Epigraph:

And they ask you concerning the soul. Say, ‘The soul is by the command of my Lord; and of the knowledge thereof you have been given but a little.’ (Al Quran 17:85)

Abstract

Presented by Zia H Shah MD

This research report presents an exhaustive examination of the life, career, and philosophical system of Colin McGinn, a figure who stands as one of the most intellectually distinct and institutionally controversial philosophers of the contemporary era. Rising from a working-class background to the pinnacles of academia at Oxford, Rutgers, and the University of Miami, McGinn played a pivotal role in shaping the modern philosophy of mind through his advocacy of “New Mysterianism”—the thesis that the human mind is cognitively closed to the solution of the hard problem of consciousness.

The report provides a detailed biographical reconstruction, tracing his educational lineage under Michael Ayers and P.F. Strawson, his celebrated tenure as the Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy at Oxford, and the abrupt, scandal-ridden conclusion of his academic career in 2013 following allegations of sexual harassment. Beyond biography, the document offers a granular analysis of his Ontological framework, synthesizing insights from his extensive bibliography and his appearances on the Closer to Truth series. It dissects his arguments for Ontological Pluralism, his rejection of reductive physicalism, and his rigorous distinction between contingent concreta and necessary abstracta.

Furthermore, the report critically evaluates his forays into the metaphysics of physics, specifically the controversial “Deletion Theory” of matter, and his evolutionary speculations regarding the cognitive role of the human hand in Prehension. By weaving together the strands of his logical realism, his naturalistic skepticism, and his late-career independent scholarship, this monograph aims to provide a definitive account of a thinker who argues that the ultimate nature of reality—from the qualia of the mind to the substance of space—lies permanently beyond the perimeter of human conceptual anatomy.

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1. Introduction: The Enigma of Analysis

In the landscape of late 20th-century analytic philosophy, few figures commanded as much attention—and eventually, as much division—as Colin McGinn. A philosopher of immense technical skill and broad cultural interests, McGinn spent decades at the center of the Anglo-American tradition, holding court at its most prestigious institutions: University College London, Oxford University, Rutgers University, and the University of Miami.¹ His intellectual output is characterized by a rare combination of analytic rigor and existential humility, a duality that culminated in his most famous contribution to the field: the doctrine of “New Mysterianism”.³

McGinn’s philosophy fundamentally challenges the Enlightenment optimism that has driven Western science and philosophy for three centuries. While most materialists and dualists fought over how to explain the mind, McGinn posed a more radical question: Can we explain it? His answer—that the human intellect is biologically constrained, or “cognitively closed,” to the deep nature of consciousness—shifted the terrain of the debate from the ontology of the mind to the epistemology of the human organism.²

However, the trajectory of McGinn’s influence cannot be separated from the turbulence of his personal and professional history. In 2013, his tenure at the University of Miami ended in a widely publicized resignation following allegations of sexual harassment, an event that sparked a reckoning within the discipline regarding gender, power, and professional conduct.⁵ This report seeks to provide a holistic analysis of McGinn, treating his biography and his philosophy as intertwined narratives of exploration, limitation, and exile. It examines his work not merely as a series of arguments but as a coherent, albeit controversial, worldview that seeks to map the outer limits of what can be known.

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2. Biographical Foundations and Academic Ascent

2.1. From Hartlepool to Oxford: The Education of a Philosopher

Born in 1950 in West Hartlepool, England, Colin McGinn’s origins were far removed from the aristocratic traditions of the British academy.¹ He was raised in Gillingham, Kent, in a mining family background that prioritized practical labor over abstract speculation.⁸ This background would later inform his “plain-speaking” philosophical style and his disdain for the obfuscating jargon often found in continental philosophy.

McGinn initially pursued psychology at Manchester University, driven by a desire to understand the human mind.¹ However, he found empirical psychology’s behaviorist and statistical focus insufficient for addressing the fundamental questions of existence and consciousness. Seeking a more rigorous framework, he pivoted to philosophy, a decision that led him to Jesus College, Oxford, in 1972.²

Oxford in the early 1970s was the epicenter of analytic philosophy. McGinn was initially admitted to study for a Bachelor of Letters (a postgraduate research degree) but was quickly identified as a student of exceptional promise. On the recommendation of his advisor, Michael R. Ayers, he transferred to the Bachelor of Philosophy (BPhil) program.² The BPhil at Oxford is notoriously rigorous, designed to produce professional philosophers. McGinn thrived in this environment, culminating in his receipt of the University’s prestigious John Locke Prize in Mental Philosophy in 1973.²

His BPhil thesis, written in 1974, was supervised by two titans of 20th-century thought: Michael Ayers and P.F. Strawson.² The thesis focused on the semantics of Donald Davidson, an American philosopher whose work on truth-conditional semantics and the “anomalous monism” of the mind would deeply influence McGinn’s early commitment to realism and his later struggles with the mind-body problem. This period instilled in McGinn a lifelong commitment to the analytic method—clarity, logical precision, and argumentation—even as he would later use these tools to argue for the limits of analysis itself.

2.2. The London and Oxford Years (1974–1990)

Upon completing his education, McGinn began a rapid ascent through the British academic hierarchy. He served as a lecturer and later a reader in philosophy at University College London (UCL) from 1974 to 1985.¹ During his time at UCL, he published The Character of Mind (1982), a text that established him as a lucid expositor of the central problems in the philosophy of mind.²

In 1985, McGinn returned to Oxford to assume the position of Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, succeeding Gareth Evans.² The Wilde Readership is one of the most distinguished chairs in the field, and McGinn’s appointment signaled his arrival as a leading figure in British philosophy. His tenure at Oxford (1985–1990) was marked by prolific productivity, including work on Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein on Meaning, 1984) and the philosophy of language.⁹ He held visiting professorships at institutions across the globe, including UCLA, the University of Bielefeld, and the University of Helsinki, expanding his reputation beyond the UK.²

2.3. The Rutgers Era: The “Dream Team” (1990–2006)

By the late 1980s, the center of gravity in the philosophy of mind was shifting across the Atlantic. Rutgers University in New Jersey was aggressively recruiting top talent to build a world-class department. In 1990, McGinn joined Rutgers as a full professor, becoming a key member of a faculty that included Jerry Fodor, Ernest Lepore, and Stephen Stich.²

The Rutgers years were arguably McGinn’s most influential period. It was here that he fully articulated the “New Mysterian” position in The Problem of Consciousness (1991) and the best-selling The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (1999).¹ Working alongside Jerry Fodor—another giant of the field who shared McGinn’s skepticism about current theories of consciousness—McGinn helped cement Rutgers’ reputation as the premier department for cognitive science and philosophy of mind in the world.

2.4. The Move to Miami (2006–2013)

In 2006, McGinn left the northeast to join the University of Miami as a Professor of Philosophy and Cooper Fellow.¹ The move was viewed as a semi-retirement into a warmer climate where he could focus on writing. During this period, his interests broadened significantly. He published on topics ranging from the philosophy of film (The Power of Movies, 2005) to literature (Shakespeare’s Philosophy, 2006) and even the metaphysics of sport.¹ He became a public intellectual, appearing in documentaries like The Atheism Tapes and the Closer to Truth series, and writing novels.²

This period of broad intellectual exploration, however, was destined to end in a controversy that would overshadow his academic achievements and lead to his departure from the institutional university system.

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3. The Miami Controversy and Institutional Exile

3.1. The Allegations and Investigation

The coda to McGinn’s academic career began in 2012 when a graduate student at the University of Miami filed a formal complaint alleging sexual harassment.⁵ The allegations centered on a series of electronic communications—emails and text messages—sent by McGinn to the student, whom he was advising.

The content of these messages, which later became public through leaked documents and blog posts, was explicitly sexual. Reports indicated that McGinn had written to the student about his sexual fantasies involving her, including references to “handjobs” and other intimate acts.¹³ In one instance, he allegedly wrote, “This morning at 6 I had a handjob imagining you giving me a handjob. It was good”.¹³ The student, Monica Morrison, alleged that these advances were unwanted and created a hostile educational environment, given the power differential between a celebrated tenured professor and a graduate student dependent on his mentorship.⁷

3.2. The Defense and Resignation

McGinn’s defense, articulated in blog posts and through supporters like University of Miami colleague Edward Erwin, was that the relationship was a consensual “romance” or a playful intellectual friendship that had evolved into flirtation.¹³ McGinn argued that the student had reciprocated the affection in her own messages, using phrases like “sending you virtual hugs” and “thinking of your thumb intertwined with mine”.¹³ He contended that the university’s investigation failed to consider the context of the relationship and the student’s apparent participation in the banter.¹⁴

Furthermore, McGinn claimed that he resigned in 2013 not because he admitted to harassment, but to avoid a protracted tenure revocation process. He stated that he left believing no formal finding of sexual harassment had been made against him, a claim contradicted by university officials who indicated that the resignation was accepted in lieu of disciplinary action that would have likely resulted from the investigation’s findings.⁵

3.3. The Aftermath and Wider Debate

The “McGinn Case” became a flashpoint for a broader cultural war within academic philosophy. The discipline, historically male-dominated, was already grappling with accusations of systemic sexism. McGinn’s resignation triggered a polarized response.

• Supporters (including some prominent philosophers and colleagues) argued that the university had overreached, policing consensual adult relationships and failing to distinguish between awkward romance and predatory harassment. They worried about the implications for academic freedom and due process.¹³
• Critics argued that McGinn’s behavior exemplified the “star system” toxicities, where senior faculty felt entitled to sexualize their subordinates. They pointed out that even if a student attempts to navigate a professor’s advances with polite or ambiguous responses, the power dynamic makes true consent difficult to establish.⁶

Following his resignation, McGinn was effectively exiled from the academy. He lost his affiliation with the University of Miami and was removed from visiting professorships (e.g., at East Carolina University) as the scandal followed him.² Despite this, he continued to publish prolifically as an independent scholar, releasing books through major academic presses like MIT Press and Oxford University Press well after 2013, suggesting that while his institutional persona was riven, his intellectual standing retained significant weight.¹⁶

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4. The Philosophy of Mind: Constructing the Mystery

4.1. The Hard Problem and the Failure of Materialism

McGinn’s most enduring contribution to philosophy is his intervention in the mind-body problem. By the late 20th century, the dominant view in Anglo-American philosophy was Physicalism (or Materialism): the view that the mind is the brain, and mental states are identical to, or supervene upon, physical states.

McGinn, however, found the standard materialist accounts—such as functionalism or identity theory—woefully inadequate. He aligned himself with the “Hard Problem” articulated by Thomas Nagel and later David Chalmers: no matter how much we know about neurons firing, there is an “explanatory gap” between the objective third-person mechanism and the subjective first-person feeling of what it is like to be conscious.³

However, unlike Dualists (who posit a soul) or Panpsychists (who say everything is conscious), McGinn proposed a naturalistic but skeptical solution.

4.2. New Mysterianism and Cognitive Closure

McGinn’s position, termed “New Mysterianism” by Owen Flanagan (a play on the 60s band Question Mark and the Mysterians), rests on the concept of Cognitive Closure.²

The argument proceeds as follows:

1. Naturalism: Consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon. It is not a miracle; it arises from the brain in virtue of some specific property of the brain, let’s call it $P$ (or $C*$ in some texts).
2. Evolutionary Limitation: Human beings are evolved organisms, not all-knowing gods. Our cognitive faculties (intelligence) evolved to solve specific survival problems (hunting, gathering, social navigation).
3. The Closure Thesis: Just as a dog is “cognitively closed” to the concept of a prime number—not because prime numbers are magical, but because the dog’s brain lacks the architecture to grasp them—human beings are likely cognitively closed to the property $P$ that links the brain to the mind.³
4. The Two Windows: McGinn argues we have two ways of accessing reality:
   • Perception: We look outwards at the physical world (seeing neurons, tissue). This reveals spatial properties.
   • Introspection: We look inwards at our own mind. This reveals consciousness.
   • The Blind Spot: Neither faculty can reveal the link between the two. Property $P$ is theoretically “noumenal” to us; it does not present itself in perception (it’s not a visible neuron) nor in introspection (we don’t “feel” our neurons).

4.3. The Hidden Structure of Reality

In The Mysterious Flame (1999), McGinn elaborates that for consciousness to emerge from the brain, the brain must have properties that are fundamentally different from the standard spatial properties we observe in physics. He speculates that the “hidden structure” of the universe—the property that unites mind and matter—might be non-spatial or pre-spatial.¹⁸

He draws a parallel to physics before the discovery of electromagnetic fields or gravity. Just as pre-Newtonian humans might have found action-at-a-distance “mysterious,” we find the mind-brain link mysterious. But unlike the gravity case, McGinn suspects we can never make the conceptual leap required to solve it. We are “terminally confused” about the mind.²⁰

4.4. Critical Reception of Mysterianism

McGinn’s Mysterianism provoked intense debate.

• Critics like Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland accused him of “defeatism.” They argued that drawing an analogy between dogs and humans is flawed because humans have language and culture, which act as “cognitive prosthetics,” extending our reach indefinitely. We can understand quantum mechanics, which is highly counter-intuitive; why not consciousness?.²⁰
• Supporters (or partial allies) like Thomas Nagel and Noam Chomsky agreed with the premise of biological limitation. Chomsky, in particular, distinguished between “problems” (solvable) and “mysteries” (permanent), placing consciousness in the latter category.³

McGinn defended his view as “Existential Naturalism.” He is not saying the mind is supernatural; he is saying the human mind is limited. It is a plea for epistemic humility.

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5. Ontology and Metaphysics: The Closer to Truth Dialogues

While his work on mind is famous, McGinn’s broader Ontology—his theory of existence—is equally rigorous. His appearances on the Closer to Truth series with Robert Lawrence Kuhn provide a vital oral history of these views.

5.1. The Question of “Something Rather Than Nothing”

In the video clip “Why is There Anything at All?” ²¹, McGinn tackles the Leibnizian question. His analysis is a masterclass in analytic metaphysics.

The Problem of the Question: McGinn argues that the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is grammatically similar to “Why is there a mountain here?” but logically distinct.

• To explain a mountain, you appeal to something else (tectonic plates).
• To explain “Something” (the totality of existence), there is nothing else outside of it to appeal to.
• Therefore, a causal explanation for the totality of existence is logically impossible.

Abstract vs. Concrete: McGinn solves the anxiety of the question by distinguishing between two types of existence:

1. Abstract Objects (Necessary): Numbers, logic, and truth. McGinn argues these exist in all possible worlds. There is no possible world where $2+2=5$. Therefore, absolute “Nothingness” is impossible. “Nothing” cannot exist because numbers must exist.²¹
2. Concrete Objects (Contingent): The physical universe, stars, and minds. These could have failed to exist.

Brute Facts: McGinn concludes that we must accept Brute Facts. The existence of the contingent concrete universe is a brute fact. It has no explanation. We must accept that the chain of explanation ends. He argues that the feeling of “mystery” we have about existence is a result of our mind trying to apply a local tool (causality) to a global totality where it doesn’t belong.²¹

5.2. Ontological Pluralism and the Kuhn Interview

In his specific interview with Robert Lawrence Kuhn ²², McGinn systematically dismantles the popular worldview of “Scientific Materialism.”

Critique of the “Physical”: When asked about the categories of reality, McGinn challenges the very definition of “physical.” He notes that modern physics is divided between Particles (discrete, hard) and Fields (continuous, fluid). He suggests these might be ontologically distinct categories, not just one thing called “matter”.²²

The Failure of Monism: McGinn identifies as an Ontological Pluralist. He argues that “Monism” (the idea that reality is made of one stuff) is a mistake.

• Mental Pluralism: He argues that the “Mental” is not one thing. Feeling pain (phenomenology) is totally different from thinking a thought (cognition).
• The Reality of Value: Most strikingly, McGinn argues that Value (moral and aesthetic truth) is a genuine slice of the pie of reality.²² It is not reducible to physics or psychology. “Goodness” exists in the universe just as “Gravity” does.

Science as Metaphysics: McGinn explicitly tells Kuhn that when scientists say “Only the physical exists,” they are no longer doing science; they are doing bad metaphysics. No experiment can prove that “only” physical things exist; that is a philosophical dogma, not an empirical finding.²²

5.3. Table: McGinn’s Ontological Categories

Category	Nature	Status	Example
Abstracta	Non-spatial, non-temporal	Necessary	Numbers, Logic, Propositions
Concreta (Physical)	Spatial, Temporal	Contingent	Atoms, Stars, Tables
Concreta (Mental)	Non-spatial (?), Temporal	Contingent	Pain, Color perception, Thoughts
Value	Normative	Necessary (?)	Moral truths (“Cruelty is wrong”)
Space	The “Receptive” Medium	Fundamental	The manifold of the universe

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6. The Metaphysics of Physics: Space, Matter, and Deletion

In 2011, McGinn published Basic Structures of Reality: Essays in Meta-Physics, a bold attempt to apply his analytic method to the foundations of physics. This work contains his most controversial ontological hypothesis: the Deletion Theory of Matter.

6.1. The Puzzle of Impenetrability

McGinn starts with a naive but profound question: Why is matter impenetrable? Why can two objects not occupy the same space?

Standard physics answers this with forces (Pauli exclusion principle, electromagnetic repulsion). McGinn argues this is circular or insufficient as a metaphysical explanation. It explains mechanically why they bounce off, but not constitutively why they cannot overlap.23

6.2. The Deletion Thesis

McGinn proposes a radical geometric solution:

• Space is defined as “receptive” (it allows things to be in it).
• Matter is defined as “exclusive.”
• The Theory: Matter is not a substance sitting in space. Matter is a hole in space. An object exists where space has been deleted.

If Object A is a hole in space, and Object B is a hole in space, Object A cannot move into Object B because there is no space there to move into. The medium of motion (space) has been annihilated. McGinn argues this explains impenetrability by definition, without needing to appeal to mysterious forces.²⁴

6.3. Controversy and the “Armchair” Critique

This theory was met with withering criticism from the philosophy of physics community. In a review for the journal Mind, Kerry McKenzie and others savaged the book for ignoring the realities of modern Quantum Field Theory (QFT).²³

• The “Lucky Charms” Critique: Critics noted that physics no longer views matter as hard, impenetrable chunks (like cereal). Matter is composed of fields, wave-functions, and probability clouds, which can and do overlap (superposition). McGinn’s theory seemed to be solving a problem (impenetrability) that 20th-century physics had already discarded.²⁶
• Metaphysics vs. Physics: The backlash highlighted a deep divide in the discipline. McGinn defended his right to do “Meta-Physics”—analyzing the concepts of “matter” and “space” as logical categories—while critics accused him of scientific illiteracy.²⁵

Despite the criticism, the Deletion Theory remains a fascinating example of McGinn’s willingness to follow a logical intuition to its extreme conclusion, regardless of current scientific orthodoxy.

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7. Logical Realism and Properties

In Logical Properties (2000), McGinn turns his attention to the “Abstract” category of his ontology. Here, he fights against the “Deflationary” or “Nominalist” trends that seek to reduce logic to mere language games.

7.1. Existence as a Property

A central dogma of analytic philosophy (from Kant to Frege) is that “Existence is not a property.” You cannot say “The Apple is Red, Round, and Existing.” Existence is the instantiation of the concept Apple.

McGinn rejects this. He argues for Logical Realism:

• The Circularity Argument: If we say “Cows exist” means “The concept cow has instances,” McGinn asks: What does “has instances” mean? It must mean “has existing instances.” If it just meant “has instances” in a non-existential sense, then “Sherlock Holmes exists” would be true (because the concept Holmes has imaginary instances). Therefore, the standard view presupposes existence rather than explaining it.²⁸
• The Property Thesis: McGinn argues existence is a real, first-order property of objects. It is the property of “being there.”

7.2. Identity and Truth

McGinn also argues that Identity ($A=A$) is a fundamental, indefinable relation. He rejects attempts to define identity through “sharing of properties” (Leibniz’s Law), arguing that this leads to infinite regress. Identity is a “brute” logical reality.28

This work reinforces his Ontological Pluralism: Logic is not just a human invention; it is a rigid, objective structure of the universe that determines what is possible.

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8. Evolutionary Philosophy and the Hand

In his later work, McGinn bridges the gap between his abstract metaphysics and his naturalism through Evolutionary Psychology and Philosophical Anthropology.

8.1. Prehension: The Hand-Mind Thesis

In Prehension: The Hand and the Emergence of Humanity (2015), McGinn argues that the human hand is the engine of human intelligence.¹⁷

• From Grasping to Understanding: He notes the etymological and conceptual link between “Prehension” (grasping physically) and “Comprehension” (grasping mentally).
• The Origin of Reference: How do we learn to refer to things with words? McGinn speculates that pointing and grasping were the primal forms of reference. The hand taught the mind how to pick out objects in the world, which laid the cognitive groundwork for nouns and names.³¹
• Agency: The hand is the “executive” of the will. It is the primary means by which the mental will imposes itself on physical reality.

8.2. Inborn Knowledge: The Return to Rationalism

In Inborn Knowledge (2015), McGinn defends Nativism (the view that we are born with knowledge) against Empiricism (the Blank Slate).³²

• Poverty of the Stimulus: Aligning with Chomsky, McGinn argues that the sensory data we receive is too poor and chaotic to explain the rich, structured knowledge we have of language, logic, and mathematics. Therefore, this structure must be innate.³²
• The Hallucination Argument: He uses a thought experiment: If you can hallucinate a color or shape you have never seen, it proves that the capacity to form that image is internal, not dependent on external history.

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9. Aesthetics and Applied Philosophy

McGinn’s pluralism extends to the study of culture, where he treats art not as mere entertainment but as a distinct mode of knowing.

9.1. The Power of Movies: Cinema as Dream

In The Power of Movies (2005), McGinn answers the question: Why is cinema so hypnotic? He argues that the film experience is ontologically identical to the Dream experience.¹

• The Passive Viewer: In both dreams and movies, we are paralyzed observers looking into a lit world that we cannot affect.
• The Screen as Mind: The movie screen functions like the “mind’s eye.” We inhabit the camera’s subjectivity, merging our consciousness with the director’s vision.

9.2. Shakespeare’s Philosophy

In Shakespeare’s Philosophy (2006), McGinn analyzes the Bard’s plays through the lens of analytic philosophy.¹

• Othello and Skepticism: He reads Othello as a tragedy of epistemology. Othello’s downfall is the “Problem of Other Minds”—the impossibility of knowing for certain what Desdemona is thinking. Iago weaponizes this epistemic gap.
• Hamlet and the Self: Hamlet is treated as an investigation into the nature of the self and the continuity of personal identity.

9.3. Philosophical Provocations

In his 2017 collection Philosophical Provocations, McGinn adopts the aphoristic style, offering 55 short essays that challenge orthodoxy.¹⁶ He attacks the “citation-heavy, leaden” style of academic philosophy, arguing for brevity and wit. This work represents his post-institutional voice: unencumbered by peer review, direct, and often contrarian, tackling everything from “The concept of a person” to “Science as Metaphysics.”

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10. Thematic Epilogue: The Perimeter of Conceptual Anatomy

The philosophy of Colin McGinn is a philosophy of boundaries.

Throughout his career, he has mapped the walls of the human prison. In the philosophy of mind, he showed us the Cognitive Boundary: the wall that separates our primate brains from the true nature of consciousness. In his ontology, he showed us the Logical Boundary: the wall that separates the contingent universe from the necessary truths of mathematics. In his “Deletion Theory,” he attempted to find the boundary between matter and space.

There is a poignant symmetry between his intellectual life and his biographical arc. McGinn spent decades arguing that the “inner life” is a private, inaccessible realm that can never be fully transparent to the outside world. Yet, his career collapsed when the most private aspects of his life—his desires, his fantasies, his digital whispers—were dragged into the harsh, litigious light of the public sphere.

The “McGinn Case” remains a scar on the field, a reminder of the complex interplay between intellect and conduct. But the “McGinn Philosophy” remains a vital, if discomfiting, monument. It stands as a check on human hubris. In an age where science promises to unveil every secret, McGinn is the voice at the back of the room reminding us that we are biological creatures, not gods. We may map the genome and photograph black holes, but if McGinn is right, the ultimate nature of the light within us—the simple feeling of being alive—will forever remain a mystery, locked away in the blind spot of our own existence.

He leaves us with a world that is vividly real—filled with numbers, values, films, and stars—but a world where the ultimate explanation is always just out of reach, hidden in the shadow of our own hands.

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