleem writes that this notion of humiliation runs contrary to verses such as, Do not dispute with the People of the Book except in the best manner (Q 29:46), and the Prophetic ḥadīth, ‘May God have mercy on the man who is liberal and easy-going (samḥ) when he buys, when he sells, and when he demands what is due to him’.Al-Shafi’i, the founder of the Shafi’i school of law, wrote that a number of scholars explained this last expression to mean that “Islamic rulings are enforced on them.” This understanding is reiterated by the Hanbali jurist Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who interprets wa-hum ṣāghirūn as making all subjects of the state obey the law and, in the case of the People of the Book, pay the jizya.
An authentic Hadith mentioned in Sahih Bukhari Volume IV Chapter 88 states that jizya is supposed to humiliate non-Muslims:
Narrated Ibn Umar that the Prophet said, “My livelihood is under the shade of my spear, and he who disobeys my orders will be humiliated by paying Jizya.”
In the classical era
Liability and exemptions
Rules for liability and exemptions of jizya formulated by jurists in the early Abbasid period appear to have remained generally valid thereafter.
Islamic jurists required adult, free, sane, able-bodied males of military age with no religious functions among the dhimma community to pay the jizya, while exempting women, children, elders, handicapped, monks, hermits, the poor, the ill, the insane, slaves, as well as musta’mins (non-Muslim foreigners who only temporarily reside in Muslim lands) and converts to Islam. Dhimmis who chose to join military service were exempted from payment. If anyone could not afford this tax, they would not have to pay anything. Sometimes a dhimmi was exempted from jizya if he rendered some valuable services to the state.
The Hanafi scholar Abu Yusuf wrote, “slaves, women, children, the old, the sick, monks, hermits, the insane, the blind and the poor, were exempt from the tax” and states that jizya should not be collected from those who have neither income nor any property, but survive by begging and from alms. The Hanbali jurist al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā states, “there is no jizya upon the poor, the old, and the chronically ill”. Historical reports tell of exemptions granted by the second caliph ‘Umar to an old blind Jew and others like him. The Maliki scholar Al-Qurtubi writes that, “there is a consensus amongst Islamic scholars that jizya is to be taken only from heads of free men past puberty, who are the ones fighting, but not from women, the children, the slaves, the insane, and the dying old.” The 13th century Shafi’i scholar Al-Nawawī wrote that a “woman, a hermaphrodite, a slave even when partially enfranchised, a minor and a lunatic are exempt from jizya.” The 14th century Hanbali scholar Ibn Qayyim wrote, “And there is no Jizya upon the aged, one suffering from chronic disease, the blind, and the patient who has no hope of recovery and has despaired of his health, even if they have enough.”Ibn Qayyim adds, referring to the four Sunnimaddhabs: “There is no Jizya on the kids, women and the insane. This is the view of the four imams and their followers. Ibn Mundhir said, ‘I do not know anyone to have differed with them.’ Ibn Qudama said in al-Mughni, ‘We do not know of any difference of opinion among the learned on this issue.” In contrast, the Shāfi’ī jurist Al-Nawawī wrote: “Our school insists upon the payment of the poll-tax by sickly persons, old men, even if decrepit, blind men, monks, workmen, and poor persons incapable of exercising a trade. As for people who seem to be insolvent at the end of the year, the sum of the poll tax remained as debt to their account until they should become solvent.”Abu Hanifa, in one of his opinions, and Abu Yusuf held that monks were subject to jizya if they worked. Ibn Qayyim stated that the dhahir opinion of Ibn Hanbal is that peasants and cultivators were also exempted from jizya.
The sources of jizya and the practices varied significantly over Islamic history.Shelomo Dov Goitein states that the exemptions for the indigent, the invalids and the old were no longer observed in the milieu reflected by the Cairo Geniza and were discarded even in theory by the Shāfi’ī jurists who were influential in Egypt at the time. According to Kristen A. Stilt, historical sources indicate that in Mamluk Egypt, poverty did “not necessarily excuse” the dhimmi from paying the tax, and boys as young as nine years old could be considered adults for tax purposes, making the tax particularly burdensome for large, poor families. Ashtor and Bornstein-Makovetsky infer from Geniza documents that jizya was also collected in Egypt from the age of nine in the 11th century.
Rate of jizya tax
The rates of jizya were not uniform, as there were no fixed limits in Islam. By the time of Mohammed, the jiyza rate was one dinar per year imposed on male dhimmis in Medina, Mecca, Khaibar, Yemen, and Nejran. According to Muhammad Hamidullah, the rate of ten dirhams per annum represented the expenses of an average family for ten days.Abu Yusuf, the chief qadhi of the caliph Harun al-Rashid, states that there was no amount permanently fixed for the tax, though the payment usually depended on wealth: the Kitab al-Kharaj of Abu Yusuf sets the amounts at 48 dirhams for the richest (e.g. moneychangers), 24 for those of moderate wealth, and 12 for craftsmen and manual laborers. Moreover, it could be paid in kind if desired; cattle, merchandise, household effects, even needles were to be accepted in lieu of specie (coins), but not pigs, wine, or dead animals.
The jizya varied in accordance with the affluence of the people of the region and their ability to pay. In this regard, Abu Ubayd ibn Sallam comments that the Prophet imposed 1 dinar (then worth 10 or 12 dirhams) upon each adult in Yemen. This was less than what Umar imposed upon the people of Syria and Iraq, the higher rate being due to the Yemenis greater affluence and ability to pay.
The rate of jizya that were fixed and implemented by the second caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate, namely ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, during the period of his Khilafah, were small amounts: four dirhams from the rich, two dirhams from the middle class and only one dirham from the active poor who earned by working on wages, or by making or vending things. The 13th-century scholar Al-Nawawī writes, “The minimum amount of the jizya is one dinar per person per annum; but it is commendable to raise the amount, if it be possible to two dinars, for those possessed of moderate means, and to four for rich persons.” Abu ‘Ubayd insists that the dhimmis must not be burdened beyond their capacity, nor must they be caused to suffer.
Ibn Qudamah narrates three views in what concerns the rates of jizya. First, that it is a fixed amount that can’t be changed, a view that is reportedly shared by Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi’i. Secondly, that it is up to the Imam (Muslim ruler) to make ijtihād (independent reasoning) so as to decide whether to add or decrease. He gives the example of ‘Umar making particular amounts for each class (the rich, the middle class and the active poor). Finally, the third opinion considered the strict minimum to be one dinar, but gave no upper bound concerning the maximum amount.Ibn Khaldun states that jizya has fixed limits that cannot be exceeded. In the classical manual of Shafi’ifiqhReliance of the Traveller it is stated that, “[t]he minimum non-Muslim poll tax is one dinar (n: 4.235 grams of gold) per person (A: per year). The maximum is whatever both sides agree upon.”
Ann Lambton states that the jizya was to be paid “in humiliating conditions”. Ennaji and other scholars state that some jurists required the jizya to be paid by each in person, by presenting himself, arriving on foot not horseback, by hand, in order to confirm that he lowers himself to being a subjected one, and willingly pays. According to Mark R. Cohen, the Quran itself does not prescribe humiliating treatment for the dhimmi when paying Jizya, but some later Muslims interpreted it to contain “an equivocal warrant for debasing the dhimmi (non-Muslim) through a degrading method of remission”. In contrast, the 13th century hadith scholar and Shafi’ite jurist Al-Nawawī, comments on those who would impose a humiliation along with the paying of the jizya, stating, “As for this aforementioned practice, I know of no sound support for it in this respect, and it is only mentioned by the scholars of Khurasan. The majority of scholars say that the jizya is to be taken with gentleness, as one would receive a debt. The reliably correct opinion is that this practice is invalid and those who devised it should be refuted. It is not related that the Prophet or any of the rightly-guided caliphs did any such thing when collecting the jizya.”Ibn Qudamah also rejected this practice and noted that Muhammad and the Rashidun caliphs encouraged that jizya be collected with gentleness and kindness.
The Maliki scholar Al-Qurtubi states, “their punishment in case of non-payment [of jizya] while they were able [to do so] is permitted; however, if their inability to pay it was clear then it isn’t lawful to punish them, since, if one isn’t able to pay the jizya, then he is exempted”. According to Abu Yusuf, jurist of the fifth AbbasidCaliphHarun al-Rashid, those who didn’t pay jizya should be imprisoned and not be let out of custody until payment; however, the collectors of the jizya were instructed to show leniency and avoid corporal punishment in case of non-payment. If someone had agreed to pay jizya, leaving Muslim territory for enemy land was, in theory, punishable by enslavement if they were ever captured. This punishment did not apply if the person had suffered injustices from Muslims.
Failure to pay the jizya was commonly punished by house arrest and some legal authorities allowed enslavement of dhimmis for non-payment of taxes. In South Asia, for example, seizure of dhimmi families upon their failure to pay annual jizya was one of the two significant sources of slaves sold in the slave markets of Delhi Sultanate and Mughal era.
Use of jizya tax
Jizya was considered as one of the basic tax revenue for the early Islamic state along with zakat, kharaj, and others, and was collected by the Bayt al-Mal (public treasury). Holger Weiss states that four-fifths of the fay revenue, that is jizya and kharaj, goes to the public treasury according to the Shafi’i madhhab, whereas the Hanafi and Maliki madhhabs state that the entire fay goes to the public treasury.
In theory, jizya funds were distributed as salaries for officials, pensions to the army and charity. Cahen states, “But under this pretext it was often paid into the Prince’s khass, “private” treasury.” In later times, jizya revenues were commonly allocated to Islamic scholars so that they would not have to accept money from sultans whose wealth came to be regarded as tainted.
Sources disagree about expenditure of jizya funds on non-Muslims. Ann Lambton states that non-Muslims had no share in the benefits from the public treasury derived from jizya. In contrast, according to several Muslim scholars, Islamic tradition records a number of episodes in which the second caliph Umar stipulated that needy and infirm dhimmis be supported from the Bayt al-Mal, which some authors hold to be representative of Islam. Evidence of jizya benefitting non-residents and temporary residents of an Islamic state is found in the treaty Khalid bin al-Walid concluded with the people of Al-Hirah of Iraq, wherein any aged person who was weak, had lost his or her ability to work, fallen ill, or who had been rich but became poor, would be exempt from jiyza and his or livelihood and the livelihood of his or her dependents, who were not living permanently in the Islamic state, would be met by Bayt al-Mal. Hasan Shah states that non-Muslim women, children, indigent, slaves, aren’t only exempted from the payment of jizya, but they are also helped by stipends from the public treasury when necessary.
At least in the early Islamic era of the Umayyad the levy of Jizya was sufficiently onerous for non-Muslims and its revenue sufficiently significant for rulers that there were more than a few accounts of non-Muslims seeking to convert to avoid paying it and revenue conscious authorities denying them this opportunity. Robert Hoyland mentions repeated complaints by fiscal agents of revenues diminishing as conquered people converting to Islam, of peasants attempting to convert and join the military but being rounded up and sent back to the countryside to pay taxes, and governors circumventing the exemption on jizya for converts by requiring recitation of the Quran and circumcision.
Patricia Seed describes the purpose of jizya as “a personal form of ritual humiliation directed at those defeated by a superior Islam” quoting the Quranic verse calling for jizya: “Fight those who believe not in Allah … nor acknowledge the religion of truth … until they pay the jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued” (noting that the word translated as “subdued” — ṣāghirūn—comes from the root ṣ-gh-r (small, little, belittled, or humbled)). Seed calls the idea that jizya was a contribution to help pay for the “military defense” of those who paid not a rationale but a rationalization, one often found in societies were the conquered paid tribute to conquerors.
The history of the origins of the jizya is very complex for the following reasons:
Abbasid-era authors who systematized earlier historical writings, where the term jizya was used with different meanings, interpreted it according to the usage common in their own time;
the system established by the Arab conquest was not uniform, but rather resulted from a variety of agreements or decisions;
the earlier systems of taxation on which it was based are still imperfectly understood.
William Montgomery Watt traces its origin to a pre-Islamic practice among the Arabian nomads wherein a powerful tribe would agree to protect its weaker neighbors in exchange for a tribute, which would be refunded if the protection proved ineffectual. Robert Hoyland describes it as a poll tax originally paid by “the conquered people” to the mostly Arab conquerors, but which later became a “religious tax, payable only by non-Muslims”.
Jews and Christians in some southern and eastern areas of the Arabian peninsula began to pay tribute, called jizya, to the Islamic state during Muhammad’s lifetime. It was not originally the poll tax it was to become later, but rather an annual percentage of produce and a fixed quantity of goods.
During the Tabuk campaign of 630 Muhammad sent letters to four towns in the northern Hejaz and Palestine urging them to relinquish maintenance of a military force and rely on Muslims to ensure their security in return for payment of taxes.Moshe Gil argues that these texts represent the paradigm of letters of security that would be issued by Muslim leaders during the subsequent early conquests, including the use of the word jizya, which would later take on the meaning of poll tax.
Jizya received divine sanction in 630 when the term was mentioned in a Quranic verse (9:29). Max Bravmann argues that the Quranic usage of the word jizya develops a pre-Islamic common-law principle which states that reward must necessarily follow a discretional good deed into a principle mandating that the life of all prisoners of war belonging to a certain category must be spared provided they grant the “reward” (jizya) to be expected for an act of pardon.
In 632 jizya in the form of a poll tax was first mentioned in a document reportedly sent by Muhammad to Yemen.W. Montgomery Watt has argued that this document was tampered with by early Muslim historians to reflect a later practice, while Norman Stillman holds it to be authentic.
Emergence of classical taxation system
Taxes levied on local populations in the wake of early Islamic conquests could be of three types, based on whether they were levied on individuals, on the land, or as collective tribute. During the first century of Islamic expansion, the words jizya and kharaj were used in all these three senses, with context distinguishing between individual and land taxes (“kharaj on the head,” “jizya on land,” and vice versa). In the words of Dennett, “since we are talking in terms of history, not in terms of philology, the problem is not what the taxes were called, but what we know they were.” Regional variations in taxation at first reflected the diversity of previous systems. The Sasanian Empire had a general tax on land and a poll tax having several rates based on wealth, with an exemption for aristocracy. In Iraq, which was conquered mainly by force, Arabs controlled taxation through local administrators, keeping the graded poll tax, and likely increasing its rates to 1, 2 and 4 dinars. The aristocracy exemption was assumed by the new Arab-Muslim elite and shared by local aristocracy by means of conversion. The nature of Byzantine taxation remains partly unclear, but it appears to have involved taxes computed in proportion to agricultural production or number of working inhabitants in population centers. In Syria and upper Mesopotamia, which largely surrendered under treaties, taxes were calculated in proportion to the number of inhabitants at a fixed rate (generally 1 dinar per head). They were levied as collective tribute in population centers which preserved their autonomy and as a personal tax on large abandoned estates, often paid by peasants in produce. In post-conquest Egypt, most communities were taxed using a system which combined a land tax with a poll tax of 2 dinars per head. Collection of both was delegated to the community on the condition that the burden be divided among its members in the most equitable manner. In most of Iran and Central Asia local rulers paid a fixed tribute and maintained their autonomy in tax collection, using the Sasanian dual tax system in regions like Khorasan.
Difficulties in tax collection soon appeared. Egyptian Copts, who had been skilled in tax evasion since Roman times, were able to avoid paying the taxes by entering monasteries, which were initially exempt from taxation, or simply by leaving the district where they were registered. This prompted imposition of taxes on monks and introduction of movement controls. In Iraq, many peasants who had fallen behind with their tax payments, converted to Islam and abandoned their land for Arab garrison cities in hope of escaping taxation. Faced with a decline in agriculture and a treasury shortfall, the governor of Iraqal-Hajjaj forced peasant converts to return to their lands and subjected them to the taxes again, effectively forbidding peasants to convert to Islam. In Khorasan, a similar phenomenon forced the native aristocracy to compensate for the shortfall in tax collection out of their own pockets, and they responded by persecuting peasant converts and imposing heavier taxes on poor Muslims.
The situation where conversion to Islam was penalized in an Islamic state could not last, and the devout Umayyad caliph Umar II has been credited with changing the taxation system. Modern historians doubt this account, although details of the transition to the system of taxation elaborated by Abbasid-era jurists are still unclear.Umar II ordered governors to cease collection of taxes from Muslim converts, but his successors obstructed this policy. Some governors sought to stem the tide of conversions by introducing additional requirements such as undergoing circumcision and the ability to recite passages from the Quran. According to Hoyland, taxation-related grievances of non-Arab Muslims contributed to the opposition movements which resulted in the Abbasid revolution. In contrast, Dennett states that it is incorrect to postulate an economic interpretation of the Abbasid revolution. The notion of an Iranian population staggering under a burden of taxation and ready to revolt at the first opportunity, as imagined by Gerlof van Vloten, “will not bear the light of careful investigation”, he continues.
Under the new system that was eventually established, kharaj came to be regarded as a tax levied on the land, regardless of the taxpayer’s religion. The poll-tax was no longer levied on Muslims, but treasury did not necessarily suffer and converts did not gain as a result, since they had to pay zakat, which was instituted as a compulsory tax on Muslims around 730. The terminology became specialized during the Abbasid era, so that kharaj no longer meant anything more than land tax, while the term “jizya” was restricted to the poll-tax on dhimmis.
In India, Islamic rulers imposed jizya on non-Muslims starting with the 11th century. The taxation practice included jizya and kharaj taxes. These terms were sometimes used interchangeably to mean poll tax and collective tribute, or just called kharaj-o-jizya.
Jizya expanded with Delhi Sultanate. Alauddin Khilji, legalized the enslavement of the jizya and kharaj defaulters. His officials seized and sold these slaves in growing Sultanate cities where there was a great demand of slave labour. The Muslim court historian Ziauddin Barani recorded that Kazi Mughisuddin of Bayanah advised Alā’ al-Dīn that Islam requires imposition of jizya on Hindus, to show contempt and to humiliate the Hindus, and imposing jizya is a religious duty of the Sultan.
During the early 14th century reign of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, expensive invasions across India and his order to attack China by sending a portion of his army over the Himalayas, emptied the precious metal in Sultanate’s treasury. He ordered minting of coins from base metals with face value of precious metals. This economic experiment failed because Hindus in his Sultanate minted counterfeit coins from base metal in their homes, which they then used for paying jizya. In the late 14th century, mentions the memoir of Tughlaq dynasty‘s Sultan Firoz Shah Tughlaq, his predecessor taxed all Hindus but had exempted all Hindu Brahmins from jizya; Firoz Shah extended it over all Hindus. He also announced that any Hindus who converted to Islam would become exempt from taxes and jizya as well as receive gifts from him. On those who chose to remain Hindus, he raised jizya tax rate.
In Kashmir, Sikandar Butshikan levied jizya on those who objected to the abolition of hereditary varnas, allegedly at the behest of his neo-convert minister Suhabhatta. Ahmad Shah (1411-1442), a ruler of Gujarat, introduced the Jizyah in 1414 and collected it with such strictness that many people converted to Islam to evade it.
Jizya was later abolished by the third Mughal emperor Akbar, in 1579. However, in 1679, Aurangzeb chose to re-impose jizya on non-Muslim subjects in lieu of military service, a move that was sharply critiqued by many Hindu rulers and Mughal court-officials. The specific amount varied with the socioeconomic status of a subject and tax-collection were often waived for regions hit by calamities; also, monks, musta’mins, women, children, elders, the handicapped, the unemployed, the ill, and the insane were all perpetually exempted. The collectors were mandated to be Muslims. In some areas revolts led to its periodic suspension such as the 1704 AD suspension of jizya in Deccan region of India by Aurangzeb.
Jizya collected from Christian and Jewish communities was among the main sources of tax income of the Ottoman treasury. In some regions, such as Lebanon and Egypt, jizya was payable collectively by the Christian or the Jewish community, and was referred to as maqtu—in these cases the individual rate of jizya tax would vary, as the community would pitch in for those who could not afford to pay.[page needed]
In Persia, jizya was paid by Zoroastrian minority until 1884, when it was removed by pressure on the Qajar government from the Persian Zoroastrian Amelioration Fund.
The jizya was eliminated in Algeria and Tunisia in the 19th century, but continued to be collected in Morocco until the first decade of the 20th century (these three dates coincide with the French colonization of these countries).
The Ottoman Empire abolished the “jizya” in 1856. It was replaced with a new tax, which non-Muslims paid in lieu of military service. It was called baddal-askari (lit. ‘military substitution’), a tax exempting Jews and Christians from military service. The Jews of Kurdistan, according to the scholar Mordechai Zaken, preferred to pay the “baddal” tax in order to redeem themselves from military service. Only those incapable of paying the tax were drafted into the army. Zaken says that paying the tax was possible to an extent also during the war and some Jews paid 50 gold liras every year during World War I. According to Zaken, “in spite of the forceful conscription campaigns, some of the Jews were able to buy their exemption from conscription duty.” Zaken states that the payment of the baddal askari during the war was a form of bribe that bought them at most a one-year deferment.”
The jizya is no longer imposed by Muslim states. Nevertheless, there have been reports of non-Muslims in areas controlled by the Pakistani Taliban and ISIS being forced to pay the jizya.
In 2009, officials in the Peshawar region of Pakistan claimed that members of the Taliban forced the payment of jizya from Pakistan’s minority Sikh community after occupying some of their homes and kidnapping a Sikh leader. In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) announced that it intended to extract jizya from Christians in the city of Raqqa, Syria, which it controlled. Christians who refused to pay the tax would have to either convert to Islam or die. Wealthy Christians would have to pay the equivalent of USD $664 twice a year; poorer ones would be charged one-fourth that amount. In June, the Institute for the Study of War reported that ISIL claims to have collected the fay, i.e. jizya and kharaj.
The late Islamic scholar Abul A’la Maududi, of Pakistan, said that Jizya should be re-imposed on non-Muslims in a Muslim nation.Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Egypt also held that position in the mid-1980s, however he later reconsidered his legal opinion on this point, stating: “[n]owadays, after military conscription has become compulsory for all citizens—Muslims and non-Muslims—there is no longer room for any payment, whether by name of jizya or any other.” According to Khaled Abou El Fadl, moderate Muslims generally reject the dhimma system, which encompasses jizya, as inappropriate for the age of nation-states and democracies.
Some authors have characterized the complex of land and poll taxes in the pre-Abbasid era and implementation of the jizya poll tax in early modern South Asia as discriminatory and/or oppressive, and the majority of Islamic scholars, amongst whom are Al-Nawawi and Ibn Qudamah, have criticized humiliating aspects of its collection as contrary to Islamic principles. Discriminatory regulations were utilized by many pre-modern polities. However, W. Cleveland and M. Bunton assert that dhimma status represented “an unusually tolerant attitude for the era and stood in marked contrast to the practices of the Byzantine Empire“. They add that the change from the Byzantine and Persian rule to Arab rule lowered taxes and allowed dhimmis to enjoy a measure of communal autonomy. According to Bernard Lewis, available evidence suggests that the change from Byzantine to Arab rule was “welcomed by many among the subject peoples, who found the new yoke far lighter than the old, both in taxation and in other matters”.
Ira Lapidus writes that the Arab-Muslim conquests followed a general pattern of nomadic conquests of settled regions, whereby conquering peoples became the new military elite and reached a compromise with the old elites by allowing them to retain local political, religious, and financial authority. Peasants, workers, and merchants paid taxes, while members of the old and new elites collected them. Payment of various taxes, the total of which for peasants often reached half of the value of their produce, was not only an economic burden, but also a mark of social inferiority.
Norman Stillman writes that although the tax burden of the Jews under early Islamic rule was comparable to that under previous rulers, Christians of the Byzantine Empire (though not Christians of the Persian empire, whose status was similar to that of the Jews) and Zoroastrians of Iran shouldered a considerably heavier burden in the immediate aftermath of the Arab conquests. He writes that escape from oppressive taxation and social inferiority was a “great inducement” to conversion and flight from villages to Arab garrison towns, and many converts to Islam “were sorely disappointed when they discovered that they were not to be permitted to go from being tribute bearers to pension receivers by the ruling Arab military elite,” before their numbers forced an overhaul of the economic system in the 8th century.
The influence of jizya on conversion has been a subject of scholarly debate. Julius Wellhausen held that the poll tax amounted to so little that exemption from it did not constitute sufficient economic motive for conversion. Similarly, Thomas Arnold states that jizya was “too moderate” to constitute a burden, “seeing that it released them from the compulsory military service that was incumbent on their Muslim fellow subjects.” He further adds that converts escaping taxation would have to pay the legal alms, zakat, that is annually levied on most kinds of movable and immovable property. Other early 20th century scholars suggested that non-Muslims converted to Islam en masse in order to escape the poll tax, but this theory has been challenged by more recent research. Daniel Dennett has shown that other factors, such as desire to retain social status, had greater influence on this choice in the early Islamic period. According to Halil İnalcık, the wish to avoid paying the jizya was an important incentive for conversion to Islam in the Balkans, though Anton Minkov has argued that it was only one among several motivating factors.
Mark R. Cohen writes that despite the humiliating connotations and the financial burden, the jizya paid by Jews under Islamic rule provided a “surer guarantee of protection from non-Jewish hostility” than that possessed by Jews in the Latin West, where Jews “paid numerous and often unreasonably high and arbitrary taxes” in return for official protection, and where treatment of Jews was governed by charters which new rulers could alter at will upon accession or refuse to renew altogether. The Pact of Umar, which stipulated that Muslims must “do battle to guard” the dhimmis and “put no burden on them greater than they can bear”, was not always upheld, but it remained “a steadfast cornerstone of Islamic policy” into early modern times.
Yaser Ellethy states that the “insignificant amount” of the jizya, as well as its progressive structure and exemptions leave no doubt that it was not imposed to persecute people or force them to convert. Niaz A. Shah states that jizya is “partly symbolic and partly commutation for military service. As the amount is insignificant and exemptions are many, the symbolic nature predominates.”Muhammad Abdel-Haleem states, “[t]he jizya is a very clear example of the acceptance of a multiplicity of cultures within the Islamic system, which allowed people of different faiths to live according to their own faiths, all contributing to the well-being of the state, Muslims through zakāt, and the ahl al-dhimma through jizya.”
In 2016, Muslim scholars from more than 100 countries signed the Marrakesh Declaration, a document that called for a new Islamic jurisprudence based on modern nation-based notions of citizenship, the opposite of what is written in the Qur’an, recognizing that the dhimmī system is obsolete in the modern era.
Abdel-Haleem, Muhammad (2010). Understanding the Qur’ān: Themes and Style. I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd. pp. 70, 79. ISBN978-1845117894. Abou Al-Fadl 2002, p. 21. “When the Qur’an was revealed, it was common inside and outside of Arabia to levy poll taxes against alien groups. Building upon the historical practice, classical Muslim jurists argued that the poll tax is money collected by the Islamic polity from non-Muslims in return for the protection of the Muslim state. If the Muslim state was incapable of extending such protection to non-Muslims, it was not supposed to levy a poll tax.” Jizyah The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (2010), Oxford University Press, Quote: Jizyah: Compensation. Poll tax levied on non-Muslims as a form of tribute and in exchange for an exemption from military service, based on Quran 9:29. M. Zawati, Hilmi (2002). Is Jihād a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights Under Islamic and Public International Law (Studies in religion & society). Edwin Mellen Press. pp. 63–4. ISBN978-0773473041. Wael, B. Hallaq (2009). Sharī’a: Theory, Practice and Transformations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 332–3. ISBN978-0-521-86147-2. Ellethy 2014, p. 181. “[…] the insignificant amount of this yearly tax, the fact that it was progressive, that elders, poor people, handicapped, women, children, monks and hermits were exempted, leave no doubt about exploitation or persecution of those who did not accept Islam. Comparing its amount to the obligatory zaka which an ex-dhimmi should give to the Muslim state in case he converts to Islam dismisses the claim that its aim was forced conversions to Islam.” Alshech, Eli (2003). “Islamic Law, Practice, and Legal Doctrine: Exempting the Poor from the Jizya under the Ayyubids (1171-1250)”. Islamic Law and Society. 10 (3): 348–375. doi:10.1163/156851903770227584. …jurists divided the dhimma community into two major groups. The first group consists of all adult, free, sane males among the dhimma community, while the second includes all other dhimmas (i.e., women, slaves, minors, and the insane). Jurists generally agree that members of the second group are to be granted a “blanket” exemption from jizya payment. Rispler-Chaim, Vardit (2007). Disability in Islamic law. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. p. 44. ISBN978-1402050527. The Hanbali position is that boys, women, the mentally insane, the zamin, and the blind are exempt from paying jizya. This view is supposedly shared by the Hanafis, Shafi’is, and Malikis.Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, pp. 192-3. Bowering, Gerhard; Crone, Patricia; Mirza, Mahan; et al., eds. (2013). The Princeton encyclopedia of Islamic political thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. p. 283. ISBN978-0691134840. Free adult males who were not afflicted by any physical or mental illness were required to pay the jizya. Women, children, handicapped, the mentally ill, the elderly, and slaves were exempt, as were all travelers and foreigners who did not settle in Muslim lands. […] As Islam spread, previous structures of taxation were replaced by the Islamic system, but Muslim leaders often adopted practices of the previous regimes in the application and collection of taxes. Mapel, D.R. and Nardin, T., eds. (1999), International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, p. 231. Princeton University Press. ISBN9780691049724. Quote: “Jizya was levied upon dhimmis in compensation for their exemption from military service in the Muslim forces. If dhimmis joined Muslims in their mutual defense against an outside aggressor, the jizya was not levied.” Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 61–2. … the jizyah was levied on the able-bodied males, in lieu of the military service they would have been called upon to perform had they been Musalmans; and it is very noticeable that when any Christian people served in the Muslim army, they were exempted from the payment of this tax. Such was the case with the tribe of al-Jurājima, a Christian tribe in the neighborhood of Antioch who made peace with the Muslims, promising to be their allies and fight on their side in battle, on condition that they should not be called upon to pay jizyah and should receive their proper share of the booty. (online) Shah 2008, pp. 19–20. Ghazi, Kalin & Kamali 2013, pp. 240–1. Abdel-Haleem 2012, pp. 75–6, 77. Sabet, Amr (2006), The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24:4, Oxford; pp. 99–100. Bravmann 2009, pp. 199–201, 204–5, 207–12. Mohammad, Gharipour (2014). Sacred Precincts: The Religious Architecture of Non-Muslim Communities Across the Islamic World. BRILL. p. XV. ISBN978-9004280229. Sources indicate that the taxation system of early Islam was not necessarily an innovation of Muslims; it appears that ‘Umar adopted the same tax system as was common at the time of the conquest of that territory. The land tax or kharaj was an adapted version of the tax system used in Sassanid Persia. In Syria, ‘Umar followed the Byzantine system of collecting two taxes based on the account of lands and heads.Shah 2008, p. 20. “Jizia was not a specific Islamic invention but was the norm of the time. “Several of the early caliphs made peace treaties with the Byzantine Empire some of which even required them to pay tribute [Jizia] to the Byzantines” (Streusand, 1997).” Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. p. 59 ff. There is evidence to show that the Arab conquerors left unchanged the fiscal system that they found prevailing in the lands they conquered from the Byzantines, and that the explanation of jizyah as a capitation-tax is an invention of later jurists, ignorant of the true condition of affairs in the early days of Islam. (Caetani, vol. iv. p. 610 (§ 231); vol. v. p. 449.) H.Lammens: Ziād ibn Abīhi. (Rivista degli Studi Orientali, vol. iv. p. 215.) (online) Morony, Michael (2005). Iraq after the Muslim conquest. NJ, USA: Gorgias Press. pp. 109, 99–134. ISBN978-1-59333-315-7. Levy, Reuben (2002). The social structure of Islam. London New York: Routledge. pp. 310–1. ISBN978-0-415-20910-6. “There is little doubt that in origin kharaj and jizya were interchangeable terms. In the Arabic papyri of the first century AH only jizya is mentioned, with the general meaning of tribute, while later the poll tax could be called kharaj ala ru’us ahl al-dhimma, i.e. a tax on the heads of protected peoples. The narrower meaning of the word is brought out by Abu Hanifa, “No individual can be liable at the same time to the zakat and to kharaj.” [emphasis added] Satish Chandra (1969), Jizyah and the State in India during the 17th Century, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 322–40, quote=”Although kharaj and jizyah were sometimes treated as synonyms, a number of fourteenth century theological tracts treat them as separate” Peri, Oded (1990). “The Muslim waqf and the collection of jizya in late eighteenth-century Jerusalem”. In Gilbar, Gad (ed.). Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914 : Studies in economic and social history. Leiden: E.J. Brill. p. 287. ISBN978-90-04-07785-0. the jizya was one of the main sources of revenue accruing to the Ottoman state treasury as a whole.Abu Khalil, Shawkiy (2006). al-Islām fī Qafaṣ al-ʾIttihām الإسلام في قفص الإتهام (in Arabic). Dār al-Fikr. p. 149. ISBN978-1575470047. Quote: و يعين مقدار الجزية إعتبارا لحالتهم الإقتصادية، فيؤخد من الموسرين أكثر و من الوسط أقل منه و من الفقراء شيء قليل جدا. و على الدين لا معاش لهم أو هم عالة على غيرهم يعفون من أداء الجزية. Translation: “The amount of jizya is determined in consideration of their economic status, so that more is taken from the prosperous, less from the middle [class], and a very small amount from the poor (fuqaraʾ). Those who do not have any means of livelihood or depend on support of others are exempted from paying the jizya.” (online) Ghazi, Kalin & Kamali 2013, pp. 82–3. Abu Zahra, Muhammad. Zahrat al-Tafāsīr زهرة التفاسير (in Arabic). Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī. pp. 3277–8. Quote: و ما يعطيه الذمي من المال يسمى جزية؛ […] و لأنها جزاء لأن يدفع الإسلام عنهم، و يكفيهم مئونة القتال، و لأنها جزاء لما ينفق على فقراء أهل الذمة كما كان يفعل الإمام عمر، […] و الإسلام قام بحق التساوي بين جميع من يكونون في طاعته، فإن الجزية التي تكون على الذمي تقابل ما يكون على المسلم من تكليفات مالية، فعليه زكاة المال، و عليه صدقات و نذور، و عليه كفارات، و غير ذلك، و لو أحصى كل ما يؤخد من المسلم لتبين أنه لا يقل عما يؤخد من جزية إن لم يزد. و إن الدولة كما ذكرنا تنفق على فقراء أهل الذمة، و لقد روى أن عمر – رضي الله تعالى عنه – وجد شيخا يهوديا يتكفف، فسأله: من أنت يا شيخ؟ قال رجل من أهل الذمة، فقال له: ما أنصفناك أكلنا شبيبتك و ضيعناك في شيخوختك، و أجرى عليه رزقا مستمرا من بيت المال، و قال لخادمه: ابحت عن هذا و ضربائه، و أَجْرِ عليهم رزقا من بيت المال. Translation: “And the money that the dhimmī gives is called jizya: […] and [it is so named] because it is in return for the protection that they are guaranteed by the Islamic [community], and instead of rendering military service, and since it is [also] in return for what is spent on the poor amongst the dhimmī community (ahl al-dhimma) as ʾImām ʿUmar used to do. […] and Islam gave the right of equality between all of those who are under its rule, indeed, the jizya that is demanded from the dhimmī corresponds to the financial obligations that are compulsory on the Muslim, so he is obliged [to purify] his wealth [through] zakat, and he is required to pay sadaqat and nudhur, and he is duty-bound to give kaffarat, as well as other things. And if all that is taken from the Muslim was calculated, it would become clear that it isn’t less than what is taken by way of jizya, if it isn’t more. And as we have mentioned earlier, the state spends on the poor amongst the dhimmī community, and it is narrated that ʿUmar – May God Almighty be pleased with him – found an elderly Jew begging, so he asked him: ‘Who are you, old man (shaykh)?’ He said, ‘I am a man from the dhimma community.’ So ʿUmar said to him: ‘We have not done justice to you in taking from you when you were young and forsaking you in your old age’, so ʿUmar gave him a regular pension from the public treasury (Bayt al-Māl), and he then said to his servant: “Search for him and those like him, and give them out from the public treasury.”” Anver M. Emon (26 July 2012). Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 99–109. ISBN978-0199661633. Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 60–1. This tax was not imposed on the Christians, as some would have us think, as a penalty for their refusal to accept the Muslim faith, but was paid by them in common with the other dhimmīs or non-Muslim subjects of the state whose religion precluded them from serving in the army, in return for the protection secured for them by the arms of the Musalmans. (online) Non-Muslims Paying Jizyah In a State of Humiliation by Bassam Zawadi https://www.call-to-monotheism.com/non_muslims_paying_jizyah_in_a_state_of_humiliationEsposito 1998, p. 34. “They replaced the conquered countries, indigenous rulers and armies, but preserved much of their government, bureaucracy, and culture. For many in the conquered territories, it was no more than an exchange of masters, one that brought peace to peoples demoralized and disaffected by the casualties and heavy taxation that resulted from the years of Byzantine-Persian warfare. Local communities were free to continue to follow their own way of life in internal, domestic affairs. In many ways, local populations found Muslim rule more flexible and tolerant than that of Byzantium and Persia. Religious communities were free to practice their faith to worship and be governed by their religious leaders and laws in such areas as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In exchange, they were required to pay tribute, a poll tax (jizya) that entitled them to Muslim protection from outside aggression and exempted them from military service. Thus, they were called the “protected ones” (dhimmi). In effect, this often meant lower taxes, greater local autonomy, rule by fellow Semites with closer linguistic and cultural ties than the hellenized, Greco-Roman élites of Byzantium, and greater religious freedom for Jews and indigenous Christians.” Ziauddin Ahmed (1975). “The concept of Jizya in early Islam”. Islamic Studies. 14 (4): 293–305. JSTOR20846971. Quote: The tax of jizya is imposed on the non-Muslims subjects of a Muslim state. In view of the general body of the Fuquha, it is imposed upon the non-Muslims as a badge of humiliation for their unbelief, or by way of mercy for protection given to them by the Muslims. Some Fuqaha consider this tax as punishment for their unbelief, there being no economic motive behind its imposition, because their continued stay in a Muslim land is a crime, hence they have no escape from being humiliated. Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam, trans. David Maisel, Paul Fenton, and David Littman (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson, 1985), 201-202: “Documents: 19. The Manner of Collecting the Jizya.” Ye’or quotes two sixteenth-century narratives of how the Christians must lower themselves literally and ritually and then receive a blow in the payment of the jizya. Hoyland, In God’s Path, 2015: p.199 ʿImāra, Muhammad (2003). al-Islām wa’l-ʿaqalliyyāt الاسلام والأقليات (in Arabic). Cairo: Maktabat al-Shurūk al-Dawliyya. p. 15. Quote: «ولأن (الجزية) هي (بدل جندية)، لا تُؤخذ إلا من القادرين ماليًا، الذين يستطيعون حمل السلاح وأداء ضريبة القتال دفاعًا عن الوطن، وليست (بدلاً من الإيمان بالإسلام) وإلا لفرضت على الرهبان و رجال الدين .. وبدليل أن الذين اختاروا أداء ضريبة الجندية في صفوف المسلمين، ضد الفرس والروم، وهم على دياناتهم غير الإسلامية – فى الشام .. والعراق .. ومصر – لم تفرض عليهم الجزية، وإنما اقتسموا مع المسلمين الغنائم على قدم المساواة..» Translation: “And since the jizya is in exchange for military service, it is taken only from those who are financially capable, and those who are able to take arms and do military service in defense of a country, and it isn’t in exchange for not embracing Islam otherwise [the jizya] would have been taken from monks and the clergy .. and also since those who did volunteer to fight with the Muslims, against the Persians and Byzantines, and who professed a religion other than Islam – in the Levant, Iraq and Egypt – were exempted from the jizya and shared equally the battle gains with the Muslims…” (online) Matthew Long (jizya entry author) (2012). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought. Princeton University Press. pp. 283–4. ISBN978-0691134840. Werner Ende; Udo Steinbach (2010). Islam in the World Today. Cornell University Press. p. 738. ISBN978-0801445712. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2007). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. HarperOne. p. 214. ISBN978-0061189036. Coming home to Orakzai ABDUL SAMI PARACHA, Dawn.com (JAN 05, 2010). “In December 2008, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan enforced a strict version of Islamic law in divergence of enviously guarded distinctive tribal culture in Orakzai Agency. Less than a month a later, a decree for jizya was imposed and had to be paid by all minorities if they want protection against local criminal gangs or that they had to convert to Islam.” Aryn Baker (Feb 28, 2014). “Al-Qaeda Rebels in Syria Tell Christians to Pay Up or Die”. Time. In a statement posted to Jihadi websites and signed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-designated emir of the future Islamic caliphate of Raqqa, as well as the founder of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] rebel brigade, Christians are urged to pay a tax in order to continue living under ISIS’s protection. Vincent J. Cornell (2009). “Jizyah”. In John L. Esposito (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN9780195305135. John Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (2013). The Oxford handbook of Islam and politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 149–50. ISBN978-0-19-539589-1. One of Mawdudi’s most significant legacies was the reintroduction into the modern world – and into modern language – of an idealized vision of the Islamic community. […] Non-Muslims in the Muslim state would be categorized, in classical terms, as dhimmis, a protected class; would be restricted from holding high political office; would have to pay the jizyah poll tax; …Lambton 2013, pp. 204–205. Shah 2008, p. 19. Yusuf Ali (1991 Reprint), Notes 1281 and 1282 to verse 9:29, p. 507 al-ʾIsfahānī, al-Rāghib. Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī (ed.). Mufradāt ʾal-Faẓ al-Qurʾān مفردات ألفاظ القرآن (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Qalam. p. 195. 4th edition. Quote: «.والجزية: ما يؤخَذ من أهل الذمّة، وتسميتها بذلك للاجتزاء بها عن حقن دمهم» Translation: “A tax that is levied on Dhimmis, and it is so named because it is in return for the protection they are guaranteed.” (online)al-ʾIsfahānī, al-Rāghib (2009). Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī (ed.). Mufradāt ʾal-Faẓ al-Qurʾān مفردات ألفاظ القرآن (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Qalam. p. 195. 4th edition. (online) Abdel-Haleem 2012, pp. 75–6. Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Saʿid (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām الجهاد في الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. pp. 135–136. Quote: «فقد صح أن نصارى تغلب تضايقوا من كلمة (الجزية) و (الجزاء) و عرضوا على أمير المؤمنين عمر بن الخطاب، أن تؤخد منهم الجزية بإسم الصدقة، و إن إقتضى ذلك مضاعفة القدر عليهم، و قالوا له: خد منا ما شئت، و لا تسمها جزاء .. فشاور عمر الصحابة في ذلك، فأشار عليه علي رضي الله عنه أن يقبلها منهم مضاعفة بإسم الصدقة. رواه الطبري في تاريخه.» Translation: “It is true that the Christians of Taghlab didn’t feel at ease with the words (Jizya) and (Compensation) and they proposed to the leader of the believers ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, that jizya be taken from them in the name of charity, even if that meant that they would have to pay twice as much, and they said to him: ‘Take from us whatever you want, but don’t call it a compensation’ .. So ʿUmar consulted the companions on this [matter], and ʿAli – May God be pleased with him – advised him to accept it from them with a double amount by the name of charity. This was related by al-Ṭabarī in his history.” (online) Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 49–50. They were called upon to pay the jizyah or tax imposed on the non-Muslim subjects, but they felt it to be humiliating to their pride to pay a tax that was levied in return for protection of life and property, and petitioned the caliph to be allowed to make the same kind of contribution as the Muslims did. So in lieu of the jizyah they paid a double Sadaqah or alms,—which was a poor tax levied on the fields and cattle, etc., of the Muslims. (online) Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Saʿid (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām الجهاد في الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 136. Quote: «إستدلالاً بهذا، ذهب جمهور الفقهاء من الشافعية والحنفية والحنابلة إلى أنه يجوز أن تؤخد الجزية من أهل الذمة باسم الزكاة مضاعفة. أي فليس ثمة ما يلزم بتسمية المال الذي يؤخد منهم (جزية)، ومن القواعد الفقهية المعروفة إن العبرة بالمقاصد والمعاني لا بالألفاظ والمباني. […] ولعلك تسأل: فهل يجب إذا تحول إسم هذا المال من الجزية إلى الصداقة أو الزكاة، أن يضاعف المبلغ عن القدر المطلوب زكاةً؟ والجواب أن هذا من أحكام الإمامة، فالأمر في تحويل الاسم، وفي تحديد المبلغ منوط بما يراه إمام المسلمين في كل عصر.» Translation: “Based on this (event), the majority of jurists from Shāfiʿīs, Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs state that it is lawful to take the jizya from ahl al-dhimmah by name of double zakat. Meaning it isn’t necessary to call the tax that is taken from them by (jizya), and among the known legal maxim is that consideration is granted to objectives and meanings and not to terms and specific wordings. […] And you may ask: Is it necessary when the name of this tax is transformed from jizya to zakāt or ṣadaqah that the requested amount be doubled? The answer is that this falls under the laws of the ruler (ʾaḥkām al-ʾimāmah), so the command to change the name, and to define the respective amount is exclusive to what the ruler sees most fit according to each time.” (online) Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon. Book 1, p. 422. (Citing al-Nihaya fi Gharib al-Hadith by Majd al-Din ibn Athir (d. 1210), and others.) Muhibbu-Din, M. A. (2000-04-01). “Ahl Al-Kitab and Religious Minorities in the Islamic State: Historical Context and Contemporary Challenges”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 20 (1): 119. doi:10.1080/13602000050008933. ISSN1360-2004. S2CID143224068. Morony, Michael (2005). Iraq after the Muslim conquest. NJ, USA: Gorgias Press. p. 110. ISBN978-1-59333-315-7. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (2011), Encyclopedia of the Qur’an, Brill Academic, Vol. 4, pp. 152-153; Vol. 5, pp. 192–3, ISBN978-9-00412-35-64. Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. p. 59. jizyah — a word which originally denoted tribute of any kind paid by the non-Muslim subjects of the Arab empire, but came later on to be used for the capitation-tax as the fiscal system of the new rulers became fixed. (online) Tritton 2008, pp. 197–198. Tritton 2008, p. 223. A Ben Shemesh (1967), Taxation in Islam, Vol. 1, Netherlands: Brill Academic, p. 6 Davutoglu, Ahmet (1993). Alternative paradigms : the impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on political theory. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. p. 160. ISBN978-0819190475. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2007). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. HarperOne. p. 204. ISBN978-0061189036. According to the dhimma status system, non-Muslims must pay a poll tax in return for Muslim protection and the privilege of living in Muslim territory. Per this system, non-Muslims are exempt from military service, but they are excluded from occupying high positions that involve dealing with high state interests, like being the president or prime minister of the country. In Islamic history, non-Muslims did occupy high positions, especially in matters that related to fiscal policies or tax collection.A.C. Brown, Jonathan (2011). Muhammad: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 48. ISBN9780199559282.
Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Saʿid (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām الجهاد في الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 134. Quote: «كلمة (الجزية) … تطلق على المال الذي يؤخد من الكتابي، فيجزئ عن ضرورة تحمل مسؤلية رعايته وحمايته، وإعتباره عضواً في المجتمع الإسلامي بحيث ينال سائر الحقوق التي يقتضيها مبدأ التكافل الإجتماعي.» Translation: “The word (jizya) … is defined as the monetary amount that is taken from the People of the Book, and it is taken in exchange of guaranteeing their protection and safety, and considering them to be part of the Islamic society, such that they receive all the rights that are required by the principle of social insurance.” (online)
Sābiq, al-Sayyid. Fiqh al-Sunnah فقه السنة (in Arabic). 3. Cairo: al-Fatḥ lil-ʾIʿlām al-ʿArabī. p. 49. Quote: «حكمة مشروعيتها: وقد فرض الإسلام الجزية على الذميين في مقابل فرض الزكاة على المسلمين، حتى يتساوى الفريقان، لأن المسلمين والذميين يستظلون براية واحدة ويتمتعون بجميع الحقوق وينتفعون بمرافق الدولة بنسبة واحدة، … نظير قيامهم بالدفاع عن الذميين، وحمايتهم في البلاد الإسلامية التي يقيمون فيها.» Translation: “Its justification: And Islām obligated jizya on dhimmīs in parallel with the obligation of zakāt on Muslims, so that the two groups be equal, since Muslims and dhimmīs are under the shade of the same banner and they enjoy all of the same rights and they benefit from the state facilities in an equal proportion, … (also) in exchange for defending the dhimmīs, and guaranteeing their safety in the Muslim country they live in.” (online)
Riḍā, Rashīd. Majallat al-Manār مجلة المنار (in Arabic). 12. Cairo. p. 433. n°6. Quote: «جرى الصحابة في فتوحاتهم على جعل الجزية التي يفرضونها على أهل الذمة جزاء على حمايتهم والدفاع عنهم وعدم تكليفهم منع أنفسهم وبلادهم أي حمايتها والدفاع عنها ولذلك كانو يفرضونها على من هم أهل للدفاع دون غيرهم كالشيوخ والنساء فكان ذلك منهم تفسيرا وبيانا لمراد الكتاب العزيز منها. وكأن العثمانيين سموها لأجل ذلك بدل عسكرية.» Translation: “The Companions were in their openings (futūḥāt) making the jizya that they put on the ahl al-dhimmah in exchange for their protection and safety, and for not making them having to defend themselves and their country by themselves, and that’s why they were taking it from those who can participate in military service other than those who can’t such as the old and women, and so this was from them an explanation and illustration of the intended meaning (behind this word) in the Noble Book. And the Ottomans were calling it for that reason ‘Tax in exchange for not participating in military service’.”
Ḥassan, Ḥassan ʾIbrāhīm; Ḥassan, ʿAlī ʾIbrāhīm (1999). al-Nuẓum al-ʾIslāmiyyah النظم الإسلامية (in Arabic). Cairo: al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah. p. 230. Quote: «نظير قيامهم بالدفاع عن الذميين وحمايتهم في الاقاليم الإسلامية التي يقيمون فيها.» Translation: “In exchange for (Muslims) defending dhimmis and protecting them in the Muslim lands where they live.” (online)
Riḍā, Rashīd. Majallat al-Manār مجلة المنار (in Arabic). 12. Cairo. p. 433. n°6. Quote: «جرى الصحابة في فتوحاتهم على جعل الجزية التي يفرضونها على أهل الذمة جزاء على حمايتهم والدفاع عنهم وعدم تكليفهم منع أنفسهم وبلادهم أي حمايتها والدفاع عنها ولذلك كانو يفرضونها على من هم أهل للدفاع دون غيرهم كالشيوخ والنساء فكان ذلك منهم تفسيرا وبيانا لمراد الكتاب العزيز منها. وكأن العثمانيين سموها لأجل ذلك بدل عسكرية.» Translation: “The Companions were in their openings (futūḥāt) making the jizya that they put on the ahl al-dhimmah in exchange for their protection and safety, and for not making them having to defend themselves and their country by themselves, and that’s why they were taking it from those who can participate in military service other than those who can’t such as the old and women, and so this was from them an explanation and illustration of the intended meaning (behind this word) in the Noble Book. And the Ottomans were calling it for that reason ‘Tax in exchange for not participating in military service’.”
Salīm al-ʿAwā, Moḥammed (2006). Fī al-Niẓām al-Siyāsā lil-dawlah al-ʾIslāmiyyah في النظام السياسي للدولة الإسلامية (in Arabic). Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq. p. 247. Quote: «وأصح أقوال الفقهاء في تعليلها – أنها بدل عن إشترك غير المسلمين في الدفاع عن دار الإسلام، لذلك أسقطها الصحابة والتابعون عاماً قبل منهم الإشتراك في الدفاع عنها» Translation: “And the most correct sayings of the jurists in its (jizya) justification – is that it is in exchange for non-Muslims defending the nation, and that’s why the Companions and Successors exempted those who joined them in its defense.”
Durant, Will. The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith. 4. p. 218. This tax fell only upon non-Moslems capable of military service; it was not levied upon monks, women, adolescents, slaves, the old, crippled, blind or very poor. In return the dhimmis were excused (or excluded) from military service, were exempted from the two and a half per cent tax for community charity, and received the protection of the government.
Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 61. Again, in the treaty made by Khālid with some towns in the neighborhood of Hīrah, he writes: “If we protect you, then jizyah is due to us; but if we do not, then it is not due.” (online) Shah, Nasim Hasan (1988). “The concept of Al‐Dhimmah and the rights and duties of Dhimmis in an Islamic state”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 9 (2): 220. doi:10.1080/02666958808716075. ISSN0266-6952. Zaydān, ʿAbd al-Karīm (1982). ʾAḥkām al-Dhimmiyīn wa-l-mustaʾminīn fī dār al-Islām أحكام الذميين والمستأمنين في دار الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Quds – Muʾassassat al-Risālah. p. 154. Quote: «جاء في صلح خالد بن الوليد … في منطقة الحيرة، ما يأتي: “… فإن منعناكم فلنا الجزية و إلا فلا …”» Translation: “It was stated in the peace treaty made by Khālid b. al-Walīd … in the neighborhood of al-Ḥīrah, what follows: «… If we protect you, then jizya is due to us; but if we do not, then it is not due…»” (online) Nuʿmānī, Shiblī (Entry Author), Rashīd Riḍā (ed.). Majallat al-Manār مجلة المنار [Al-Manar] (in Arabic). 1. Cairo. p. 873. n°45. Quote: «هذا كتاب من خالد بن الوليد … ما منعناكم (أي حميناكم) فلنا الجزية وإلا فلا. كتب سنة اثنتي عشرة في صفر.» Translation: “This is a treaty made by Khālid b. al-Walīd … If we protect you, then jizya is due to us; but if we do not, then it is not due. This was written in the year twelve in Safar.” (online) al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (1992). Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʾIslāmī غير المسلمين في المجتمع الاسلامي (in Arabic). Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah. p. 62. ISBN978-977-7236-55-3. 3rd Ed. Quote: «سجّل خالد في المعاهدة التي أبرمها مع بعض أهالي المدن المجاورة للحيرة قوله: “فإن منعناكم فلا الجزية وإلا فلا”.» Translation: “Khālid wrote in the treaty that he concluded with some towns in the neighborhood of al-Ḥīrah that: «If we protect you, then jizya is due to us; but if we do not, then it is not due».” (online) Shaltut 2013, pp. 428–9. Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 60–1. The Emperor Heraclius had raised an enormous army with which to drive back the invading forces of the Muslims, who had in consequence to concentrate all their energies on the impending encounter. The Arab general, Abū ʻUbaydah, accordingly wrote to the governors of the conquered cities of Syria, ordering them to pay back all the jizyah that had been collected from the cities, and wrote to the people, saying, “We give you back the money that we took from you, as we have received news that a strong force is advancing against us. The agreement between us was that we should protect you, and as this is not now in our power, we return you all that we took. But if we are victorious we shall consider ourselves bound to you by the old terms of our agreement.” In accordance with this order, enormous sums were paid back out of the state treasury, and the Christians called down blessings on the heads of the Muslims, saying, “May God give you rule over us again and make you victorious over the Romans; had it been they, they would not have given us back anything, but would have taken all that remained with us.” (online) al-Zuḥaylī, Wahbah (1998). ʾĀthar al-ḥarb fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī : dirāsah muqārinah آثار الحرب في الفقه الإسلامي : دراسة مقارنة (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. pp. 692–693. ISBN978-1-57547-453-3. Quote: «أبي عبيدة بن الجراح، حينما حشد الروم جموعهم على حدود البلاد الإسلامية الشمالية، فكتب أبو عبيدة إلى كل وال ممن خلفه في المدن التي صلاح أهلها يأمرهم أن يردوا عليهم ما جبي منهم من الجزية والخراج، وكتب إليهم أن يقول لهم : « إنما رددنا عليكم أموالكم لأنه قد بلغنا ما جمع لنا من الجموع، وانكم إشترطم عليها أن نمنعكم، وإنا لا نقدر على ذلك، وقد رددنا عليكم ما أخدنا منكم ونحن لكم على الشرط، وما كتبنا بيننا وبينكم إن نصرنا الله عليهم ». فلما قالو ذلك لهم، وردوا عليهم الأموال التي جبوها منهم، قالو: « ردكم الله علينا ونصركم عليهم (أي على الروم). فلو كانو هم لم يردوا علينا شيئاً وأخذوا كل شيء بقي لنا حتى لا يدعو لنا شيئاً ».» Translation: “Abu ʿUbaydah b. al-Jarāḥ, when he was informed that the Romans were readying for battle against him in the boundaries of the Islamic State in the north, Abu ʿUbaydah then wrote to the governors of the cities with whom pacts had been concluded that they must return the sums collected from jizya and kharāj and say to their subjects: “We return to you your money because we have been informed that troops are being raised against us. In our agreement you stipulated that we protect you, but we are unable to do so. Therefore, we now return to you what we have taken from you, and we will abide by the stipulation and what has been written down, if God grants us victory over them.” And when they stated that to them, and they returned the sums that they took from them, they (the Christians) said: “May God give you rule over us again and make you victorious over [the Romans]; had it been they, they would not have given us back anything, but would have taken all that remained with us.”” (online) Zaydān, ʿAbd al-Karīm (1982). ʾAḥkām al-Dhimmiyīn wa-l-mustaʾminīn fī dār al-Islām أحكام الذميين والمستأمنين في دار الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Quds – Muʾassassat al-Risālah. p. 155. Quote: «ان أبا عبيدة بن الجراح عندما اعلمه نوابه على مدن الشام بتجمع الروم كتب اليهم: أن ردوا الجزية على من اخذتموها منه. وأمرهم أن يقول لهم: انما رددنا عليكم أموالكم لانه قد بلغنا ما جمع لنا من الجموع وانكم اشترطم علينا أن نمنعكم وانا لا نقدر على ذلك وقد رددنا عليكم ما أخذنا منكم ونحن لكم على الشروط وما كتبنا بيننا وبينكم إن نصرنا الله عليهم.» Translation: “Abu ʿUbaydah b. al-Jarāḥ, when he was informed by his governors that the Romans were readying for battle against him, he then wrote to them that they must return the jizya that they took from them. And he ordered them to say to their subjects: “We return to you your money because we have been informed that troops are being raised against us. In our agreement you stipulated that we protect you, but we are unable to do so. Therefore, we now return to you what we have taken from you, and we will abide by the stipulation and what has been written down, if God grants us victory over them.” (online) al-Zuḥaylī, Wahbah (1998). ʾĀthar al-ḥarb fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī : dirāsah muqārinah آثار الحرب في الفقه الإسلامي : دراسة مقارنة (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 693. ISBN978-1-57547-453-3. Quote: «ولهذا نظير في الحروب الصليبية، فقد رد صلاح الدين الأيوبي الجزية إلى نصارى الشام حين إضطر إلى الإنسحاب منها.» Translation: “And this (historical precedents for the jizya being returned when the state couldn’t protect ahl al-dhimma) has an equivalent [during the times] of the Crusades, as such Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī returned the jizya to the Christians of Syria when he was compelled to retract from it.” (online) al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (1992). Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʾIslāmī غير المسلمين في المجتمع الاسلامي (in Arabic). Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah. p. 63. ISBN978-977-7236-55-3. 3rd Ed. Quote: «ومن الواضح أن أي جماعة مسيحية كانت تعفى من أداء هذه الضريبة إذا ما دخلت في خدمة الجيش الإسلامي. وكانت الحال على هذا النحو مع قبيلة «الجراجمة» وهي مسيحية كانت تقيم بجوار أنطاكية، سالمت المسلمين وتعهدت أن تكون عوناً لهم، وأن تقاتل معهم في مغازيهم، على شريطة ألا تؤخد بالجزية، وأن تعطى نصيبها من الغنائم.» Translation: “It is very clear that any Christian group who joined the service of the Muslim army was exempted from this tax, just as is the case with the tribe of «al-Jurājima», a Christian tribe near Antioch, who made peace with the Muslims, promising to be their allies, and fight on their side in battle, on condition that they should be exempted from [the payment of] the jizya, and should receive their proper share of the booty.” (online) Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 62–3. On the other hand, when the Egyptian peasants, although Muslim in faith, were made exempt from military service, a tax was imposed upon them as on the Christians, in lieu thereof. (online) Shah, Nasim Hasan (1988). “The concept of Al‐Dhimmah and the rights and duties of Dhimmis in an Islamic state”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 9 (2): 221. doi:10.1080/02666958808716075. ISSN0266-6952. al-Zuḥaylī, Wahbah (1998). ʾĀthar al-ḥarb fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī : dirāsah muqārinah آثار الحرب في الفقه الإسلامي : دراسة مقارنة (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 692. ISBN978-1-57547-453-3. Quote: «قال الخطيب الشربيني الشافعي: “ولا يجب الجهاد على الكافر ولو ذمياً لأنه يبذل الجزية لنذب عنه لا ليذب عنا.”» Translation: “The Shafi’i scholar al-Khaṭīb ash-Shirbīniy stated: «Military service is not obligatory for non-Muslims — especially for a dhimmi since he gives the jizya so that we protect and defend him, and not so that he defends us.»” (online) Al-Awa, Mohammad Salim (2005-07-13). “Nidhām ʾAhl al-Dhimma, Ruʾyah Islāmiyah Muʿāssira” نظام أهل الذمة: رؤية إسلامية معاصرة (in Arabic). Archived from the original on 2009-06-04. Retrieved 2019-10-13. «الجزية بدل عن الجهاد، و لقد أسقطها الصحابة و التابعون عمن قبل من غير أهل الإسلام مشاركة المسلمين في الدفاع عن الوطن، كما يقرر الإمام إبن حجر في شرحه للبخاري، فتح الباري ج٦ ص٣٨. و ينسب ذلك – و هو صحيح صائب – إلى جمهور الفقهاء، …» Translation: “Jizya is in exchange for military service, and the companions and successors exempted it from non-Muslims who joined Muslims in defending the nation, just as the Imam Ibn Hajar pointed in his commentary on al-Bukhari, Fath al-Bari, and he relates that [opinion] – and indeed this is correct – to the majority of jurists.” Mun’im Sirry (2014), Scriptural Polemics: The Qur’an and Other Religions, p. 178. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0199359363. Shaltut 2013, pp. 14–5. Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on Ayat al-Jizya and Ayat al-Sayf,” in Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Eight to Eighteenth Centuries, eds. Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), pp. 103–19. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein; Dagli, Caner K.; Dakake, Maria Massi; Lumbard, Joseph E.B.; Rustom, Mohammed (2015). The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary. HarperCollins. See alternative translation via Abdel-Haleem 2012, p. 83: “Fight those who believe not in God and in the Last Day, and who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who follow not the Religion of Truth among those who were given the Book, till they pay the jizyah with a willing hand, being humbled.” Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Saʿid (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām الجهاد في الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. pp. 101–102. Quote: «الآية أمرت بالقتال لا بالقتل، وقد علمت الفرق الكبير بين الكلمتين … فأنت تقول: قتلت فلاناً، إن بدأته بالقتل، وتقول: قاتلته، إذا قاومت سعيه إلى قتلك بقتل مثله، أو سابقته إلى ذلك كي لا ينال منك غرة.» Translation: “The verse commands qitāl (قتال) and not qatl (قتل), and it is known that there is a big distinction between these two words … For you say qataltu (قتلت) so-and-so’ if you initiated the fighting, while you say qātaltu (قاتلت) him’ if you resisted his effort to fight you by a reciprocal fight, or if you forestalled him in that so that he would not get at you unawares.” (online) Abdel-Haleem 2012, pp. 72–4. Ahmad b. Muṣṭafā, Al-Maraghī. Tafsīr Al-Maraghī تفسير المراغي (in Arabic). 10. p. 95. Quote: «أي قاتلوا من ذكروا حين وجود ما يقتضى القتال كالاعتداء عليكم أو على بلادكم أو اضطهادكم وفتنتكم عن دينكم أو تهديد منكم وسلامتكم كما فعل بكم الروم وكان ذلك سببا لغزوة تبوك» Translation: “That is, fight those mentioned when the conditions which necessitate fighting are present, namely, aggression against you or your country, oppression and persecution against you on account of your faith, or threatening your safety and security, as was committed against you by the Byzantines, which was what lead to Tabuk.” Al-Bayḍawī, Tafsīr (2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988), vol. 1, p. 401. Dawood 1990, p. 136. Jones 2007. Nasr et al 2015. Arberry 1955. Pickthall 1930. Yusuf Ali 1938. Shakir 2000. Muhammad Sarwar 1982. Fayrūzabādī, al-Qamūs al-muḥīṭ, reprint (4 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1952), vol. 4, p. 227. Al-Muʿjam al-wasīṭ (Cairo: Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya, 1972); al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, vol. 8, p. 29. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (2015), The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary, ISBN0061125865. Quote: “Here with a willing hand renders ʿan yad (lit. “from/for/at hand”), which some interpret to mean that they should pay directly, without intermediary and without delay (R). Others say that it refers to its reception by Muslims and means “generously” as in “with an open hand,” since the taking of the jizyah is a form of munificence that averted a state of conflict (Q, R, Z).” M.J. Kister “‘An yadin (Qur’an IX/29): An Attempt at Interpretation,” Arabica 11 (1964):272-278. Cohen 2008, p. 56. Ahmed, Ziauddin (1975). “The concept of Jizya in early Islam”. Islamic Studies. 14 (4): 293. http://sunnah.com/bukhari/34/29Al-Shafi’i, Kitabul Umm, 4/219. Quote: «.وَسَمِعْت عَدَدًا مِنْ أَهْلِ الْعِلْمِ يَقُولُونَ الصَّغَارُ أَنْ يَجْرِيَ عَلَيْهِمْ حُكْمُ الْإِسْلَامِ» Translation: “And I heard a number of the people of knowledge state that al-sighar means that Islamic rulings are enforced on them.” al-Zuḥaylī, Wahbah (1998). ʾĀthar al-ḥarb fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī : dirāsah muqārinah آثار الحرب في الفقه الإسلامي : دراسة مقارنة (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 705. ISBN978-1-57547-453-3. Quote: «لا أن يضربوا و لا يؤذوا قال الشافعي: […] و الصغار : أن يجري عليهم الحكم» Translation: “al-Shafi’i said: […] And aṣ-Ṣaghār means that rulings are enforced on them, it does not mean that they should be beaten or be harmed.” (online) al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (2009). Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Aḥkāmih wa Falsafatih fī Ḍawʾ al-Qurʾān wa al-Sunnah فقه الجهاد: دراسة مقارنة لأحكامه وفلسفته في ضوء القرآن والسنة (in Arabic). 2 (3 ed.). Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah. p. 831. ISBN978-977-225-246-6. Quote: «وليس معنى: وَهُمْ صَاغِرُونَ إذلالهم، وإشعارهم بالهوان، كما قد يفهم بعضهم، بل ما فسّر به الإمام الشافعي (الصّغار) بإجراء حكم الإسلام عليهم، ونقل ذلك عن العلماء فقد قال: (سمعت رجالاً من أهل العلم يقولون: الصّغار أن يجري عليهم حكم الإسلام…)» Translation: “And it is not the case that the meaning of: “… while they are ṣāghirūn” is to humiliate them, and making them feel shame, like some may misunderstand, but [the meaning] is as Imām Shāfiʿī explained, that (aṣ-Ṣaghār) means that Islamic rulings are enforced on them, and he narrated this from the scholars, so he stated: (I heard a number of the people of knowledge state: aṣ-Ṣaghār means that Islamic rulings are enforced on them…)” (online) Cahen, p. 561. “A certain number of rules formulated during the ‘Abbasid period appear to be generally valid from that time onwards. Jizya is only levied on those who are male, adult, free, capable and able-bodied, so that children, old men, women, invalids, slaves, beggars, the sick and the mentally deranged are excluded. Foreigners are exempt from it on condition that they do not settle permanently in the country. Inhabitants of frontier districts who at certain times could be enrolled in military expeditions even if not Muslim (Mardaites, Amenians, etc.), were released from jizya for the year in question.” Lambton 2013, p. 205. “These rules, formulated by the jurists in the early ‘Abbasid period, appear to have remained generally valid thereafter.” Stillman 1979, pp. 159–161. al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, p. 160. Quote: «وتسقط الجزية عن الفقير وعن الشيخ وعن الزَمِن [أي صاحب العاهة]» Translation: “There is no jizya upon the poor, the old, and the chronically ill.” Dagli 2013, pp. 82–3. Ṭaʿīmah, Ṣābir (2008). al-Islām wa’l-ʿĀkhar — Dirāsah ʿan Waḍʿiyat Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī Mujtamaʿāt al-Muslimīn الإسلام والآخر — دراسة عن وضعية غير المسلمين في مجتمعات المسلمين. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd. p. 499. Quote: «وقصته رضي الله عنه مشهورة مع اليهودي الذي رآه على باب متسولاً، وهو يقول: شيخ كبير ضرير البصر، فضرب عضده من خلفه وقال: من أي أهل الكتاب أنت؟ قال: يهودي، قال: فما ألجأك إلي ما أرى؟ قال: أسأل الجزية والحاجة والسن، قال: فأخذ عمر بيده وذهب به إلى منزله فرضخ له بشيء من المنزل، ثم أرسل إلى خازن بيت المال فقال: انظر هذا وضرباءه فوالله ما أنصفناه، أن أكلنا شبيبته ثم نخذله عند الهرم، وقرأ الآية الكريمة: إِنَّمَا الصَّدَقَاتُ لِلْفُقَرَاءِ وَالْمَسَاكِينِ وَالْعَامِلِينَ عَلَيْهَا وَالْمُؤَلَّفَةِ قُلُوبُهُمْ وَفِي الرِّقَابِ وَالْغَارِمِينَ وَفِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ ۖ فَرِيضَةً مِّنَ اللَّهِ ۗ وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ [التوبة : ٦٠] والفقراء هم المسلمون، وهذا من المساكين من أهل الكتاب، ووضع عنه الجزية وعن ضربائه» Translation: “And his [ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb] – May God be pleased with him – famous story with the Jew that he saw by a door begging, while stating: ‘An old man, blind sight’. ʿUmar then asked him, ‘So why are you begging?’ ‘I am begging for money’, the man said, ‘so I can pay the jizya and fulfill my needs’. ʿUmar took him by the hand and led him to his home and gave him gifts and money, then he sent him to the treasurer of the public treasury (Bayt al-Mal) and said, ‘Take care of him and those like him, for by God, we have not treated him fairly if we benefited from him in his younger days but left him helpless in his old age! Then he recited the verse, “Alms are meant only for the poor, the needy, those who administer them, those whose hearts need winning over, to free slaves and help those in debt, for God’s cause, and for travellers in need. This is ordained by God; God is allknowing and wise.” [Quran9:60] and the poor are amongst the Muslims and this one is from the needy amongst the People of the Book.’ So ʿUmar exempted him and those like him from payment of the jizya.” (online) Abdel-Haleem 2012, p. 80. Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad (2011). Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. London: Minhaj-ul-Quran. pp. 150–2. ISBN978-0-9551888-9-3. al-Zuḥaylī, Wahbah (1998). ʾĀthar al-ḥarb fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī : dirāsah muqārinah آثار الحرب في الفقه الإسلامي : دراسة مقارنة (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 700. ISBN978-1-57547-453-3. Quote: «ما روي عن سيدنا عمر رضي الله عنه: أنه مر بشيخ من أهل الذمة يسأل على أبواب المساجد بسبب الجزية و الحاجة و السن، فقال: ما أنصفناك كنا أخذنا منك الجزية في شبيبتك ثم ضيعناك في كبرك، ثم أجرى عليه من بيت المال ما يصلحه، و وضع عنه الجزية و عن ضربائه.» Translation: “What was narrated from Sayyiduna ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb – May God be pleased with him – : That he passed by an old man from the dhimma community who was begging in front of the doors of the mosques because of [the need to pay] jizya and fulfill his needs and his old age, so he [ʿUmar] said: ‘We have not done justice to you in taking from you when you were young and forsaking you in your old age’, so he gave him a regular pension from the Bayt al-Māl (Public Treasury), and he exempted him and his likes from the jizya.” (online) Iḥsān, Al-Hindī (1993). Aḥkām al-Ḥarb wa al-Salām fī Dawlat al-Islām أحكام الحرب والسلام في دولة الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Numayr. p. 15. Al-Qurtubi, Al-Jami’ li Ahkam al-Qur’an, vol.8, p. 72. Quote: «قال علماؤنا: الذي دل عليه القرآن أن الجزية تؤخذ من المقاتلين… وهذا إجماع من العلماء على أن الجزية إنما توضع على جماجم الرجال الأحرار البالغين، وهم الذين يقاتلون دون النساء والذرية والعبيد والمجانين المغلوبين على عقولهم والشيخ الفاني» Translation: “Our scholars have said: that which the Qurʾān has indicated is that the jizya is taken from fighters … and there is a consensus amongst scholars that the jizya be only placed on the heads of free men who have reached puberty, who are the ones fighting with the exclusion of women and children and slaves and the crazy insane and the dying old man.” Al-Nawawī, Minhaj al-Talibin, 3:277. Al-Nawawī (Translated by E.C. Howard) (2005). Minhaj et talibin: a manual of Muhammadan law. Adam Publishers. pp. 337–8. ISBN978-81-7435-249-1. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimma, 1/16. Quote: «ولا جزية على شيخ فان ولا زمن ولا أعمى ولا مريض لا يرجى برؤه، بل قد أيس من صحته، وإن كانوا موسرين: وهذا مذهب أحمد وأصحابه، وأبي حنيفة، ومالك، والشافعي في أحد أمواله، لأن هؤلاء لا يقتلون ولا يقاتلون، فلا تجب عليهم الجزية كالنساء والذرية.» Translation: “And there is no Jizya upon the aged, one suffering from chronic disease, the blind, and the patient who has no hope of recovery and has despaired of his health, even if they have enough: And this is the opinion of Ahmad and his followers, and Abū Ḥanīfah, Malik, and al-Shafi’i in one narration, since those do not fight and aren’t fought, and so the jizya is exempted from them such as women and children.” Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ahkam Ahl Al-Dhimma, 1/14. Quote: «ولا جزية على صبي ولا امرأة ولا مجنون: هذا مذهب الأئمة الأربعة وأتباعهم. قال ابن المنذر: ولا أعلم عن غيرهم خلافهم. وقال أبو محمد ابن قدامة في ” المغنى ” : (لا نعلم بين أهل العلم خلافا في هذا) .» Translation: “There is no Jizya on the kids, women and the insane: This is the view of the four imams and their followers. Ibn Mundhir said, ‘I do not know anyone to have differed with them.’ Abu Muhammad Ibn Qudama said in ‘al-Mughni’, ‘We do not know of any difference of opinion among the learned on this issue.'” Lambton 2013, p. 205. “Monks were exempted according to some jurists, but Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf hold that they paid jizya if they worked.” Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ahkam Ahl Al-Dhimma, 1/17. Quote: «وأما الفلاحون الذين لا يقاتلون والحراثون […] وظاهر كلام أحمد أنه لا جزية عليهم» Translation: “As for peasants who do not fight … the dhahir from the writings of Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] is that there is no jizya [on them].” Seed, Patricia. Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640, Cambridge University Press, Oct 27, 1995, pp. 79–80. Al-Yaqoubi, Muhammad (2015). Refuting ISIS: A Rebuttal Of Its Religious And Ideological Foundations. Sacred Knowledge. pp. 54–5. ISBN978-1908224125. Markovits, C. (Ed.). (2002). A History of Modern India: 1480–1950. Anthem Press; pages 28-39, 89–127 Jackson, Peter (2003). The Delhi Sultanate : a political and military history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 282–9. ISBN978-0-521-54329-3. Eraly, Abraham (2000). Emperors of the peacock throne : the saga of the great Mughals. New York: Penguin Books. pp. 401–6. ISBN978-0-14-100143-2. Kishori Saran Lal. “Political conditions of the Hindus under the Khaljis”. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 9: 232. Gerber, Jane (1995). Sephardic studies in the university. London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. pp. 54–74. ISBN978-0-8386-3542-1. Daniel Dennett (1950). Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam. Harvard University Press. pp. 107–10, 116–28. ISBN978-0-674-33158-7. Goiten, S.D., “Evidence on the Muslim Poll Tax from Non-Muslim Sources”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1963, Vol. 6, pp. 278–9, quote – “The provisions of ancient Islamic law which exempted the indigent, the invalids and the old, were no longer observed in the Geniza period and had been discarded by the Shāfi’ī School of Law, which prevailed in Egypt, also in theory.” Stilt, Kristen (12 January 2012). “Case5.4”. Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt. OUP Oxford. ISBN9780191629822. Retrieved 19 January 2016. Eliyahu Ashtor and Leah Bornstein-Makovetsky (2008), Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd Edition, Volume 12, Thomson Gale, Article: Kharaj and Jizya, Quote: “…Many extant *Genizah letters state that the collectors imposed the tax on children and demanded it for the dead. As the family was held responsible for the payment of the jizya by all its members, it sometimes became a burden and many went into hiding in order to escape imprisonment. For example there is a Responsum by *Maimonides from another document, written in 1095, about a father paying the jizya for his two sons, 13 and 17 years old. From another document, written around 1095, it seems that the tax was due from the age of nine.” Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. p. 60. The rates of jizyah levied by the early conquerors were not uniform (online) Tritton 2008, p. 204. Hamidullah, Muhammad (1970). Introduction to Islam. International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations. p. 173. In the time of the Prophet, the jizyah amounted to ten dirhams annually, which represented the expenses of an average family for ten days. Hunter, Malik and Senturk, p. 77 Stillman 1979, pp. 159–160. Shah, Nasim Hasan (1988). “The concept of Al‐Dhimmah and the rights and duties of Dhimmis in an Islamic state”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 9 (2): 219. doi:10.1080/02666958808716075. ISSN0266-6952. Instead of cash, jizya may be paid in kind.al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (1992). Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʾIslāmī غير المسلمين في المجتمع الاسلامي (in Arabic). Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah. p. 39. ISBN978-977-7236-55-3. 3rd Ed. Quote: «وكان يسمح بدفع الجزية نقداً أو عيناً، لكن لا يسمح بتقديم الميتة أو الخنزير أو الخمر بدلاً من الجزية.» Translation: “And it was accepted to pay it in cash or in kind, but it wasn’t permitted to [pay] the jizya by means of dead [animals], pigs or wine.” (online) Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. p. 60. This tax could be paid in kind if desired; cattle, merchandise, household effects, even needles were to be accepted in lieu of specie, but not pigs, wine, or dead animals. (online) The Spread of Islam Throughout the World, edited by Idris El Hareir, Ravane Mbaye, p. 200. Mufti Muhammad Shafi, Ma’ārifu’l-Qur’ān4, p. 364. Al-Nawawī (Translated by E.C. Howard) (2005). Minhaj et talibin: a manual of Muhammadan law. Adam Publishers. pp. 339-340. ISBN978-81-7435-249-1. Ahmet Davutoğlu (1994), Alternative paradigms: the impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on political theory, p. 160. University Press of America. Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, 13/209-10. Quote: «وفي مقدار الجزية ثلاث روايات: 1 – أنها مقدرة بمقدار لا يزيد عليه ولا ينقص منه، وهذا قول أبي حنيفة والشافعي؛ […] 2 – أنها غير مقدرة بل يرجع فيها إلى اجتهاد الإمام في الزيادة والنقصان، قال الأشرم: قيل لأبي عبد الله: فيزداد اليوم فيه وينقص؟ يعني من الجزية، قال: نعم، يزاد فيه وينقص على قدر طاقتهم، على ما يرى الإمام، […] وعمر جعل الجزية على ثلاث طبقات: – على الغني ثمانية وأربعين درهمًا. – وعلى المتوسط أربعة وعشرين درهما. – وعلى الفقير اثني عشر درهما. […] وهذا يدل على أنها إلى رأي الإمام. […] قال البخاري في صحيحه (4/ 117)، قال ابن عيينة: عن ابن أبي نجيح، قلت لمجاهد: ما شأن أهل الشام عليهم أربعة دنانير، وأهل اليمن عليهم دينار؟ قال: جعل ذلك من أجل اليسار، ولأنها عوض فلم تتقدر كالأجرة. 3 – أن أقلها مقدر بدينار، وأكثرها غير مقدر، وهو اختيار أبي بكر، فتجوز الزيادة ولا يجوز النقصان؛» Translation:(incomplete) “Concerning the rate of jizya, [we can discern between] three opinions: 1. That it is a fixed amount that can’t be augmented, nor abated, and this is the opinion [as narrated from] Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi’i; […] 2. That it isn’t fixed, but it is up to the Imam (Muslim ruler) to make ijtihad (independent reasoning) in [determining whether to make] additions or subtractions, al-Ashram said: It was said to Abi ‘Abd Allah: So we add or reduce it? Meaning from jizya. He said: “Yes, it is added or subtracted according to their (dhimmis) capability, [and] according to what the Imam sees [most fitting] […] And ‘Umar made the jizya into three different layers: 48 dirhams from the rich, 24 dirhams from the middle class and 12 dirhams from the [working] poor. […] And this indicates that it goes to the opinion of the Imam. […] al-Bukhari said in his Sahih (4:117): Ibn ‘Uyaynah said: From Ibn Abi Najih: I said to Mujahid: What is the matter with the people of al-Sham who are required to pay 4 dinars, whereas the people of Yemen [only] pay one dinar? He said: It was made so for easing things (depending on the capacity of each), and since it is in exchange for something so its [amount] wasn’t fixed like employment. […] 3. That its minimum is rated at one dinar, but its maximum isn’t fixed, and this is the choice of Abu Bakr, so it is permitted to add, and it wouldn’t be lawful to reduce.” Ibn Khaldun, translation: Franz Rosenthal, N. J. Dawood (1969), The Muqaddimah : an introduction to history ; in three volumes1, p. 230. Princeton University Press. Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, Nuh Ha Mim Keller (1368). “Reliance of the Traveller” (PDF). Amana Publications. p. 608. Retrieved 14 May 2020. Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, Nuh Ha Mim Keller (1368). “A Classic Manual of Islamic Scared Law” (PDF). Shafiifiqh.com. Retrieved 14 May 2020. Ennaji, Mohammed (2013). Slavery, the state, and Islam. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60–4. ISBN978-0521119627. Aghnides, Nicolas (2005). Islamic theories of finance : with an introduction to Islamic law and a bibliography. Gorgias Press. pp. 398–408. ISBN978-1-59333-311-9. Tsadik, Daniel (2007). Between foreigners and Shi’is : nineteenth-century Iran and its Jewish minority. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press. pp. 25–30. ISBN978-0-8047-5458-3. Cohen 2008, pp. 56, 64, 69. Al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn wa ‛Umdat al-Muftīn, vol. 10, pp. 315–6. al-Maktab al-Islamiy. Ed. Zuhayr al-Chawich. Quote: « قُلْتُ: هَذِهِ الْهَيْئَةُ الْمَذْكُورَةُ أَوَّلًا: لَا نَعْلَمُ لَهَا عَلَى هَذَا الْوَجْهِ أَصْلًا مُعْتَمَدًا، وَإِنَّمَا ذَكَرَهَا طَائِفَةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا الخراسَانِيِّينَ، وَقَالَ جُمْهُورٌ الْأَصْحَابِ: تُؤْخَذُ الْجِزْيَةُ بِرِفْقٍ ، كَأَخْذِ الدُّيُونِ . فَالصَّوَابُ الْجَزْمُ بِأَنَّ هَذِهِ الْهَيْئَةَ بَاطِلَةٌ مَرْدُودَةٌ عَلَى مَنِ اخْتَرَعَهَا، وَلَمْ يُنْقَلْ أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ وَلَا أَحَدًا مِنَ الْخُلَفَاءِ الرَّاشِدِينَ فَعَلَ شَيْئًا مِنْهَا ، مَعَ أَخْذِهِمِ الْجِزْيَةَ.» Translation: “As for this aforementioned practice (hay’ah), I know of no sound support for it in this respect, and it is only mentioned by the scholars of Khurasan. The majority (jumhūr) of scholars say that the jizya is to be taken with gentleness, as one would receive a debt (dayn). The reliably correct opinion is that this practice is invalid and those who devised it should be refuted. It is not related that the Prophet or any of the rightly-guided caliphs did any such thing when collecting the jizya.” (Translation by Dr. Caner Dagli, taken from: H.R.H. Prince Ghazi Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Editors) (2013), War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad, pp. 82–3. The Islamic Texts Society Cambridge. ISBN978-1-903682-83-8.) Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Sa’id (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 133. Quote: «الإمام النووي […] قال في كتابه روضة الطالبين […]: «قلْت: هذه الْهيئَة الْمذكورة أَولا: لا نعلَم لها علَى هذا الْوجه أَصلا معتمدا، وإِنما ذكرها طائِفة من أَصحابنا الخراسانيين، وقال جمهور الأَصحاب: تؤْخذ الجزية برفق، كأَخذ الديون. فالصواب الجزم بأَن هذه الْهيئَة باطلة مردودة على من اخترعها، ولم ينقل أَن النبي ولا أَحدا من الخلَفاء الراشدين فعل شيئَا منها، مع أَخذهم الْجزية.» وقد كرر هذا التحذير وهذا النكير على هؤلاء المخترعين، في كتابه المشهور المنهاج.» Translation: “The Imām al-Nawawī […] said in his book Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn […] : «I said: As for this aforementioned practice, I know of no sound support for it in this respect, and it is only mentioned by the scholars of Khurasan. The majority (jumhūr) of scholars say that the jizya is to be taken with gentleness, as one would receive a debt (dayn). The reliably correct opinion is that this practice is invalid and those who devised it should be refuted. It is not related that the Prophet or any of the rightly-guided caliphs did any such thing when collecting the jizya.» And he repeated this warning and this negation on those innovators, in his famous book al-Minhāj.” (online) Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Sa’id (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 133. Quote: «ونقل إبن قدامة في مغنيه بعض هذه المخترعات الباطلة، ثم أوضح أن عمل رسول الله ﷺ وأصحابه والخلفاء الراشدين كان على خلاف ذلك، وأنهم كانوا يتواصون باستحصال هذا الحق بالرفق وإتباع اللطف في ذلك.» Translation: “And Ibn Qudāmah mentioned in his Mughni (encyclopedic book on fiqh) some of these flawed innovations [in the collection of this tax], and he clarified that the way of the Prophet of God – Peace be upon him -, his companions, and the rightly-guided caliphs was contrary to that, and that they encouraged that jizya be collected with gentleness and kindness.” (online) Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, 4:250. Al-Qurtubi, Ahkam al-Qur’an, vol. 8, p. 49. Quote: «وأما عقوبتهم إذا امتنعوا عن أدائها مع التمكين فجائز، فأما مع تبين عجزهم فلا تحل عقوبتهم، لأن من عجز عن الجزية سقطت عنه» Translation: “Their punishment in case of non-payment [of jizya] while they were able [to do so] is permitted; however, if their inability to pay it was clear, then it isn’t lawful to punish them, since, if one isn’t able to pay the jizya, then he is exempted.” Humphrey Fisher (2001), Slavery in the History of Muslim Black Africa. NYU Press. p. 47. Lewis, Bernard (1992). Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry. Oxford University Press. pp. 7. ISBN978-0195053265. […] those who remained faithful to their old religions and lived as protected persons (dhimmis) under Muslim rule could not, if free, be legally enclaved unless they had violated the terms of the dhimma, the contract governing their status, as for example by rebelling against Muslim rule or helping the enemies of the Muslim state or, according to some authorities, by withholding payment of the Kharaj or the Jizya, the taxes due from dhimmis to the Muslim state. Mark R. Cohen (2005), Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt, Princeton University Press, ISBN978-0691092720, pp. 120–3; 130–8, Quotes: “Family members were held responsible for individual’s poll tax (mahbus min al-jizya)”; “Imprisonment for failure to pay (poll tax) debt was very common”; “This imprisonment often meant house arrest… which was known as tarsim” I. P. Petrushevsky (1995), Islam in Iran, SUNY Press, ISBN978-0-88706-070-0, pp 155, Quote – “The law does not contemplate slavery for debt in the case of Muslims, but it allows the enslavement of Dhimmis for non-payment of jizya and kharaj.(…) ” Scott C. Levi (2002), “Hindu Beyond Hindu Kush: Indians in the Central Asian Slave Trade.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 12, Part 3 (November 2002): p. 282 Çizakça, Murat (2011). Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution and the Future. p. 20. Weiss, Holger. Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa. p. 18. Holger Weiss, Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa, p. 17. Cahen, p. 562. Kamaruddin Sharif; Wang Yong Bao (2013-08-05). Iqbal, Zamir; Mirakhor, Abbas (eds.). Economic Development and Islamic Finance. p. 239. ISBN978-0-8213-9953-8. As these examples show, the responsibility for social safety and security that the Islamic state has undertaken has not been restricted to its citizens, but has also included all residents. ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Qurchi, Samahat al-Islam. pp. 278-9. Maktabat al-‘Adib. Kamaruddin Sharif; Wang Yong Bao. Iqbal, Zamir; Mirakhor, Abbas (eds.). Economic Development and Islamic Finance. p. 239. Nuʻmānī, Shiblī (2004). Umar: Makers of Islamic Civilization. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 131. ISBN9781850436706. Hamidullah, Muhammad (1998). Le Prophète de l’Islam : Sa vie, Son œuvre (in French). 2. Paris: El-Najah. pp. 877–8. Rappelons ici la pratique du Calife Abû Bakr : après la conquête de la ville de Hîrah, le commandant Khâlid, au nom du calife, conclut un traité, où il dit : “… en outre, je leur accorde que tout vieillard qui deviendrait inapte au travail, ou qu’aurait frappé un malheur, ou bien qui, de riche deviendrait pauvre, se mettant ainsi à la merci de la charité de ses coreligionnaires, sera exonéré par moi de la jizya (capitation), et recevra l’aide du Trésor Public des Musulmans, lui et les personnes dont il a la charge, et ce, pour aussi longtemps qu’il demeurera en terre d’Islam (dâr al-Islam). Translation: “Let us recall here the practice of the Caliph Abu Bakr : After the conquest of the city of Hirah, the commandant Khalid, by the name of the Caliph, concluded a treaty, where he states : “… I assured them that any [non-Muslim] person who is unable to earn his livelihood, or is struck by disaster, or who becomes destitute and is helped by the charity of his fellow men will be exempted from the jizya and he and his family will be supplied with sustenance by the Bayt al-Mal (public treasury), and this, as long as he’s staying in the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam).” al-Zuḥaylī, Wahbah (1998). ʾĀthar al-ḥarb fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī : dirāsah muqārinah آثار الحرب في الفقه الإسلامي : دراسة مقارنة (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. p. 700. ISBN978-1-57547-453-3. Quote: «و جاء في كتاب خالد بن الوليد لأهل الحيرة: و جعلت لهم أيما شيخ ضعف عن العمل، أو أصابته آفة من الآفات، أو كان غنياً فافتقر و سار أهل دينه يتصدقون عليه، طرحت جزيته و عيل من بيت مال المسلمين و عياله.» Translation: “And it was stated in the treaty of Khalid b. al-Walid with the people of al-Hirah: I assured them that any [non-Muslim] person who is unable to earn his livelihood, or is struck by disaster, or who becomes destitute and is helped by the charity of his fellow men will be exempted from the jizya and he and his family will be supplied with sustenance by the Bayt al-Mal (public treasury).” (online) Abu Yusuf. Kitāb al-Kharāj كتاب الخراج (in Arabic). Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah. pp. 143–4. Quote: «هذا كتاب من خالد بن الوليد لاهل الحيرة […] وأيما شخص ضعف عن العمل أو أصابته آفة من الآفات أو كان غنيا فافتقر وصار أهل دينه يتصدقون عليه، طرحت جزيته وأعيل من بيت مال المسلمين و عياله» Translation: “This is a treaty of Khalid b. al-Walid to the people of al-Hirah […] Any [non-Muslim] person who is unable to earn his livelihood, or is struck by disaster, or who becomes destitute and is helped by the charity of his fellow men will be exempted from the jizya and he and his family will be supplied with sustenance by the Bayt al-Mal (public treasury).” Iḥsān, Al-Hindī (1993). Aḥkām al-Ḥarb wa al-Salām fī Dawlat al-Islām أحكام الحرب والسلام في دولة الإسلام (in Arabic). Damascus: Dār al-Numayr. p. 15. Quote: «و كان للذميين كذلك نوع من التأمين الاجتماعي ضد العوز و الشيخوخه و المرض، و الدليل على ذلك أن خالداً بن الوليد كتب في عهده لأهل الحيرة المسيحيين بعد فتحها: 《 و جعلت لهم أيما شيخ ضعف عن العمل، أو أصابته آفة من الآفات، أو كان غنياً فافتقر و سار أهل دينه يتصدقون عليه، طرحت جزيته و عيل من بيت مال المسلمين و عياله 》» Translation: “And dhimmis had also a kind of social insurance in case of destitution or advanced age or sickness, and the justification for that is the treaty of Khalid b. al-Walid that he wrote with the people of al-Hirah [who were] Christians after its fath: 《Any [non-Muslim] person who is unable to earn his livelihood, or is struck by disaster, or who becomes destitute and is helped by the charity of his fellow men will be exempted from the jizya and he and his family will be supplied with sustenance by the Bayt al-Mal (public treasury).》” al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (1992). Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʾIslāmī غير المسلمين في المجتمع الاسلامي (in Arabic). Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah. pp. 16–7. ISBN978-977-7236-55-3. 3rd Ed. (online); al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (2009). Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Aḥkāmih wa Falsafatih fī Ḍawʾ al-Qurʾān wa al-Sunnah فقه الجهاد: دراسة مقارنة لأحكامه وفلسفته في ضوء القرآن والسنة (in Arabic). 2. Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah. p. 1005. ISBN978-977-225-246-6. 3rd Ed. Quote: «قال رسول الله ﷺ: «كُلُّكُمْ رَاعٍ، وَكُلُّكُمْ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ، فَالإِمَامُ رَاعٍ وَهْوَ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ …» وهذا ما مضت به سنة الراشدين ومن بعدهم. ففي عقد الذمة اللذي كتبه خالد إبن الوليد لأهل الحيرة بالعراق، وكانوا من النصارى: (وجعلت لهم: أيما شيخ ضعف عن العمل، أو اصابته آفة من الآفات، أو كان غنياً فافتقر وصار أهل دينه يتصدقون عليه: طرحت جزيته، وعيل من بيت مال المسلمين هو وعياله). وكان هذا في عهد أبي بكر الصديق، وبحضرة عدد كبير من الصحابة، وقد كتب خالد به إلى أبي بكر الصديق خليفة رسول الله، ولم ينكر عليه أحد، ومثل هذا يعد إجماعاً.» Translation: “The Prophet of God ﷺ said: «Everyone of you is a guardian, and everyone of you is responsible for his charges: The ruler (Imām) is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects …» And that is how things went in the (period) of the Rāshidūn and those after them. So we find in the treaty of protection between Khālid b. al-Walīd and the town of al-Ḥīrah in ʿIrāq, who were Christians: (I assured them that any [non-Muslim] person who is unable to earn his livelihood, or is struck by disaster, or who becomes destitute and is helped by the charity of his fellow men will be exempted from the jizya and he and his family will be supplied with sustenance by the public treasury). And this was in the era of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, with the presence of a large number of companions, and this was (also) written by Khālid to Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq the successor of the Prophet of God, and no one disagreed with him (on this matter), and (so) things like this are considered to be a consensus.” (online) Seed, Patricia (1995). Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640. Cambridge University Press. p. 79. ISBN978-0-521-49757-2. Retrieved 21 February 2020. Seed, Patricia (1995). Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640. Cambridge University Press. p. 82. ISBN978-0-521-49757-2. Retrieved 21 February 2020. Payment of tribute was often rationalized, as jizya had been, as a contribution by indigenous peoples to their military defense.Cahen, p. 559. William Montgomery Watt (1980), pp. 49–50. Hoyland, In God’s Path, 2015: p.198 Stillman 1979, pp. 17–18. Gil, Moshe (1997). A History of Palestine: 634–1099. Cambridge University Press. pp. 28–30. Bravmann 2009, p. 204. “Whereas in the (non-Islamic) examples mentioned by us above the good deed consists in the pardon granted by an individual according to his discretion to an individual who has been vanquished and taken captive by him, in the Qur’an verse discussed by us the good deed, and hence also the “reward” (jizya = jaza’ = tawab) necessarily following it according to ancient Arab common law have become a practice normally occurring and that must be performed: the life of all prisoners of war belonging to a certain privileged category of non-believers must, as a rule, be spared. All must be subject to pardon – provided they grant the “reward” (jizya) to be expected for an act of pardon (sparing of life).” Anver M. Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law, p. 98, note 3. Oxford University Press, ISBN978-0199661633. Quote: “Some studies question the nearly synonymous use of the terms kharaj and jizya in the historical sources. The general view suggests that while the terms kharaj and jizya seem to have been used interchangeably in early historical sources, what they referred to in any given case depended on the linguistic context. If one finds references to “a kharaj on their heads,” the reference was to a poll tax, despite the use of the term kharaj, which later became the term of art for land tax. Likewise, if one fins the phrase “jizya on their land,” this referred to a land tax, despite the use of jizya which later come to refer to the poll tax. Early history therefore shows that although each term did not have a determinate technical meaning at first, the concepts of poll tax and land tax existed early in Islamic history.” Denner, Conversion and the Poll Tax, 3–10; Ajiaz Hassan Qureshi, “The Terms Kharaj and Jizya and Their Implication,” Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society 12 (1961): 27–38; Hossein Modarressi Rabatab’i, Kharaj in Islamic Law (London: Anchor Press Ltd, 1983). Dennett 1950, p. 11. Cahen, p. 560. Hoyland 2014, p. 99. Hoyland 2014, p. 199. Cahen, p. 561. Dennett 1950, p. 103. “ʿUmar II, however ordered all converts to be exempt from the poll tax. They paid their land tax as always.” Hoyland 2014, pp. 201–202. Dennett 1950, p. 113. Hoyland 2014, p. 200. Jackson, Peter (2003). The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 284–6. ISBN978-0521543293. Irfan Habib, Economic History of Medieval India, 1200-1500, Vol VIII, part 1, pp. 78–80. ISBN978-81-317-2791-1. Fouzia Ahmed (2009), The Delhi Sultanate: A Slave Society or A Society with Slaves?, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, 30(1): 8-9 Elliot, H. M. (Henry Miers), Sir; John Dowson. “15. Táríkh-i Fíroz Sháhí, of Ziauddin Barani”. The History of India, as Told by Its Own Historians. The Muhammadan Period (Vol 3.). London, Trübner & Co. p. 184. Quote – The Sultan then asked, “How are Hindus designated in the law, as payers of tributes or givers of tribute? The Kazi replied, “They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them, they should tender gold. If the officer throws dirt into their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths to receive it. The due subordination of the zimmi is exhibited in this humble payment and by this throwing of dirt in their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty. God holds them in contempt, for he says, “keep them under in subjection”. To keep the Hindus in abasement is especially a religious duty, because they are the most inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because the Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, enslave them and spoil their wealth and property. No doctor but the great doctor (Hanafi), to whose school we belong, has assented to the imposition of the jizya (poll tax) on Hindus. Doctors of other schools allow no other alternative but Death or Islam. Vincent A Smith, The Oxford History of India: From the Earliest Times to the End of 1911 at Google Books, Chapter 2, pp 236–42, Oxford University Press William Hunter (1903), A Brief History of the Indian Peoples, p. 124, at Google Books, 23rd Edition, pp. 124–8 Muḥammad ibn Tughluq Encyclopedia Britannica (2009) Vincent A Smith, The Oxford History of India: From the Earliest Times to the End of 1911 at Google Books, Chapter 2, pp. 249–51, Oxford University Press. Futuhat-i Firoz Shahi Autobiography of Firoz Shah Tughlaq, Translated y Elliot and Dawson, Volume 3 – The History of India, Cornell University, pp 374–83 Annemarie Schimmel (1997). Islam in the Indian Subcontinent. Brill Academic. pp. 20–23. ISBN978-9004061170. Kingship in Kaśmīr (AD 1148‒1459); From the Pen of Jonarāja, Court Paṇḍit to Sulṭān Zayn al-‛Ābidīn. Edited by Walter Slaje. With an Annotated Translation, Indexes and Maps. [Studia Indologica Universitatis Halensis. 7.] Halle 2014. ISBN978-3-86977-088-8 Slaje, Walter (2019). “What Does it Mean to Smash an Idol? Iconoclasm in Medieval Kashmir as Reflected by Contemporaneous Sanskrit Sources”. Brahma’s Curse : Facets of Political and Social Violence in Premodern Kashmir. Studia Indologica Universitatis Halensis – 13. p. 36. ISBN978-3-86977-199-1. Satish C. Misra, The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat (Bombay, 1963), p.175. Truschke, Audrey (2020-07-20). “5. Moral Man and Leader”. Aurangzeb : The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King. Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503602595-009/html. ISBN978-1-5036-0259-5. Lal, Vinay. “Aurangzeb, Akbar, and the Communalization of History”. Manas. Lal, Vinay. “Aurangzeb’s Fatwa on Jizya”. MANAS. Retrieved 2021-02-05. Chandra, Satish (1969). “Jizyah and the State in India during the 17th Century”. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 12 (3): 322–340. doi:10.2307/3596130. ISSN0022-4995. Aurangzeb, Emperor of Hindustan; Jamshedji Hormasji Bilimoriya (1908). Ruka’at-i-Alamgiri; or, Letters of Aurungzebe, with historical and explanatory notes;. University of California Libraries. London : Luzac [etc., etc.] Truschke, Audrey (2017-01-01). “7. Later Years”. Aurangzeb: The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King. Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503602595-011. ISBN978-1-5036-0259-5. Markovits, C. (Ed.). (2002). A History of Modern India: 1480–1950, Anthem Press. pp. 109-12. Shlomo Simonsohn, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Jews in Sicily, Brill, ISBN978-9004192454, pp 24, 163 Stefan Winter (2012), The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788, Cambridge University Press, ISBN978-1107411432, p. 64. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman et al (1960), ISBN9789004161214, Jizya “The Zoroastrians who remained in Persia (modern Iran) after the Arab–Muslim conquest (7th century AD) had a long history as outcasts. Although they purchased some toleration by paying the jizya (poll tax), not abolished until 1882, they were treated as an inferior race, had to wear distinctive garb, and were not allowed to ride horses or bear arms.” Gabars, Encyclopædia Britannica. 2007. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. 29 May 2007.[full citation needed] “Though in Tunisia and Algeria the jizya/kharaj practice was eliminated during the 19th century, Moroccan Jewry still paid these taxes as late as the first decade of the twentieth century.” Michael M. Laskier, North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century: Jews of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, NYU Press, 1994, p. 12. Mordechai Zaken, Jewish Subjects and their Tribal Chieftains in Kurdistan: A Study in Survival, Brill, 2007, pp. 280–284–71. “Sikhs pay Rs 20 million as ‘tax’ to Taliban”. Tribuneindia.com. 16 April 2009. Retrieved 30 October 2015. Caris, Charlie. “The Islamic State Announces Caliphate”. Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 1 July 2014. Scott, Rachel (2010). The challenge of political Islam non-Muslims and the Egyptian state. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. p. 101. ISBN978-0-8047-6906-8. In the mid-1980s Yusuf al-Qaradawi argued that non-Muslims should not serve in the army and should pay the jizya on the basis that the Islamic state is best protected by those who believe in it.al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf (2007). al-Dīn wa-al-siyāsah : taʼṣīl wa-radd shubuhāt الدين والسياسة : تأصيل ورد شبهات. Dublin: European Council for Fatwa and Research. p. 157. Quote: «و اليوم بعد أن أصبح التجنيد الإجباري مفروضا على كل المواطنين − مسلمين و غير مسلمين − لم يعد هناك مجال لدفع أي مال، لا باسم جزية، و لا غيرها.» Translation: “Nowadays, after military conscription has become compulsory for all citizens — Muslims and non-Muslims — there is no longer room for any payment, whether by name of jizya, or any other.” (online) Hoyland 2014, p. 198. “The most contentious aspect of this discriminatory policy was taxation. Initially, as one would expect, the Arabs, as conquerors and soldiers/rulers, did not pay any taxes. The (adult male) conquered people, on the other hand, all paid tax, irrespective of their religion or ethnicity, unless they were granted an exemption in return for providing military service or spying or the like.” Stillman 1979, p. 28. Malik, Jamal (2008). Islam in South Asia a short history. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. p. 69. ISBN978-90-04-16859-6. It is to be noted that this tax was collected in lieu of military service, but the problem gets compounded when we learn that so many Hindus fought in Muslim armies. It was only with expanding Muslim rule by the later half of the fourteenth century, that jizya was levied on non-Muslims as a discriminatory tax, but was relaxed here and there. Chandra, S. (1969), Jizyah and the State in India during the 17th Century, Journal de l’histoire economique et sociale de l’Orient, p. 339. Quote: “Politically, the greatest objection to jizyah was that it harassed and alienated some of the most influential sections of the Hindus, namely the urban masses […] These people were subjected to great harassment and oppression by the collectors of jizyah, and in retaliation resorted on a number of occasions to hartal and public demonstrations.” Markovits, Claude (2004). A history of modern India, 1480-1950. London: Anthem. p. 30. ISBN978-1-84331-152-2. the jizya [was] the symbol par excellence of the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims: it is highly doubtful that it was in reality levied as a tax distinct from the land tax; the terms jizya and kharaj are interchangeable in the texts dating from this time. The extremely theoretical nature of this discrimination must be kept in mind when there is reference to its abolition or its restoration under the Moguls. Takim, L. (2007), Holy Peace or Holy War: Tolerance and Co-existence in the Islamic Juridical Tradition, Islam and Muslim Societies, 4(2). pp. 14-6 Ramadan al-Buti, Muhammad Sa’id (2005). Al-Jihād fī’l-Islām. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr. pp. 132–3. Quote: «تزيدات مبتدعة في طريقة استحصال الرسم أو الضريبة التي تسمى الجزية. و في معاملة الكتابيين عموماً، لم نقرأها في القرآن، و لم نجد دليلاً عليها في سنَّة عن رسول الله ﷺ، و إنما ذكرها بعض متأخري الفقهاء. […] و قد أنكر محققو الفقهاء على إختلاف مذاهبهم، هده التزايدات المبتدعة، و المقحمة في أحكام الشرع و مبادئه، و حذروا من اعتمادها و الأخذ بها.» Translation: “Heretical additions in the collection methods of the tax that is called the jizya, and in the common behavior with the People of the Book in general, that we didn’t read in the Qur’an, and that we didn’t find evidence for in the Sunnah of the Prophet of God – Peace be upon him, but that was mentioned by some later jurists (fuqahā). […] In point of fact, leading scholars (muḥaqqiqū) of jurisprudence, despite their differences in their respective schools of jurisprudence (madhāhib), have denied and refuted these heretical innovations, that were intrusive in the rules and principles of the Law, and they warned against following and taking them.” Emon, Anver (2012). Religious pluralism and Islamic law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 98. ISBN978-0-19-966163-3. Imposing poll-taxes and other regulatory measures on minority religious communities was not unique to the Islamic tradition. Rather, discriminatory regulations were utilized by many polities throughout antiquity, late antiquity, and the medieval period. Victoria, William L. Cleveland, late of Simon Fraser University, Martin Bunton, University of (2013). A history of the modern Middle East (Fifth ed.). New York: Westview Press. p. 13. ISBN978-0813348346. Lewis, Bernard (2002). Arabs in History. p. 57. ISBN978-0-19280-31-08. Lapidus, Ira M. (2014). A History of Islamic societes. Cambridge University Press. p. 53. ISBN9780521514309. Tramontana, Felicita (2013). “The Poll Tax and the Decline of the Christian Presence in the Palestinian Countryside in the 17th Century”. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 56 (4–5): 631–652. doi:10.1163/15685209-12341337. The (cor)relation between the payment of the poll-tax and conversion to Islam, has long been the subject of scholarly debate. At the beginning of the twentieth century scholars suggested that after the Muslim conquest the local populations converted en masse to evade the payment of the poll tax. This assumption has been challenged by subsequent research. Indeed Dennett’s study clearly showed that the payment of the poll tax was not a sufficient reason to convert after the Muslim conquest and that other factors—such as the wish to retain social status—had greater influence. According to Inalcik the wish to evade payment of the jizya was an important incentive for conversion to Islam in the Balkans, but Anton Minkov has recently argued that taxation was only one of a number of motivations.Dennett 1950, p. 10. “Wellhausen makes the assumption that the poll tax amounted to so little that exemption from it did not constitute sufficient economic motive for conversion.” Walker Arnold, Thomas (1913). Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. Constable & Robinson Ltd. pp. 59. … but this jizyah was too moderate to constitute a burden, seeing that it released them from the compulsory military service that was incumbent on their Muslim fellow-subjects. Conversion to Islam was certainly attended by a certain pecuniary advantage, but his former religion could have had but little hold on a convert who abandoned it merely to gain exemption from the jizyah; and now, instead of jizyah, the convert had to pay the legal alms, zakāt, annually levied on most kinds of movable and immovable property. (online) Cohen 2008, pp. 72-73. Abdel-Haleem 2012, p. 86.