Federal Shariah Court of Pakistan

Presented by Zia H Shah MD

Abstract

This report examines the Quranic verses 24:6–9 and the institution of liʿān (mutual imprecation) as a complex socio-legal mechanism in Islamic law. We survey its historical and theological origins, drawing on classical asbāb al-nuzūl narratives (such as the cases of Hilāl ibn Umayyah and Uwaimir al-Ajlani) and verse exegesis quran.com. The analysis highlights liʿān’s role as a last-resort paternity adjudication: in the absence of the Quran’s required four eyewitnesses for adultery, it allows a husband to affirm his truthfulness by sworn oath and invoke God’s curse, and likewise permits the wife to swear her truth and invoke divine wrath. This procedure thereby preserves lineage and social order by resolving the agonizing dilemma of uncertain paternity and preventing extrajudicial violence quran.com.

Classical Islamic jurisprudence debated liʿān’s technicalities: for example, whether the spouses act as “witnesses” (shahādah) or simply as oath-takers (yamīn), and whether its effect is an irrevocable divorce or perpetual prohibition on remarriage. Juristic schools also differed on prerequisites (e.g. competency of spouses) and penalties for a wife’s refusal (ranging from imprisonment to the Hadd of stoning). In practice, however, historical records show judges often mediated or discouraged formal liʿān to protect family unity and children’s legitimacy.

This study further explores liʿān from a philosophical and psychological perspective. We argue that the ritual of mutual oaths invokes Ghazālian occasionalism: in moments when human evidence fails, God’s will is called upon to decide the truth plato.stanford.edu. The Quran thus transfers the “final judgment” to the Divine, acknowledging the limits of earthly adjudication. Gender dynamics and justice implications are critically analyzed: although the procedure affords the wife an equal oath-right once triggered, only the husband can initiate liʿān. As scholars note, this asymmetry privileges patrilineage (nasab) while exposing wives to severe evidentiary and legal penalties if they lack four witnesses.

In the contemporary era, liʿān persists in state family laws (e.g. in Pakistan, Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria), often as the exclusive channel for paternity denial. This codification has made the process more rigid, raising tensions with modern norms (e.g. DNA evidence vs. the classical “marriage-bed” presumption). We consider how the underlying principles might inform present-day practices: promoting counseling and mutual trust to address infidelity, while acknowledging how liʿān’s legacy of mercy (rahmah) intersects with legal finality quran.com. The thematic epilogue revisits the tension between divine mercy and irrevocable separation in liʿān, suggesting that the institution exemplifies a sacred balancing act – one that asks spouses to stake their eternal fate on uttered truth while averting worldly bloodshed.

I. Historical and Theological Background

The legal institution of liʿān is codified in the Quranic text of Surah An-Nūr (24:6–9). These verses were revealed against the backdrop of early Islamic community dilemmas, where a husband’s lived suspicion of his wife’s adultery collided with the Quran’s strict evidentiary requirement (four eyewitnesses) for proving fornication (adultery or zina). Classical sources record that two incidents catalyzed this revelation. In the first, Hilāl ibn Umayyah accused his wife of adultery with another man; he swore by Allah that he was truthful but could produce no eyewitnesses. When instructed to offer proof or accept the punishment for slander, Hilāl prayed for divine guidance. In a second case, Uwaimir al-Ajlānī found his wife in a compromising situation and wondered if he should kill the man (and be punished for murder) or accuse his wife and face flogging for false slander. In both situations, the Prophet ﷺ responded with the Quranic injunction liʿān as a “way out” (makhraj) that would prevent vigilante bloodshed and unjust punishment.

The verses of 24:6–9 thus establish liʿān as a sacramental dispute-resolution process. The Quran articulates it precisely:

“And those who accuse their wives [of adultery] and have no witnesses except themselves – let the one testify four times [by swearing] by Allah that he is of the truthful. And a fifth time [invoke] that the curse of Allah be upon him if he is of the liars. And it will avert punishment from her if she gives four testimonies [swearing] by Allah that he is of the liars, and a fifth [oath that] the wrath of Allah be upon her if he is of the truthful.”.

In the liturgical language, the husband swears four oaths to affirm his honesty, with a fifth recitation that “the curse of Allah” fall on him if he lied. The wife then has the symmetrical opportunity: four oaths of innocence, with a fifth invoking “the wrath of Allah” if the husband’s claim were true. If either party refuses to utter the required oaths, they face the penal consequences of falsehood (the husband faces the ḥadd for slander, and the wife the ḥadd for adultery)quran.com. Completion of the ritual results in an immediate legal divorce: the Quran directs that the couple be separated and permanently forbidden to remarryquran.com.

Linguistically, exegetes note key terms in the verses. For example, the Arabic uses shahādah (testimony) in reference to the spouses’ oaths rather than the usual yamīn (oath). The Hanafi school, noting the term shahādah, insists spouses meet normal witness qualifications (adult, sane, Muslim, etc.) and treats the process formally as testimonies supported by oaths. In contrast, the Shafiʿī and Maliki schools view the context as necessitating emergency oath-taking, and thus relax the prerequisites (they allow even the husband’s minor sons, or mute persons using gestures, to swear if necessary). Exegetical tradition also distinguishes laʿnah (curse) from ghaḍab (wrath) in the invocations. Ibn Kathīr explains that the husband’s invocation of laʿnah implies exclusion from mercy for lying, whereas the wife’s invocation of ghaḍab signifies that, if she had been truly innocent and the husband a liar (in effect, she had committed adultery), he deserves active divine anger. Thus the asymmetry of terms underscores the moral and legal weight of the situation.

The revelation context also involved concerns over slander (qaḍf) laws. The surrounding verses (e.g. 24:4-5) impose 80 lashes on anyone who accuses a chaste woman of adultery without four witnessesquran.com. Liʿān effectively creates an alternative: a husband who sincerely claims his wife’s infidelity can avoid the ḥadd of slander by invoking God’s curse, and simultaneously avoid allowing an unpunished crime or taking the law into his own hands. Theologically, commentators emphasize that this was divine mercy (raḥmah): it provided a way out to preserve life and honor where human evidence was lacking, stating that each party is spared “punishment in this world” while the ultimate truth is left to Godquran.com.

II. Classical Jurisprudence of Liʿān

Islamic jurists (fuqahāʾ) codified liʿān in fiqh manuals based on these verses and the Hadith. The procedure generally mirrors the Quranic wording: in a valid marriage, if the husband accuses his wife of adultery (or denies paternity of her child) and she denies it, and there are no four witnesses, the judge orders the mutual oaths.quran.com. The husband stands and pronounces the required oath formula, invoking God’s curse if he lies; then the wife does likewise invoking God’s wrath if he told truth. After both sets of oaths, the judge pronounces an irrevocable divorce. These steps are almost universal across schools, but significant legal differences exist:

  • Legal Category (Shahādah vs. Yamīn): As noted, Hanafīs call the spouses’ oaths a form of testimony (shahādah), while Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs treat it purely as oath (yamīn by necessity). This affects who may participate: under the Hanafi view, only fully competent witnesses (Muslim, sane, adult) can take the oath, whereas the Shāfiʿī/Mālikī views broaden participation in dire need.
  • Prerequisites: All agree a valid marriage is required. Beyond that, Hanafīs typically barred non-Muslims or convicted slanderers from performing liʿān (just as witnesses in qaḍf must be free of such defects). Mālikī and Ḥanbalī texts allow more flexibility (for example, a wife who is mute may use gestures).
  • Effect on Marriage: There is divergence on whether liʿān causes a divorce or a permanent annulment. The Maliki position (as articulated by al-Qurṭubī) is that the marriage is permanently severed (ḥarām muʿabbaḍ). The husband and wife cannot remarry even if he later repents, because the mutual curse is seen as irreparably corrupting the marital bond. The Hanafi position (e.g. al-Jaṣṣāṣ) treats liʿān as effecting a ṭalāq bayn (irrevocable divorce): if the husband chooses later to confess to false slander (thus accepting punishment), some jurists allowed the impediment to be lifted and remarriage to occur. Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī opinions largely side with the Maliki on permanence.
  • Post-Liʿān Status: In all schools, after liʿān both spouses are forbidden ever to cohabit again (a permanent divorce). The husband must release the wife (either divorcing her or having the qāḍī separate them), and remarriage is barredquran.com. Classical works detail these outcomes and warn that a husband who refuses to initiate liʿān when unable to prove adultery himself is liable to the ḥadd of slanderquran.com.
  • Penalties for Refusal: If the husband balks at swearing the required oath, Hanafīs prescribe his detention until he either swears or admits lying; if he admits lying, he receives 80 lashes for slanderquran.com. If the wife refuses after the husband swears fully, most schools require her imprisonment until she either swears or confesses adulteryquran.com. Notably, Maliki, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī doctrines hold that refusal of the wife immediately incurs the ḥadd of stoning (rajm) for adultery – a punishment subsequently codified in many Muslim legal traditions (though rarely carried out in practice).

Table 1 below summarizes key differences in classical Sunni schools regarding liʿān. In practice, however, scholars and judges often emphasized leniency and alternative settlements (see below). The sharp variances among the schools underscore that liʿān straddles evidentiary law and moral theology.

FeatureHanafi SchoolMaliki SchoolShafiʿī SchoolHanbali School
Nature of LiʿānTreated as witness testimony reinforced by oathTreated as an oath of accusation/defenseOath (yamīn) by necessityTestimony format (shahāda)
PrerequisitesSpouses must be qualified witnesses (Muslim, free, sane). Mute or disabled persons cannot swear verballyValid marriage suffices; even mute spouses may indicate oaths by signsValid marriage; usual rules of permissibilityValid marriage; no extra prerequisites
Effect on MarriageJudge must decree divorce; results in a ṭalāq bayn (irrevocable divorce)Automatic dissolution upon completion; results in ḥarām muʿabbaḍ (perpetual prohibition)Divorce at completion; remarriage permanently forbiddenDivorce at completion; remarriage permanently forbidden
Wife’s RefusalImprisonment until she swears or confessesImprisonment until oath (stall); then stoning punishment once the process is doneImmediate execution (stoning) once procedure is invokedImmediate execution (stoning) once procedure is invoked

Table 1: Classical Jurisprudential Differences on Liʿān (sources: classical fiqh manuals).

The classical exegesis and law thus present liʿān as simultaneously equitable (equal oaths for husband and wife once proceedings begin) and asymmetrical (only husbands may invoke it). Later sections will examine this gendered aspect in depth.

III. Liʿān as a Paternity Solution and Social Stabilizer

At its core, liʿān functioned to resolve paternity disputes that could not be settled by ordinary evidence. Under Quranic law the presumption “the child belongs to the bed” (al-walad li-l-firāsh) is normally inviolable. But if a husband remains convinced that his wife has borne another man’s child, liʿān is the only sanctioned method to challenge that presumption. Upon completion of liʿān, the husband renounces all claims to the child, who is considered walad al-liʿān and is legally forbidden from inheriting from the father. Thus the oath procedure immediately severs paternity: jurists say “liʿān severs nasab” once the prescribed oaths are uttered. Contemporary analyses note that, even as new technologies emerged, many Muslim courts continue to uphold liʿān as the exclusive route to deny paternity, so that DNA evidence generally cannot be used in a valid marriage without first performing liʿān. Jordan’s 2019 personal status code, for example, explicitly requires a husband to invoke liʿān before challenging legitimacy, and it maintains custody for the mother even after liʿān (reflecting the “best interests of the child”).

Beyond the technical legal effect, liʿān served vital social and moral purposes. In pre-modern Muslim societies, honor-shame norms were paramount. Publicly accusing a wife of adultery brought disgrace to the entire family (the concept of sitr, or social concealment, held great value). Classical judges were wary of the turmoil that formalizing a liʿān could cause. Historians of Mamluk and Ottoman courts report that Qāḍīs often discouraged liʿān proceedings. For instance, in Ottoman records from Aleppo and Jerusalem, judges routinely warned husbands of the grave spiritual and social cost of liʿān, reminding them they would lose their wife’s dowry and their lineage status, and they would be exiled from their family’s inheritance. Faced with this warning, many men withdrew their accusations and opted for an ordinary divorce (ṭalāq) instead. In one chronicled case, a man accused his wife of “loose conduct,” but the judge sent them to mediation and implored him to allow a quiet divorce to protect the child’s legitimacy. The records vividly describe liʿān as a “nuclear option”: its mere threat was enough to bring parties to negotiated settlements.

Notwithstanding such discretion, liʿān undoubtedly also provided stability by averting violence. As 20th-century commentators point out, without liʿān a husband who knew of his wife’s infidelity might resort to revenge (even murder) or live in tortured silence. Sayyid Qutb characterizes liʿān as protecting “the sanctity of the Muslim home from public scrutiny,” for it internalizes the trial and spares the community humiliating exposure. Abdullāh Aʿlā Maudūdī famously calls it a “safety valve for the preservation of civil order,” arguing that it channels a husband’s raw anger into a regulated legal process rather than spurring blood feuds. Indeed, the Quran’s stipulation explicitly spares “both spouses from worldly punishment”quran.com, leaving ultimate justice to God’s court. In this way, liʿān blends divine mercy (by avoiding executions or illicit revenge) with legal finality: the hidden truth is entrusted to God’s oath-bound test, while the marital bond is conclusively dissolved to restore public harmonyquran.com.

IV. Liʿān and Occasionalism: Divine Intervention in Uncertainty

The liʿān procedure can be read as a striking instance of theological occasionalism in practice. Occasionalism, especially as articulated by the Ashʿarī theologian Imām al-Ghazālī, holds that all causes in the world are ultimately acts of God’s will. Nature has no inherent power; what we perceive as cause and effect happens only because God intervenes at every momentplato.stanford.edu. In human affairs, this doctrine implies that if we cannot discern truth by ordinary means, the solution must lie in divine agency.

In liʿān, the mechanism of ascertainment is flipped from human evidence to an explicit plea to God. The fifth oath – invoking Allah’s curse or wrath – is not a metaphor but a literal appeal to divine intervention: the spouses ask God to act as arbiter. Sayyid Qutb highlights this shift, noting that “the fifth oath places the final judgment in the hands of the Divine”, relieving human judges of the impossible task of probing inner intentions. This reflects the Qur’anic motif that God is the ultimate certifier of truth. Just as al-Ghazālī argued that miracles demonstrate God’s power to override natural necessityplato.stanford.edu, liʿān invokes a kind of “miracle” verdict: though no witnesses prove guilt, the ritual itself enforces a supernaturally guaranteed outcome (one party must be lying, and God’s curse establishes which).

Islamic tradition had long held that causation is contingent on God’s continuous will (e.g. “His command is: Be! – and it is.”themuslimtimes.info). By asking God to “curse” one spouse if lying, the process acknowledges God’s sole omnipotence. In a sense, liʿān ritualizes occasionalism: it suspends the usual causal chain (witness ➔ proof ➔ judgment) and substitutes direct divine action. For the uncertain husband, it affirms that God knows the unseen; for the wife, it signals that God sees her purity or guilt. Thus the verses of 24:6–9 give legal expression to the theological principle that when earthly evidence is silent, “the truth is known only to Allah” (as the Quran elsewhere emphasizes). In effect, liʿān situates the “metaphysical” (divine knowledge) within the “mundane” (court procedure), echoing al-Ghazālī’s insistence that God’s will supersedes natural law whenever it must.

V. Gender Dynamics and Evidentiary Asymmetries

Despite the mutual oath-formula, liʿān embodies a pronounced gender asymmetry. By classical consensus, only the husband can initiate liʿān. A wife who suspects her husband of infidelity has no parallel mechanism of mutual oaths; Islam allows her either to seek divorce on grounds of harm (ṭalāq for ḍarar or fahishah) or to bring four witnesses against him. If she accuses him without proof, she herself falls under qaḍf laws (80 lashes for false slander).

Scholars explain the rationale: the legal concern nasab (lineage) is patrilineal. As one jurist notes, “a wife never doubts that a child born of her body is hers… she lacks the nasab-based motivation” that drives the husband. The husband’s right in liʿān is tied to his anxiety over paternity; the wife, whose maternal link is certain, has no legal claim in this context. Moreover, a husband can divorce freely (ṭalāq) if he merely wants to end the marriage; he needs liʿān specifically to deny paternity and avoid slander charges. Thus classical law reflects a patriarchal logic: it protects male lineage (and male honor) but affords no equivalent oath-procedure for a wife’s suspicions.

Feminist critiques underscore the resulting inequalities. On the one hand, Liʿān’s very allowance of the wife to speak (with the force of oath) is notable: Amina Wadud points out that at the moment of liʿān, the wife’s testimony (her oaths) is equal to the husband’s. Unlike most classical rules where a woman’s witness is discounted, here four oaths by the wife fully neutralize the husband’s claim. This momentarily affirms her legal agency: if she swears truthfully, she escapes punishment and vindicates her chastity. However, Kecia Ali and others stress that this is a structural parity only after initiation. Because only the husband may initiate, women often have no access to liʿān’s dispensation. A woman who must prove harm to obtain divorce or who loses financial rights in khulʿ (redemptive divorce) finds herself at a disadvantage. As one commentator notes, liʿān reflects “the husband’s anxiety over lineage” being privileged by law, whereas a wife’s anxiety over fidelity is not equivalently addressed.

These dynamics have real implications. A wife falsely accused of adultery faces a dire evidentiary trap: without four male witnesses, she must either swear her innocence by liʿān (if invoked) or submit to punishmentquran.com. If her husband accuses her and she refuses to swear, she risks ḥadd (stoning) in Maliki and Shāfiʿī jurisdictions. Even if she swears, she loses her marriage and the child (socially) is cut off from the father’s tribe. Conversely, a husband accused by his wife (a situation not covered by liʿān) simply never faces the same risks under Islamic law. Thus critics argue that the liʿān framework explicitly controls women’s sexuality for the sake of male lineage, upholding patriarchal family structure.

In modern legal systems, some of this asymmetry persists. Statutes like Pakistan’s Qazf Ordinance (1979) and Jordan’s laws explicitly give only husbands the liʿān option. Women’s recourse remains limited to general divorce provisions (judicial separation for harm or khulʿ). For example, the Jordanian Personal Status Law guarantees a mother’s custody of the child even if the father performs liʿān, but it does not allow her to invoke liʿān on her husband. Some reformers argue for more gender-balanced approaches: encouraging evidence-based proofs of harm, or easing khulʿ so that a betrayed wife need not forfeit her financial rights to separate.

Table 2 below compares classical doctrine with modern statutes, illustrating how liʿān has been secularized (used mainly as a divorce/paternity protocol) while its religious form remains. Note that in modern law the judge’s role is largely procedural oversight, whereas classical qāḍīs played an active, spiritual-advisory role in mitigating conflicts.

FeatureClassical Fiqh (Maliki/Hanafi)Modern Statute (Pakistan, Jordan, Kuwait, etc.)
InitiationHusband only (per tradition)Husband only (explicitly enshrined in law, e.g. Pakistan Sec.14)
Marriage EffectIrreversible separation; Maliki: permanent ban (tahrīm muʿabbaḍ); Hanafi: irrevocable divorce (ṭalāq bayn)Divorce (final) in all cases. Kuwaiti law imposes permanent ban (Maliki view); Pakistan issues dissolution decree
PaternitySevers immediately upon the fifth oathSevers similarly, but with child’s rights considered (e.g. Jordan’s “best interests” restrictions)
Wife’s RefusalHanafi: imprisonment until oath; Maliki & Shāfiʿī: immediate stoningModern practice (Pakistan, etc.): imprisonment or simple divorce. Judicial stoning is moot in practice
Judge’s RoleActive admonition, spiritual counseling, delay for sitr (concealment)Procedural oversight, focus on legal compliance (ritual formulas)
Wife’s RecourseJudicial divorce for harm (ṭalāq li-l-ḍarar), khulʿKhulʿ, judicial divorce for harm, civil divorce (varies by jurisdiction)

Table 2: Liʿān from Classical Jurisprudence to Modern Statutory Law (sources: commentary and legal codes).

VI. Psychological and Social Dimensions

The institution of liʿān is not merely legalistic; it also engages deep psychological and ethical dimensions of marriage. For the husband, witnessing a spouse’s infidelity can be profoundly traumatic. Islamic exegesis explicitly acknowledges this: one tafsīr notes that if the husband “keeps quiet [without liʿān], it will be a lifelong agony for him to live with the knowledge that his wife has been unfaithful”quran.com. The Quranic law thus explicitly seeks to ameliorate his psychological torment by allowing the oath alternative. Indeed, Sayyid Qutb describes liʿān as a “profound psychological intervention,” emphasizing how it spares the couple and community the public humiliation of scandal and instead turns the ordeal inward – an internal covenant before God. By “calling the Divine into the courtroom,” liʿān relieves human judges (and conscience) of the impossibility of reading minds or intentions.

However, liʿān also imposes intense pressure. The act of swearing God’s curse on another is psychologically onerous. A husband must contemplate uttering a divine malediction on his wife or on himself. Similarly, a wife summoned to pledge God’s wrath invokes fears of divine retribution. Psychologically, this is akin to an ultimate truth serum: each spouse’s subconscious stakes their very soul on their claim. The prospect can induce tremendous anxiety. If she refuses, under classical law she faces immediate execution (stoning) – an unimaginable terror that no human court need ever witness. Even complying with the oath can be traumatic. Imagine a woman repeatedly declaring “By Allah, he is truthful. May Allah’s wrath fall upon me if I lie” – each oath potentially cursing herself. This ritual enacts a form of betrayal trauma for both: for the husband to doubt and curse his wife, for the wife to see her husband publicly disbelieve her fidelity.

Contemporary psychology confirms that infidelity is one of the most devastating marital traumas. Experts note that sexual betrayal causes deep wounds to the body, mind, heart, and soulmarriagerecoverycenter.com. Betrayed spouses often experience post-traumatic stress symptoms: intrusive thoughts, hypervigilance, mistrust, depression, and anxietymedium.commedium.com. Many report losing faith in themselves and in relationships: “Infidelity can result in tremendous emotional suffering,” writes a recent summary, often leading a person to lose trust not just in their partner but in their own judgmentmedium.com. Within the liʿān context, these feelings are magnified. The husband, who already feels violation and anger, must now choose between silence (living with unbearable doubt) or public denunciation (potentially punishing his wife). The wife, if innocent, suffers shock at accusation and relief at vindication only momentarily, followed by the trauma of divorce. If guilty, she must live knowing the oath has confirmed her violation, an experience likely accompanied by guilt and fear of God’s punishment.

Further social-psychological effects include the child’s well-being. Children born in wedlock but subject to liʿān become walad al-liʿān, stigmatized by law as not belonging to the father. Ottoman court records describe judges fearing the “tragedy” of a liʿān child, who would be socially outcast from both paternal and maternal kin. Judges often went to great lengths – counseling parents to retract or framing a quiet divorce – to protect the child’s legitimacy. Today, we understand that such stigmatization can inflict emotional harm and identity issues on children.

Despite its psychological cost, some find in liʿān a measure of spiritual solace. Theologians portray it as God’s merciful provision in a crisis of proof. One verse notes that after both spouses complete the oaths, “they both have escaped the punishment of this world, but in the Hereafter the one who lied will suffer”quran.com. This framing suggests that ultimate justice lies beyond human eyes. In practice, proponents argue that transferring judgment to God can help couples (and communities) accept an unresolved uncertainty. It also allows closure: a court-ordered divorce and a divine oath can enable both individuals to move forward (albeit separately), rather than remaining in a limbo of distrust. In this way, liʿān aims to stabilize families by giving them a definitive – if severe – resolution, anchored in religious meaning (God is witness, after all).

Clinical insight: Modern counselors with Islamic perspectives might encourage spouses to see beyond bitterness. For example, psychology literature on betrayal trauma emphasizes rebuilding trust (with God, oneself, and others) and avoiding overgeneralizationyaqeeninstitute.org. In a liʿān-like crisis, seeking supportive community or therapy can mitigate the extremes of anger or despair. Some Imams and judges today counsel couples that Liʿān should be truly a last resort – that mercy and forgiveness are Islamically meritorious – unless the husband is absolutely certain of the wife’s guilt. This reflects the intent of verse 24:10, which reminds believers that “a gracious mercy from Allah… that not a single good deed of theirs will be lost”. Ultimately, the spiritual ethos of liʿān is to trust God’s knowledge and to release worldly grudges to Him.

VII. Historical Implementation in the Islamic World

The practical use of liʿān varied across time and place. In pre-modern Muslim societies, liʿān cases were extremely rare. Chronicles suggest that tribal and urban qāḍīs (judges) preferred mediation. Even Ibn Taymiyyah (14th c.) – known for strict Hanbali stances – urged judges to consider the equities of each case. Court annals from Mamluk Egypt and Syria report that military and elite families occasionally faced liʿān-level scandals. When accusations threatened princely lineages or waqf inheritances, judges often handled these disputes behind closed doors. *Ibn Taymiyyah himself commented that a single formal liʿān decision was enough to permanently taint a lineage, so sometimes judges sought alternatives (like financial settlement or forced divorce) rather than let liʿān play out fully.

In the Ottoman Empire, the bureaucratic courts (miḥkama) and the ulema further reduced the incidence of liʿān. Grand Mufti Ebussuʿūd Efendi (d.1574) issued fatwās that imposed strict requirements on husbands seeking liʿān, warning them of its spiritual gravity and consequences. He echoed the Hanafi view that only legally competent spouses could swear, effectively filtering out casual claims. Historians Elyse Semerdjian and others, analyzing 16th–18th century Aleppo court records, find that liʿān was rarely enforced fully. Frequently, husbands accused wives of immorality to pressure them for financial concessions; when cases came to court, judges acted as mediators. A common scenario: a husband claims “loose behavior” by his wife, and the judge postpones the oaths, admonishes the husband that he will lose her forever, and encourages a negotiated divorce. Many couples settled by the wife returning the dower or by a simple divorce, thus avoiding the liʿān ritual altogether. Jerusalem’s records show similar patterns: judges saw themselves as guardians of family cohesion, often coaxing couples to heal or separate quietly rather than stigmatize the wife and children as liʿāniyīn.

In all these periods, the threat of liʿān loomed larger than its execution. Qāḍīs knew that once liʿān was recited, the family was permanently severed. As such, the mere possibility of invoking God’s curse served to discipline both spouses. A husband might not yield proof, but the specter of losing his wife and children often compelled him to recant or consent to a simple divorce. A wife, facing the penalty for refusal, usually either swore the oath or confessed to some wrongdoing. In short, liʿān operated more as a deterrent and negotiation tool than a routine court procedure.

VIII. Liʿān in Modern Legal Systems

With the rise of nation-states, Muslim-majority countries codified liʿān into personal status or penal laws. This codification removed much judicial discretion and subjected liʿān to bureaucratic procedure. We survey a few examples:

  • Pakistan (Qazf Ordinance 1979): Under General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization, Pakistan criminalized qaḍf (false accusation) and explicitly mandated liʿān in cases of spousal adultery accusation without witnesses. Section 14 requires that the husband must swear four times by Allah that he is truthful, and the fifth time invoke the curse; then the wife must similarly swear five times (with wrath). If the husband refuses, he is punished for slander (80 lashes); if the wife refuses, she is jailed until she swears or confesses. Upon completion, the court issues a permanent divorce decree. Notably, Pakistan’s law also stipulates that a wife acquitted by liʿān cannot be prosecuted for zina on her husband’s word alone. (Subsequent reforms have separated zina from qaḍf, but Section 14 remains.) In practice, Section 14 provides a legal path for husbands to deny paternity (since it is part of the qaḍf ordinance), but critics argue it has also been misused to trap wives: making a baseless accusation puts a wife at risk of incarceration if she cannot meet the oath requirement.
  • Jordan (Personal Status Law 2019): Jordan’s codification follows Hanafi principles but adds modern child welfare concerns. Liʿān is the sole method for a husband to deny paternity of a child born in wedlock. Jordan imposes a narrow time frame: the husband must declare liʿān immediately upon birth or learning of the pregnancy. Article 170 clarifies that after dissolution, the mother retains full custody (ḥadāna) unless unfit, separating custody from the fact of liʿān. The law notably upholds the Qur’anic “bed” presumption: Jordanian courts generally refuse to allow DNA tests to disprove legitimacy unless liʿān is first invoked. As one legal analysis notes, it “resists using DNA evidence to initiate a denial of paternity that contradicts the Firash rule”. Once liʿān is performed, however, modern Jordanian courts may consider DNA in maintenance or inheritance cases, though the legal severance remains tied to the ritual.
  • Kuwait (Personal Status Law 1984): Kuwait enshrines the strict Maliki outcome. Article 176 (et seq.) declares that after liʿān, the spouses are forever prohibited from marrying each other (tahrīm muʿabbaḍ). This reflects the view that the spiritual break is irreversible. Uniquely, Kuwait also accommodates sectarian diversity: its Shia minority follows a separate Jaʿfari family law (No.124/2019), which has its own liʿān rules. Under Jaʿfari interpretation, the child loses paternal ties but retains full inheritance rights from the mother’s side, a compromise between lineage integrity and child welfare.
  • Nigeria (Northern States with Sharia Courts): Since 1999, many northern Nigerian states have adopted Sharia family laws. There, liʿān has surfaced in high-profile cases. For a wife accused of adultery and facing stoning, liʿān provides a life-saving defense: by swearing the four oaths, she negates the husband’s claim and halts capital punishment. Conversely, if a husband wants to repudiate his wife, liʿān can expedite divorce. Courts in Zamfara, Katsina and elsewhere have showed remarkable exactitude: appellate judges have overturned entire proceedings when the ritual wording was not followed to the letter (e.g. if a clause was misstated). These cases indicate that even under modern Sharia, liʿān is treated as a stringent formula. Yet, Nigerian judiciaries also sometimes pressure husbands to retract Liʿān accusations to protect women. One commentator notes that appeals often reverse convictions because a lower qāḍī failed to properly warn the husband about the curse’s weight, reaffirming liʿān as not just a mechanical checklist but a moment of solemn conscience.
  • Other Contexts: In Egypt and many Arab countries, liʿān is embedded in personal status codes (often following Hanafi or mixed madhhabs), though practical use is sporadic. South Asian Muslim communities (India, Bangladesh) also allow liʿān under their family laws, with local variations on penalty and procedure. An interesting case is the international dispute over DNA: courts like Egypt’s typically refuse to sever lineage on genetic grounds alone, citing the sanctity of the presumption unless liʿān is performed. Thus, even globally, the Quranic procedure remains the touchstone for denying paternity in traditional communities.

IX. Modern Challenges and Reforms

Today, liʿān faces new tensions. Scientific advances (DNA, personal communications evidence) challenge the old presumption of the bed. While traditional jurists argued for it as an exception to “child belongs to bed,” many modernists question why a husband must still undergo oaths if hard evidence exists. Critics in the West and in some Muslim reform circles argue that relying on liʿān over DNA infringes on the child’s rights. Yet the defenders say liʿān preserves marital privacy and social order, preventing endless blood rivalries and the stigmatization of accusation.

Meanwhile, the stark gender asymmetry invites reform. Some legal scholars suggest creating mechanisms for a wife who can safely question paternity (for example, in cases of rape or medical evidence of her husband’s infertility) without unfairly punishing her. In practice, many Muslim-majority nations have strengthened alternative routes for women: broader grounds for judicial divorce (on cruelty or irreconcilable differences) and greater availability of khulʿ so a wronged wife can dissolve the marriage without losing everything. For instance, Egypt’s 2000 amendments made it easier for women to seek divorce for harm, partly to reduce the incentive to hide adultery accusations behind liʿān.

Safeguards: To mitigate abuse, some countries require liʿān to happen in formal court settings. Pakistan and Nigeria demand a qāḍī or judge supervise the oaths. Warnings to the spouses are mandatory, reminding them of the gravity (e.g. the husband is told he will irrevocably lose his wife). These practices echo the classical principle that a judge should counsel against rash decisions. Some activists urge that counsel or mediation be offered before liʿān, to ensure it truly is the last resort.

Reinterpretation: In modern Islamic thought, some attempt a hermeneutic shift. Amina Wadud and others frame liʿān as about truth-seeking and equal bearing of testimony, less about gender privilege. They emphasize that when the process runs, both spouses “stand on equal footing before God’s oath.” Others, mindful of justice, note that liʿān was revealed as a mercy to prevent harm. Thus, some contemporary jurists advise weighing liʿān’s spiritual intent: is preserving life more important than exposing sin? This has led to occasional rulings discouraging its use unless absolutely certain, reframing it not as encouraging suspicion but as a reluctant allowance after all else fails.

X. Application in the Present Era: Infidelity, Ethics, and Counseling

For modern couples, the Qur’anic principles behind liʿān still offer lessons. In pluralistic contexts where secular law prevails, liʿān itself may be unavailable, but its ethos of balancing truth, mercy, and social stability can guide community advice. Islamically-minded therapists might counsel spouses to maintain sincerity and avoid false oaths – echoing the law’s aim to uphold honesty. Religious scholars emphasize repentance and forgiveness as ideals whenever possible (consistent with Islam’s broader theme of mercy), but also recognize the right to justice and safety for the wronged spouse.

For men, the liʿān framework underscores the gravity of making accusations without proof. The Quran repeatedly warns against hasty judgment and enjoins assuming the best of others. Thus a husband troubled by suspicion is counseled: gather respectful dialogue with your wife first, consider counseling or marital guidance, and remember that accusing without witnesses carries its own punishmentquran.comislamweb.net. For women, knowing that liʿān exists should not incite false confidence; rather, women are urged to cultivate transparency and, if hurt, to use the lawful avenues available (divorce, mediation, khulʿ). Many modern clerics stress that liʿān is very rarely the only Islamic response to infidelity – civil courts now also deal with adultery in varied ways – so couples should not feel the need to invoke divine curses as a first step.

In family law reform debates, some argue for a more symmetrical approach: for example, enabling a wife to request lineage testing or to challenge paternity under strict conditions, on par with the husband’s right. This touches deep issues: how to safeguard children’s legitimacy while ensuring neither spouse can be unjustly accused. Any solution must balance the Qur’anic concern for clear lineage with modern standards of evidence and human rights.

Psychological insights: Modern psychology emphasizes healing the trauma of betrayal. Therapists note that betrayed spouses often go through stages of shock, anger, bargaining, and grief. They encourage healthy coping strategies: open communication if possible, rebuilding trust (if the marriage is to continue), and rebuilding one’s self-worth. The Islamic concept of sabr (patience) is often cited, alongside practical methods like cognitive reframing (correcting overgeneralizations, as one author writesyaqeeninstitute.org). For example, the incident of betrayal should not lead one to trust no one again; recognizing that one’s worth is not determined by another’s actions can mitigate self-blameyaqeeninstitute.org.

For those going through a formal liʿān, community support is crucial. The husband may be counseled on the seriousness of his accusation (since he stands to lose his wife and honor). The wife may need legal advice and assurance of her rights (financial and custodial) post-liʿān. Importantly, Islamic tradition – and many modern scholars – teaches that after a broken trust, the healing of hearts is ultimately a personal journey. While liʿān solves the legal impasse, it is only the beginning of personal recovery. Communities are thus encouraged to offer compassion: ensuring that neither party is ostracized, that children are cared for, and that moral support is available.

In some ways, liʿān also underscores an ethical truth: in marital conflict, absolute proof of certain matters (like sexual infidelity) is often impossible. The only “proof” we can offer is our own conscience – which, according to Quranic anthropology, is itself accountable to God. Thus the oaths of liʿān, as terrifying as they are, symbolically affirm each spouse’s trust in God’s justice. This teaches humility about our knowledge of others’ private actions.

Practically, modern Muslims are advised to remember the prophetic guidance: the Prophet ﷺ discouraged both crying slander and instant divorce without reflection. A wife who finds out her husband cheated is encouraged to seek counsel and, if unsafe, to use legal divorce (which in many countries can be obtained on fault grounds). A husband who discovers adultery is reminded of 24:4–5, which severely punishes false accusation, and is guided to validate evidence carefully. Importantly, liʿān shows the Quran’s intent to avoid taking matters of hidden sin lightly – each spouse must bear the weight of truth before God.

XI. Thematic Epilogue: Mercy and Legal Finality

The study of liʿān illuminates a persistent tension: the mercy (raḥmah) of divine law versus the finality of legal judgment. On one hand, Quran 24:6–9 is presented as an act of compassion – a “way out” that spares bloodshed and unwarranted punishment. It acknowledges human limitations in establishing truth: rather than force an impossible verdict, God offers Himself as arbiter. This frames Islam’s legal ethos as spiritually attuned: law can transcend strict materialism when necessary.

On the other hand, once liʿān is invoked, the legal outcome is harshly irreversible: the spouses are permanently separated, and one spouse will irrevocably lose all conjugal rights. Classical commentators saw this as the justice side of God’s mercy – the ultimate truth has been sworn for, so worldly ties are cut for good. The dramatic nature of this result (halting execution in this world but condemning the liar in the hereafterquran.com) portrays a solemn balance: God’s mercy in avoiding immediate punishment, but His finality in determining who spoke truth.

In contemporary reflection, this dialectic resonates with modern legal philosophy. Even as societies demand rights and certainties, liʿān reminds us that some human claims must yield to faith. The “child of the bed” remains presumed legitimate; only through a painful, exceptional procedure does a child become a “child of the curse.” This may seem anachronistic now, but it embodies a worldview where scientific certainty (DNA) is still seen through the lens of divine wisdom. The epilogue from classical commentary puts it poignantly: “Ultimately, Liʿān endures as a solitary witness to the persistence of sacred law in a secular age… a reminder that the ultimate truth is not always what can be proven in court, but what is whispered in the heart before God.”.

In sum, Liʿān exemplifies the intricate weave of mercy, justice, and divine sovereignty in Islamic ethics. It forces every Muslim legal thinker to ask: when we cannot prove guilt or innocence by our tools, how do we uphold both compassion and truth? The Quran’s answer in 24:6–9 is uncompromisingly radical: invoke God’s name, swear on His burden, and accept the final, irrevocable decree. For legal professionals today, this calls for sensitivity: Liʿān must not be a default knee-jerk, but a sober measure taken only in dire need. And in all instances, its legacy encourages the law to protect family and children, to seek reconciliation before adjudication, and to leave ultimate accountability to the Most Just.

Works Cited

  • Quran 24:6–9 (Surah An-Nūr) – official translations and classical tafsīrquran.com.
  • Tafsir by Ma’arif al-Qur’an (Syed Ahmad Khan)quran.comquran.com.
  • Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr on Surah An-Nūrquran.com.
  • Commentary and Fihrist on Liʿān (Zia H. Shah, The Solitary Witness and the Divine Curse, 2025).
  • Qazf Ordinance (Pakistan, 1979) – Section 14 (English translation).
  • Jordanian Personal Status Law No.15 (2019) – Articles on liʿān and custody.
  • Kuwaiti Personal Status Law No.51 (1984) – Article 176 et seq. (English commentary).
  • Christian A. (2020). Off the Straight Path: Sexual Transgression and Persecution in Ottoman Aleppo. Yale University Press.
  • Semerdjian, Elyse. “Moral Economy of the Ottoman Household” in Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (for case studies).
  • International jurisprudence on occasionalism – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Occasionalismplato.stanford.edu.
  • Yaqeen Institute, How Can I Ever Trust Again? Navigating Betrayal (2021)yaqeeninstitute.org.
  • Articles on infidelity trauma: Marriage Recovery Center (2023)marriagerecoverycenter.com; Shreya Rajesh, Between Love and Betrayal (Medium, 2023)medium.com.
  • Wadud, Amina, Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective, Oneworld (1999).
  • Ali, Kecia, Sexual Ethics and Islam, Oneworld (2006).
  • Maudūdī, Sayyid Abul Aʿla, Tafhim al-Qurʾān on Surah 24 (English tr., 2006).
  • Qutb, Sayyid, In the Shade of the Qurʾān, Vol. 10 (English tr.), on Surah 24.
  • Mernissi, Fatima, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, Basil Blackwell (1991).
  • Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, as discussed in Smith, Steven, “Al-Ghazālī’s Occasionalism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyplato.stanford.edu.

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