Epigraph:

الَّذِي خَلَقَ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ طِبَاقًا ۖ مَّا تَرَىٰ فِي خَلْقِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ مِن تَفَاوُتٍ ۖ فَارْجِعِ الْبَصَرَ هَلْ تَرَىٰ مِن فُطُورٍ

ثُمَّ ارْجِعِ الْبَصَرَ كَرَّتَيْنِ يَنقَلِبْ إِلَيْكَ الْبَصَرُ خَاسِئًا وَهُوَ حَسِيرٌ

He is the Mighty, the Forgiving; Who created the seven heavens, one above the other. You will not see any flaw in what the Lord of Mercy creates. Look again! Can you see any flaws? Look again! And again! Your sight will turn back to you, weak and defeated. (Al Quran 67:3-4)

Written and collected by Zia H Shah MD, Chief Editor of the Muslim Times

The Origins of the Laws of Nature: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives

To tackle this vast subject and discuss the ubiquitous debate between the believers and the atheists let me divide this into three sections:

  1. Scientific Perspective
  2. Philosophical Perspective
  3. Theological Perspective

Scientific Perspective

Historical Development of Natural Laws: The modern concept of “laws of nature” took shape with Isaac Newton’s work in the 17th century. Newton’s Principia (1687) introduced universal laws of motion and gravitation that applied equally to celestial and terrestrial bodies​ plato.stanford.edu. This was revolutionary: nature was seen as governed by precise mathematical principles, turning the universe into a predictable mechanical system. Over the next centuries, these Newtonian laws dominated science and suggested a deterministic cosmos—Pierre-Simon Laplace even imagined an intelligence that, knowing all forces and positions, “could derive…the future and the past” (the famous Laplace’s demon idea, not directly quoted here). In the 19th century, however, cracks in Newton’s framework emerged. James Clerk Maxwell discovered the laws of electromagnetism, and statistical laws (like those of thermodynamics) were formulated, hinting that some laws might be statistical rather than absolute. The early 20th century brought a paradigm shift: “In the 20th century Newton’s laws were replaced by quantum mechanics and relativity as the most fundamental laws of physics”, notes Britannica britannica.com. Albert Einstein’s 1905 theory of relativity replaced Newton’s absolute space-time and gravity with a new law: the speed of light is constant and gravity is the curvature of spacetime (formulated fully in 1915 as general relativity). Around the same time, quantum theory (Planck, Schrödinger, Heisenberg and others) upended the Newtonian ideal of determinism on small scales, introducing probabilistic laws for subatomic particles. By mid-20th century, Newton’s laws were recognized as excellent approximations for everyday scales, but fundamentally subsumed by the more general (and sometimes stranger) laws of quantum mechanics and relativity. Today, the Standard Model of particle physics and Einstein’s relativity represent our best understanding of fundamental laws, though they remain incomplete (not yet unified with each other). This historical arc shows an evolution from simple, deterministic laws to more complex laws that may be non-intuitive, yet still remarkably mathematical in form.

Fundamental vs. Emergent Laws: A key scientific debate is whether the laws of nature are truly fundamental properties of the universe or whether they are emergent features of complex systems. In other words, are the “laws” built into the basic fabric of reality, or do they arise from the collective behavior of simpler constituents? Many physicists assume that a set of fundamental laws (perhaps a “Theory of Everything”) underlies all phenomena. For example, the equations of quantum physics might be considered fundamental, while the regularities of chemistry, biology, or even planetary orbits are emergent from those deeper laws. On the other hand, some scholars point out that what we call laws — especially in higher-level sciences — often “emerge” when large numbers of particles interact, displaying patterns not obvious from the underlying physics. The laws of thermodynamics are a classic example: the Second Law (entropy increase) is not a basic input to physics but an emergent statistical rule from the behavior of vast numbers of molecules. In fact, one informational approach suggests “the ‘laws of nature’, such as Newton’s laws of motion, are all statistical in nature. They ‘emerge’ when large numbers of atoms or molecules get together.” philosophy.stackexchange.com

In this view, regularities like gas laws or fluid dynamics don’t force molecules to behave, but rather describe the collective outcome of those molecules following more fundamental rules. Even space and time themselves might be emergent in some speculative theories (e.g. arising from quantum information). That said, many scientists still search for truly fundamental laws (like the constants and equations of particle physics) and consider emergent laws as derivable approximations. The distinction remains subtle and active in research: if someday we find that even the known “fundamental” constants can vary or arise from deeper principles, it would tilt the balance toward an emergent picture of law. But if an ultimate theory with fixed principles exists, those would be the bedrock laws of nature.

Mathematical Symmetry and Physical Laws: One striking feature of nature’s laws is their deep connection to mathematics, especially the role of symmetry. Symmetries in physics are transformations (like rotating or shifting a system) that leave the laws unchanged, and they often yield conservation laws. In the early 20th century, mathematician Emmy Noether proved that for every fundamental symmetry, there is a corresponding conserved quantity (Noether’s theorem). For example, symmetry under time shifts implies conservation of energy, and symmetry under spatial rotations implies conservation of angular momentum. As astrophysicist Mario Livio explains, “Noether’s theorem fused together symmetries and conservation laws – these two giant pillars of physics are actually nothing but different facets of the same fundamental property.” goodreads.com

This insight showed that much of the regularity in nature (conserved quantities that behave lawfully) stems from elegant symmetry principles. Symmetry considerations also guided the formulation of modern laws: Einstein’s relativity was built on the symmetry principle that the laws of physics (and the speed of light) are the same in all inertial frames, leading to the famous equations of spacetime and gravity. Quantum mechanics and its successor, quantum field theory, rely on internal symmetries as well. The Standard Model of particle physics is essentially defined by its symmetry groups (like SU(3)×SU(2)×U(1)), and different forces of nature correspond to different symmetry structures (“gauge symmetries”). Symmetry breaking, conversely, can give rise to distinct laws under different conditions (e.g. in the early universe, symmetries broke to differentiate electromagnetism from the weak nuclear force). In short, mathematical symmetry has been a guiding light in formulating natural laws – suggesting that nature’s laws are “written in a mathematical language” (to echo Galileo). The effectiveness of mathematics in describing physical law amazes many scientists; as Einstein famously remarked, “The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” This comprehensibility is often due to underlying mathematical patterns like symmetry.

Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Laws: Another long-running debate in science is whether the laws of nature are strictly deterministic – yielding a single outcome given initial conditions – or fundamentally probabilistic. Newton’s laws and classical physics in general were deterministic: if you know the present state exactly, the laws fix the future (and past) completely. The clockwork universe envisioned by Enlightenment scientists implied a strict causal determinism. This view was epitomized by Laplace’s thought experiment of an intelligence that could compute the entire future from the laws and initial state. However, the advent of quantum mechanics in the 20th century introduced genuine randomness (according to the standard Copenhagen interpretation). Quantum laws, like the Schrödinger equation, describe the evolution of a wavefunction deterministically, but the outcomes of measurements are probabilistic – only the probability distribution is determined by law. For instance, radioactive decay follows a probabilistic law (a half-life) rather than a fixed time for each atom to decay. This led to famous debates: Einstein, uncomfortable with indeterminism, quipped “God does not play dice,” whereas Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen school embraced inherent probability. Later interpretations like many-worlds restore determinism at a multiverse level (every outcome happens in some branch), but observationally we still deal with probabilities. Even within classical physics, absolute determinism was challenged: chaos theory showed that deterministic equations can yield unpredictable behavior because tiny uncertainties amplify – though the laws are deterministic, in practice prediction can break down. Today, most scientists accept that at a fundamental level quantum events have irreducible uncertainty (though some hidden-variable theories seek underlying determinism). The question of lawlike determinism also intersects with free will (addressed later): if all events obey deterministic laws, is choice an illusion? Or if laws are probabilistic, does that reintroduce some openness? In physics, we distinguish statistical laws (like thermodynamics, which predict odds) from strict laws. Some laws (conservation of energy, light speed in vacuum, etc.) appear absolute; others (quantum outcomes, mutations in evolution) are statistical. The emerging picture is a mix: the framework of natural law might be deterministic (e.g. the Schrödinger equation), but the manifestation includes probability when linking to observed events​ biblehub.com. This remains an area of philosophical interpretation as much as physics: are the probabilities “just our ignorance” (epistemic) or truly built into nature (ontic)? Regardless, modern science acknowledges that determinism is not an across-the-board feature of nature’s laws – at least not in the naive classical sense.

Philosophical Perspective

Classical Views on Natural Laws: Philosophers have pondered the order of nature since antiquity, well before the modern idea of physical laws. Aristotle (4th century BCE), for example, did not speak of “laws of nature” in a mathematical sense, but he offered a teleological view: nature is guided by purposes and ends. He believed everything in nature has an inherent goal (telos) – for instance, heavy objects fall because they seek their natural place, and living things develop according to an internal aim. In Aristotle’s words, “Nature does nothing in vain.” todayinsci.com

This famous maxim captures his idea that natural processes are directed toward meaningful ends (e.g. organs serve functions), rather than being accidental or purely mechanistic. Thus, for Aristotle, the regularities we observe (like acorns always growing into oak trees) are explained by natural tendencies and purposes imbued in things, ultimately stemming from a divine Prime Mover that inspires order. Fast forward to the 17th century, and we see a shift with thinkers like René Descartes. Descartes was a key figure in formulating mechanistic laws of nature. He rejected Aristotelian teleology and instead described nature as matter in motion governed by divinely instituted laws. Descartes proposed that God, at creation, endowed matter with certain laws of motion and then nature runs like a clockwork. He even imagines a scenario in his Discourse on Method where God creates a chaotic “new world” and simply lets it operate under fixed laws: “Even if God had given the world no form but chaos, provided only He had established certain laws of nature and allowed them to continue, the world would eventually resemble the one we know.” literature.org. In this thought experiment, “God…did nothing more than lend his ordinary concurrence to nature, and allow her to act in accordance with the laws which he had established.” literature.org The implication is that God’s ongoing role is like a sustainer of the laws, but not a constant tinkerer – a distinctly mechanistic and quasi-deistic view for its time. Descartes actually formulated three basic laws (including inertia) that overlapped with Newton’s later laws, emphasizing that these were built into creation by a rational God. By removing intrinsic purposes from nature, Descartes helped inaugurate the concept of laws as universal, mathematical rules governing matter. A bit later, Immanuel Kant (18th century) offered a different twist: he argued that what we call “laws of nature” are intimately connected to the human mind’s structure. Kant held that the mind imposes order on the chaotic influx of sensations through a priori principles. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously stated that “the human understanding is the source of the general laws of nature” that make experience possible​ plato.stanford.edu. Our minds come equipped with fundamental concepts (like space, time, causality) that organize phenomena. Thus, in Kant’s view, natural law has a partly epistemic origin: “we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity that we call nature… The understanding is itself the legislation for nature” plato.stanford.edu. In other words, rather than discovering pre-existing laws written into the world, our rational faculties prescribe a law-like form onto reality (at least in terms of basic structure like every event must have a cause). This does not mean Kant thought we simply make up physics – rather, given that our experience of phenomena is filtered through the mind’s law-giving framework, the uniformity of nature is in part a reflection of our mode of cognition. To summarize these classical views: Aristotle saw law-like order as arising from intrinsic purposes in things (and ultimately a divine order), Descartes saw laws as the decrees of God that make nature a machine (purposes removed), and Kant suggested that some lawfulness stems from our own rational apparatus structuring the world. Each contributed to how we think about what a “law of nature” is – as goal-driven regularity, imposed rule, or precondition of human experience.

Are Laws Prescriptive or Descriptive?: A central philosophical debate is whether the laws of nature are prescriptions that govern the behavior of objects, or simply descriptions of observed regularities. The governing (prescriptive) view holds that laws have an ontological status – they are like “rules” built into reality that things obey. In this view (often tracing back to the 17th–18th century when the term “laws of nature” originated), scientists aren’t merely summarizing observations; they are uncovering the rules of the game that nature must follow​ plus.maths.org. Early thinkers were comfortable with this idea partly because they saw laws as issued by God (the ultimate lawgiver)​ plus.maths.org. For example, Newton thought of his laws as rooted in God’s “wise contrivance” (design) rather than logical necessity, but still as real directives for how masses move​ todayinsci.com. Modern defenders of the prescriptive view, such as some scientific realists, argue that laws produce or govern outcomes: “They take the state of the Universe at a time and produce subsequent states,” as philosopher Barry Loewer explains​ plus.maths.org. On the other side, the descriptive (or Humean) view says that laws of nature do not force things to happen; they are simply concise descriptions of the patterns we find in the world. This view, inspired by the empiricist philosopher David Hume, denies that we ever perceive a mysterious “necessity” behind events – we only see one event following another. Thus, calling something a law is just to say “this pattern has held true so far and is simple/universal.” In the descriptive view, if the universe had happened to behave differently, our “laws” would be different – but nothing in nature made it follow one pattern over another. As one formulation of Humeanism puts it, “the laws of nature are just patterns, or ways of describing patterns, in the mosaic of events” philosophy.stackexchange.com. They don’t exist in addition to the events or bring about the events – they summarize them. This debate can be illustrated by a question: When a planet orbits the sun, is it following a law (prescriptive) or do we simply describe its regular motion by calling it Kepler’s law (descriptive)? The governing view would say the law in some sense “controls” the motion; the descriptive view would say the planet is just moving according to gravity, and our so-called law is a human description of that behavior. Many philosophers today find the governing view puzzling, especially if divorced from theology – if laws are abstract entities or relations, how do they exert influence on objects? Yet physicists often speak in prescriptive language (e.g. “the Schrödinger equation governs quantum evolution”​ plus.maths.org). It might be, as cosmologist George Ellis admits, “We don’t know whether the laws are descriptive or prescriptive – that’s one of the big difficulties.”

In practice, science uses laws as if they were fixed rules, but philosophy reminds us this could be a convenient fiction. The resolution may lie in clarifying that calling laws “descriptive” doesn’t trivialize them – they can still be universal and necessary descriptions of how things happen, without being forces. On the other hand, a pure Humean might say if the cosmic pattern changed tomorrow, the “law” would change – there is nothing compelling the universe to continue following the same regularities. This ties into the problem of induction (just because something has always happened doesn’t force it to continue). In summary, the prescriptive vs. descriptive debate probes whether laws have normative power in nature or are simply human-constructed summaries of the cosmos’s habits.

Realism vs. Anti-Realism about Laws: Closely related is the question of metaphysical realism about laws. A scientific realist believes that laws of nature exist independently of our minds or theories – they are real features of the world. Under realism, when we express Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation as: F = G(m1*m2)/r^2, we intend that as a true statement about how matter really behaves, even if no humans were around. Many realists think laws involve some kind of necessity (or relations among universals, as philosopher D.M. Armstrong proposed) that make things happen as they do. By contrast, an anti-realist (or instrumentalist) about laws would suggest that “laws” are not fundamental reality but part of our conceptual framework or bookkeeping. Perhaps laws are just convenient summaries, or instruments for predicting observations, without deep existence in nature. Notably, philosopher Bas van Fraassen argued that there are no objective laws out there – the universe just happens to behave in certain regular ways, and calling those patterns “laws” adds nothing beyond a dramatic flourish. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes, “The majority of contemporary philosophers are realists about laws; they believe that some reports of what the laws are succeed in describing reality. However, some antirealists disagree. For example, van Fraassen, Giere, and Mumford believe that there are no laws. Van Fraassen finds support for his view in the problems facing accounts [of lawhood]…” plato.stanford.edu. (Van Fraassen points out, for instance, that many so-called laws have exceptions or apply ceteris paribus, and that we can do science without committing to literal governing laws.) There are intermediate positions too: some philosophers accept laws as useful fictions or as emergent at a certain level of description but not fundamental. Others introduce notions like “ceteris paribus” laws (laws that hold when interfering factors are absent) which muddy a strict realist interpretation. Overall, scientific realism holds that laws refer to something real in nature (even if abstract), whereas anti-realism treats laws as parts of our explanatory toolkit without assuming they dictate the universe. This debate also impacts how we view theories: a realist says a successful law (like the inverse-square law of gravity) likely corresponds to a real aspect of the world, while an anti-realist might say it’s just one useful way to summarize gravitational behavior. It’s worth noting that many working scientists implicitly act as realists about laws (they talk about laws as real), but philosophically, anti-realism cautions us not to reify our equations into cosmic commandments too hastily.

Necessity vs. Contingency of Laws: Perhaps the most profound question is “Why these specific laws of nature and not others?” Are the laws of our universe necessary (they had to be this way), or are they contingent (they could conceivably have been otherwise)? This touches on metaphysics, theology, and even modern multiverse hypotheses. Historically, thinkers like Leibniz argued that God selected the best possible combination of laws and constants – implying the laws are contingent on God’s choice, but also that there’s a rational reason (the Principle of Sufficient Reason) for why these laws were chosen. Newton himself, while formulating his laws, felt strongly that they were not logically necessary: they reflected God’s decision rather than any inherent need. In a theological context, Newton wrote, “From this fountain (the free will of God) it is that those laws, which we call the laws of nature, have flowed, in which there appear many traces of the most wise contrivance, but not the least shadow of necessity.” todayinsci.com. Here Newton explicitly says the laws show signs of God’s wise design, yet there is nothing that had to make them so—God could have made them differently. He even speculated, “God could vary the laws of Nature, and make worlds of several sorts in several parts of the universe.”

This clearly lays out the contingency view: the laws are what they are because God (or some initial cosmic choice) made them so; they could conceivably be otherwise (different force laws, different constants, etc.). On the other hand, some philosophers (sometimes called necessitarians) have wondered if the laws might be necessary in some sense. For example, Baruch Spinoza held that everything about the universe flows necessarily from the nature of God (who is nature); if so, the laws in our universe are the only possible laws, given God’s immutable nature. In modern terms, one might ask: could the charge of the electron or the speed of light have been different? Or are they fixed by some deeper logic? Physics so far treats such constants as contingent facts (we measure them, they could have been otherwise). Contemporary cosmology even suggests the laws might vary across a “multiverse.” Some multiverse theories propose that different regions or universes could have different fundamental constants or particle content. If true, what we call the “laws of nature” may be more like local by-laws, and a wider meta-law or mere chance decides which universe gets which laws. This strongly favors contingency – essentially, all possible laws exist in some universe, and we observe this set because (anthropic reasoning) only certain law sets allow life like us. On the flip side, if one subscribes to a single-universe view and perhaps a deeper unified theory, one might suspect some principle that necessitates the form of laws we have. For instance, some TOE hunters hope to show that only one self-consistent set of laws is mathematically possible. Kant, in his own way, thought the necessity of certain laws (like causality) came from the human mind – i.e. any experienced world must obey them. Other philosophers consider that laws are “necessary connections” in nature (as a middle ground between mere description and full logical necessity). The problem of necessity vs. contingency ultimately asks: Are the laws of nature like fundamental axioms that could not be otherwise, or are they like historical accidents of the universe? Currently, most evidence and opinions lean toward contingency – especially given the arbitrariness of many constants and the logical possibility of different physics. We can imagine a universe with inverse-cube gravity or where protons are not stable; there’s no apparent contradiction in that. Thus it seems the laws are contingent. But explaining why these particular laws obtain remains a deep puzzle. Some see this as pointing to a Creator or deeper principle (why this set, which allows complexity and life?). Others invoke the anthropic principle in a multiverse (if many law sets exist, we obviously find ourselves in one of the rare sets that permit observers). In sum, necessity vs. contingency of laws is an open question: either there is an underlying reason these laws have to exist (which we haven’t uncovered), or it’s a cosmic “coin toss” that just happened to land this way. The way one answers often aligns with one’s broader philosophical or theological stance on whether meaning or purpose underlies the universe.

Theological Perspective

Interpretations in Different Religious Traditions: Religious worldviews have long grappled with the relationship between God (or the divine) and the order of nature. Most traditions see the natural order as in some sense a reflection of a higher order or will.

  • In Islam, the laws of nature are often understood as the customs or ways of Allah (sunnat Allah). The Qur’an explicitly teaches that there is a consistent order in God’s creation: “You will never find in the way (sunnah) of Allah any change, nor will you find in the way of Allah any alteration.”aboutislam.net (Qur’an 35:43). This verse and others like it indicate that Allah has established regular principles in the universe, and they do not arbitrarily change – which is essentially a statement of the uniformity of nature under God’s will. Muslim theologians historically had varied views on how these laws operate. In the Ash’ari theological school, a form of occasionalism was dominant: they held that what we call “natural laws” are simply the habitual patterns of God’s action. On this view, fire burns cotton not because fire has an intrinsic power, but because God usually creates burning when cotton meets fire. He can suspend this pattern at will (as in the Qur’anic story of Abraham surviving the fire – a miracle where Allah did not follow the usual pattern). Thus, laws of nature in this Islamic occasionalist view are entirely contingent on God’s constant willing – regular only because God is constant, but not due to any power inherent in nature. Other Muslim thinkers, such as the philosophers influenced by Aristotle (Al-Farabi, Avicenna) or later scholars like Ibn Rushd (Averroes), leaned more toward the idea that God created a world of cause-and-effect that generally runs according to the natures He gave things. But even they maintained that ultimately, these causes trace back to God’s decree. A modern Muslim perspective sees scientific laws as signs of God’s wisdom and consistency. One writer explains that “Allah created this universe according to a number of laws” and humans can discover these laws, but they operate within the limits God set ​aboutislam.net. In summary, Islam strongly emphasizes that the reliability of natural laws reflects God’s faithfulness – nature is reliable because God does not arbitrarily change His ways ​aboutislam.net. Yet, because God is omnipotent, miracles are accepted as instances where He chooses to act differently. The laws of nature are thus subservient to divine will: always upheld by God, and suspended only by God.
  • In Christianity, the concept of laws of nature was deeply intertwined with belief in a law-giving Creator. Early scientists like Newton, Kepler, and Galileo were devout in their own ways and saw their discoveries as uncovering the orderly governance that God imposed on creation. The historical origin of the term “laws of nature” in the West was indeed theological – medieval thinkers spoke of God’s ordinances in nature. By the 17th century, this became explicit: “When [the] notion of a governing law was originally introduced in the 17th and 18th century, it went along with the idea of God’s laws… that the laws are God’s way of making or controlling the motions of material bodies in the Universe.”plus.maths.org. In Christian theology, one distinguishes God’s general providence (the regular upholding of the natural order) from special providence or miracles (specific acts of God that may seem to override the usual order). The Bible depicts a reliable natural order – for example, Jeremiah 33:25 speaks of the fixed “ordinances of heaven and earth” established by God, and Genesis 8:22 promises that cycles of nature (seedtime and harvest, day and night) will not cease. At the same time, the Bible records miracles where God temporarily works outside the normal course (parting the Red Sea, Jesus walking on water, etc.). How can fixed laws and miracles coexist? Christian thinkers have generally not seen a conflict because the laws are ultimately God’s. They view laws of nature as the normal patterns of God’s governance, which He can adjust if He wills – much like a programmer can override code. Theologian John Polkinghorne (also a physicist) explains that miracles are not violations of the laws (as if God were breaking someone else’s rules) but rather new events introduced by the lawgiver – unusual, purposeful acts that nature’s regular course might not achieve on its own. In a similar vein, a Bible commentary notes: “Throughout the Scriptures, miracles are portrayed not as random violations of natural order, but as acts of God who established that natural order. The Creator who spoke the natural laws into being can direct them supernaturally.” biblehub.com​. For instance, when Jesus calms a storm, from a believer’s perspective He is exercising authority over nature’s elements – the laws (wind, wave behavior) are subject to the higher law of Christ’s commandbiblehub.com. Moreover, many Christian theologians assert that at every moment God sustains the existence and order of the universe. The New Testament says, “In [Christ] all things hold together” and “He upholds the universe by the word of His power” (Colossians 1:17, Hebrews 1:3). Thus, the uniformity of physical laws from a Christian standpoint is a result of God’s continuous willing of a stable, intelligible creation. An article summarizing this states: “Scripture indicates that God sustains the laws of nature…and can act beyond them.”biblehub.com. The reference to Jeremiah 31:35–36 in that context underscores that as long as God’s covenant with creation stands, the regular ordinances (like the fixed patterns of sun, moon, and sea) remain in effect​. In everyday terms, a Christian might say gravity works because God is faithfully keeping the universe orderly. But God is not bound by the laws of nature in the way His creation is; He can do something unique if it serves His purpose. This aligns with theistic (as opposed to deistic) belief: God is both transcendent lawgiver and an immanent sustainer/actor in the world.
  • In Hinduism, rather than a single personal God legislating laws, the concept of a cosmic order is prominent. Ancient Vedic literature speaks of Ṛta, the principle of natural order and harmony. Ṛta (sometimes spelled Rita) is essentially the cosmic law that maintains the universe. It encompasses both physical regularity and moral order. As one source describes: “In the Vedic religion, Ṛta… is the principle of natural order which regulates and coordinates the operation of the universe and everything within it.”en.wikipedia.org. Ṛta was conceived as an aspect of the divine – later personified by the god Varuna – ensuring that the sun rises, seasons change, and rivers flow according to a proper order. It’s an impersonal but sacred order, a “truth” that even gods obey. Over time, the concept of Ṛta gave way to Dharma, especially in later Hinduism and Buddhism. Dharma can mean the cosmic law, duty, righteousness, and the inherent nature of each thing. The idea is that each being has its dharma (nature/role) and by fulfilling it, the cosmic order is maintained. So, the laws of nature in a Hindu context are tied to Dharma – the world has an intrinsic order (rita/dharma) that is both physical law and moral law, emanating from the divine essence (whether one interprets that as Brahman, or deities like Vishnu’s sustaining aspect). Hindu texts do not list physical “laws” like Newton’s, but they deeply recognize regularity: for example, the rhythm of creation and destruction (Brahma creates, Vishnu sustains, Shiva transforms). Some Hindu philosophies are quite deterministic about karma (the law of cause and effect in moral terms) which parallels a belief in an ordered universe – every action has a lawful consequence. Interestingly, Hindu thought doesn’t stress miracles as violations of nature – sages and avatars might do wondrous things, but often these are seen as still within the expansive possibilities of the divine law (since god can manifest maya, illusion). In summary, in Hinduism the laws of nature are embedded in the notion of a cosmic order (Ṛta/Dharma) that is eternal and emanates from the divine. It’s a less personal formulation than “God commands physics,” but functionally similar in that the universe is not random – it’s pervaded by a rational principle. Even karma can be seen as a law linking intent and outcome across lifetimes, reinforcing that everything is under law-like interconnection. The Rig Veda says “Ṛta (truth/order) is the foundation of everything; by Ṛta the sun rises, by Ṛta the wind blows.” So, the faithful in Hindu tradition see the stability of nature as an expression of the sacred order, and living in harmony with Dharma is aligning with the cosmic law.

Divine Order and Wisdom: Across these traditions, a common theme is that natural laws are a reflection of divine order and wisdom. In monotheistic religions, this often takes the form: God’s rationality is imprinted on creation. The universe is orderly because it was made by an intelligent Orderer. For instance, medieval Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas spoke of eternal law (the wisdom of God) manifesting as natural law (both in moral law and in the governance of the physical world). To Aquinas, the movements of the stars or the behavior of animals all ultimately trace back to God’s eternal law. Isaac Newton, though a scientist, also wrote in theological terms that the system of the world “could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent being”, and he attributed the stability of the solar system to God’s ongoing governance. The Islamic concept of hikmah (wisdom) similarly holds that creation is suffused with wisdom and purpose, even if humans fully grasp only a part of it. That is why in Islam, exploring science is often seen as appreciating the signs of God’s wisdom (each law or pattern discovered is like reading God’s book of nature). In Hindu thought, the wisdom of the cosmos is inherent in Brahman; the laws of nature are part of the divine knowledge that sustains the universe. So, one classical theological argument is that the existence of coherent laws points to a rational mind behind them – an argument echoed by many scientists historically (and even some today, who are struck by the “fine-tuning” of constants). We might summarize this argument as: Natural laws exhibit order, consistency, and intelligibility – qualities one would expect from a divine lawgiver or organizing principle. This doesn’t “prove” the divine, but for believers it reaffirms faith in a Creator whose logos (reason) is mirrored in the cosmos (notably, the Gospel of John begins “In the beginning was the Logos,” implying divine reason undergirds creation).

Deistic vs. Theistic Views on Laws: Within theology, there’s an important distinction between Deism and Theism regarding God’s relationship to natural laws. Deism (popular among some Enlightenment thinkers) posits that God designed the universe with its laws, set it in motion, and then does not interfere – God is like a watchmaker who winds up a clock and lets it run. Thus, a deist fully embraces fixed natural laws and typically denies miracles or ongoing divine intervention. An example characterization is: “Deism claims that God creates the universe and the laws of nature and then is hands-off, with everything that subsequently happens in nature being due to natural processes.” azquotes.com. In other words, after the moment of creation, the laws rule on their own; God’s role is essentially retired (or at most, God is an observer). This view supported the idea that studying nature (science) is studying God’s craftsmanship, but one shouldn’t expect any deviations in that craftsmanship thereafter. Figures like Voltaire or Thomas Jefferson leaned deist, appreciating the regularity of Newtonian mechanics as the supreme blueprint of a non-interventionist God. Theism, on the other hand, is the more traditional religious view that God not only created the laws but also actively sustains and can act within creation. In theistic belief (whether Christian, Muslim, Jewish, etc.), God is “hands-on” – the laws are expressions of His consistent will, but not a straitjacket limiting Him. God can answer prayers or perform miracles that momentarily set aside or transcend the usual course of nature. Thus, while a theist also trusts that, say, physics experiments will work tomorrow as they did today (because God is reliable, not capricious), they reserve that God has freedom to do something extraordinary if He chooses. Theistic religions often teach that even the continuing existence of the universe depends on God’s sustaining power (creatio continua). This is expressed in scripture and creed – for example, as mentioned, “God sustains the laws of nature” and providentially “rules” creation​ biblehub.com. A theist sees no conflict in believing in gravity and believing in biblical miracles, because the authority of the law comes from the lawgiver. A miracle is seen not as chaos but as a higher order of God’s action. C.S. Lewis explained it as God adding a new event (like Jesus turning water to wine) that nature then carries forward in its lawful way (once Jesus turns water to wine instantly, from that point the wine will behave with all the chemical laws of wine). In contrast, a strict deist or naturalist would say such an event simply cannot happen because it violates laws. So, deistic vs theistic perspective is essentially about whether the laws are closed (no further divine action) or open to God’s ongoing will. Historically, science did not suffer in either view – many early scientists were theists and did science expecting regular laws (they just also believed miracles occurred rarely in religious contexts). But as a philosophy, deism was important in moving the conversation toward a universe explainable by laws without needing continuous supernatural adjustment.

Divine Intervention and Fixed Laws: Do miracles “break” the laws of nature? Theologically, writers have nuanced this. If one defines a law of nature as descriptive of normal course, then a miracle is an unusual event that does not fit the normal course. Some theologians like Alvin Plantinga argue that it’s not a violation or contradiction because the laws of nature cover only natural causes; if a supernatural agent inputs a new cause, the laws aren’t violated – they just don’t apply to that particular event caused directly by God. In simpler terms, if the regular pattern is “A causes B under law L,” a miracle is when A doesn’t cause B because God caused X directly. Laws usually assume no supernatural interference in their scope. Modern science, operating methodologically, doesn’t consider supernatural causes (that’s a self-imposed scope for experimentation and prediction). But theology holds that such causes are possible. Some contemporary discussions in theistic circles involve whether God might usually work through natural laws (providential timing, quantum indeterminacies, etc.) to accomplish His will without overtly breaking anything. Others maintain miracles are by nature exceptional and not reducible to physics. In any case, all major theistic religions assert that fixed natural laws and divine freedom are compatible because the fixity comes from God’s chosen reliability, not from a constraint on God. By contrast, a naturalist (non-theist) would say if laws are truly fixed, miracles are impossible, period. Theists respond that natural laws tell us what happens if God does not intervene; they don’t bind God. Thus a miracle is inherently improbable from the point of view of natural law (that’s the point, it’s extraordinary), but not logically impossible if one allows a sovereign God.

In summary, theology provides a perspective that the laws of nature are part of a meaningful cosmic order established by the divine. Different religions articulate it in different ways – as the command of a lawgiver, the unfolding of a sacred order, or the rhythm of a divine principle. All see intelligibility and order in nature as not just brute facts but reflections of something beyond nature. Whether it’s Islamic scholars marveling at the unchanging sunnatullah, Christian scientists thinking God “thought in numbers”, or Hindu sages describing the universe as the play of cosmic law (Rta/Dharma), there is a reverence for natural law as something that connects the Creator and creation. And on the flip side, the possibility of miracles or divine intervention is generally affirmed (except in deism), with the rationale that the author of the story can write an unexpected plot twist when needed, without rendering the story itself meaningless or inconsistent.

Comparative Analysis

Alignment Among Science, Philosophy, and Theology: Despite their different starting points, the scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives often converge on the notion that the universe exhibits an underlying rational order. Scientists find that nature can be described by elegant laws and mathematical structures; philosophers note that our reasoning finds coherence and uniformity in the world; theologians claim that a rational Creator made the world orderly. These are different languages for a similar observation: the world is not arbitrary – it follows patterns. This alignment is exemplified by figures like Albert Einstein, who famously said the universe’s comprehensibility is a miracle in itself (using “miracle” metaphorically). He also expressed quasi-theological awe: “I want to know God’s thoughts – the rest are details,” implying that discovering fundamental laws is akin to glimpsing a higher rationality. Many early scientists were themselves philosophers and theologians, so historically there was considerable overlap. Isaac Newton could write Principia (science) and also discuss God’s dominion (theology) in the same breath, without feeling any conflict. Indeed, Newton and others thought the existence of universal laws strongly implied a Lawgiver – as Newton put it, the design of the solar system showed “the counsel and dominion of an intelligent being”​ todayinsci.com. Philosophically, even a skeptic like David Hume acknowledged the uniformity of nature (though he questioned if we can rationally justify expecting it to continue). Kant found a solution by saying our mind expects nature to be law-governed. So science’s success in finding lawfulness bolsters the philosophical stance that there is some order to be explained, and it also resonates with the theological stance that the order is intentional. All three perspectives, at their best, celebrate the intelligibility of nature – whether they attribute it to symmetry principles, rational categories of the mind, or God’s wisdom. This has practical consequences: the very possibility of doing science (and trusting induction) hinges on an assumption of consistent laws, something that philosophy can attempt to justify and theology could further support by saying “God is not capricious, He made an orderly universe.” Hence, there is a strong point of alignment: the existence of natural laws suggests a kind of unity and coherence in reality that both secular and religious thinkers have marveled at.

Points of Tension or Contradiction: Despite the above harmony, there are also areas of tension among the perspectives. One classic friction is over intervention vs. closed naturalism. Science, as practiced, assumes methodological naturalism – i.e. it seeks natural explanations and assumes no outside interference in experiments. Theology, however, allows for miracles and divine action. This can lead to conflict if not carefully separated: for instance, the idea of God suspending natural laws (miracles) is not testable by science and can be seen as violating the uniformity that science presupposes. Philosophers have waded in: some (e.g., the Logical Positivists) would criticize miracles as violating the logical coherence of laws, whereas others (like Plantinga) argue they’re exceptions at a different causal level. In everyday terms, a tension exists because a scientist might demand evidence for any claimed breach of law, while a religious believer might accept it on faith and testimony. Another area of tension is the sufficiency of natural laws: does explaining phenomena by laws leave any room or need for God? Many theologians say yes – God is the author of those laws – but some scientists and philosophers feel that as laws expand to explain more, they “crowd out” supernatural explanations. This was seen historically with the retreat of invoking God for gaps (the “God of the gaps” problem). For example, Newton invoked God to periodically adjust planetary orbits, but later Laplace showed a mechanical stability and famously quipped he had “no need of that hypothesis.” From a strict scientific perspective, the most parsimonious explanation is to stick with natural laws unless forced otherwise. The philosophy of science (especially in a positivist or empiricist mode) also tends to exclude metaphysical explanations like “because God made it so.” So there can be a worldview clash: naturalistic philosophers see laws as all there is, whereas theologians see laws as secondary causes. Additionally, within philosophy itself, realism vs anti-realism about laws can clash with theology: a strong anti-realist might say “laws are just human constructs,” whereas theology traditionally sees the order as real (indeed, guaranteed by God). However, one could also align a Humean anti-realism with theology by saying “what we call laws are just our descriptions of God’s consistent habits.”

Another subtle contradiction can arise regarding purpose. Science deliberately avoids teleology in physical laws (Newton’s laws have no purpose, they just describe forces). Philosophy in the modern era also largely keeps purpose out of explanations in physics (though teleology lingers in biology via concepts like adaptation). But theology explicitly affirms purpose: natural laws achieve God’s purposes (e.g. fine-tuned to allow life). Aristotle’s teleology was a pre-scientific philosophy that doesn’t fit easily into Newtonian physics, yet theology kept a version of it alive (God created X for reason Y). This means sometimes theology might interpret laws in a valuative or purposeful way that science doesn’t. For instance, a believer might say “the law of gravity is finely set so that the universe can form galaxies and eventually life – a sign of Providence,” whereas a scientist-philosopher might say “it just is what it is; we cannot ascribe a purpose to gravity.” Thus, whether one sees meaning in the laws is a divide: many philosophers of science would caution against importing meaning; theologians inherently import meaning via the Creator’s intentions.

Rational Order and the Implication of Mind: One intriguing convergence is the suggestion that the very existence of a rational order (laws) implies something about the foundation of reality – potentially a cosmic Mind or at least a logical structure akin to a mind. This is an argument echoed by many over time. For example, the physicist Paul Davies notes that scientists often take it on faith that the laws are fixed and intelligible, which is a kind of meta-law question: “Traditionally, scientists have treated the laws of physics as simply ‘given,’ elegant mathematical relationships… imprinted on the universe at its birth, and fixed thereafter. Inquiry into the origin and nature of the laws was not regarded as a proper part of science.” azquotes.com. Yet Davies himself and others have broken that tradition by asking why those laws? Some, like Davies, have flirted with the idea that perhaps information or mind underlies the laws. Similarly, philosopher John Wheeler suggested “laws” might evolve or that the universe is somehow a participatory system (bringing consciousness in). Theologically, this is amenable to saying “Yes, the reason laws exist is because a rational Mind (God) chose them.” Philosophically, even a non-theist like Plato in ancient times posited a Demiurge or at least a world of Forms that gives structure to the world – something intellect-like behind physical order. Modern anti-realists might call that unnecessary, but the sense of wonder remains: Why should a bunch of particles follow differential equations expressible in human mathematics? This wonder leads some scientists to quasi-spiritual reflections (Einstein often spoke of “Spirit manifest in the laws of the Universe” – he meant Spinoza’s God by that). Thus, at a deep level, science and theology can actually resonate: both assert there is a coherent order – science details its mechanisms, theology offers an ultimate source for it. Philosophy tries to clarify what we mean by “coherent order” and if we can justify assuming it.

Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility: The existence of laws has consequences for the age-old free will debate. If all events including human brain states are governed by physical laws, especially if deterministic, then human free will might be an illusion – everything you choose would be traceable to prior physical causes and ultimately the initial conditions of the universe. This is a philosophical problem raised by materialists. Some scientists in the late 19th century, convinced of strict determinism, indeed saw no room for free will (leading to philosophical positions like hard determinism). However, the advent of quantum indeterminism reintroduced some uncertainty – yet randomness is not the same as meaningful free will. Philosophically, there are compatibilists who argue that even in a law-governed (deterministic) universe, humans can have free will in the sense of voluntary, uncoerced action in line with their desires – because “free will” is more about acting according to one’s motives than about being uncaused. Others, like libertarian free will advocates, insist that for true free will, some actions cannot be wholly determined by prior events – there must be an agent-caused aspect (which might lie outside complete physical law). Theologically, most traditions hold humans morally accountable, which usually presupposes some form of free will. Religious philosophies have thus grappled with God’s sovereignty vs. human freedom (a parallel to law vs freedom). Some, like in Calvinist theology, lean toward a predestination (deterministic) view under God’s decrees, whereas others strongly emphasize free will (e.g. Arminian or Islamic mutazilite view that humans have choice apart from God’s determining every act). If one assumes God created the laws of nature, one must ask: did He also determine every human choice via those laws (which would make Him responsible for evil acts, etc.)? Many theologians say no – God endowed humans (or souls) with a special agency that can transcend physical causality to a degree. In dualist philosophies (mind and body separate), the mind or soul might act on the body in ways not fully accountable by physical law (a gap where free will can operate). In monist, physicalist philosophies, accommodating free will is trickier – often they adopt compatibilism or deny free will. Thus, determinism from natural laws challenges moral responsibility. This is an area where not only theology but our intuitive sense of self balks at pure lawlike determinism. Interestingly, quantum physics has sometimes been leveraged to argue that at small scales not everything is determined, so maybe the brain could have indeterministic processes (some have speculated consciousness could exploit quantum effects, though this is speculative and not a mainstream view in neuroscience). In any case, the interplay of natural law and free will remains a hot philosophical topic. Science per se doesn’t “disprove” free will; it just gives a framework of cause and effect. It becomes a philosophical question whether human decision is fully caused by prior events or can be an originator of new causal chains. Theology typically sides with there being genuine freedom (otherwise ethics and sin/virtue become meaningless), although in some strict doctrines, God’s foreordination might impose a sort of theological determinism. But even then, it’s often argued God’s determining will operates in a way we cannot fathom and that humans still choose voluntarily (a mystery). So, free will is a point where a purely scientific worldview (if taken as “everything is physics”) might conflict with human experience and theological doctrine, and philosophy tries to bridge the two with concepts like compatibilism or emergent agency.

Multiverse and Laws: Modern cosmology’s idea of a multiverse has fascinating implications for these discussions about laws. If there are indeed a vast (possibly infinite) ensemble of universes, each with different fundamental constants or even different basic laws, then what we call “the laws of nature” might be a local rulebook rather than universal absolute. This would mean the origin of laws could be statistical or evolutionary: perhaps many “bubble universes” emerge with random parameters, and we of course find ourselves in one of the rare sets that permit complexity and observers (this is an application of the anthropic principle). Such a scenario leans into contingency of laws heavily – essentially saying all possible laws exist in some universe, so there is nothing particularly special or necessary about ours, except that only certain kinds allow life. Philosophically, this moves the question up one level: instead of “why these laws?” one asks “why this multiverse (and possibly a meta-law that generates universes)?” Some argue this defers but doesn’t solve the question of origins – it just replaces one universe with laws with a multiverse with a perhaps higher-order law (like an inflation field or string theory landscape) producing them. Theologically, a multiverse can be seen in two ways. One, it can be seen as reducing the need for fine-tuning by design – if all options occur, then of course one looks designed to us but it’s actually just one roll of the dice that came out right. Some theists resist the multiverse idea for this reason (seeing it as a way to avoid a designer). Two, others embrace it by saying it magnifies God’s creative scope (God can create many worlds, why not?) – for example, some Christian theologians have no issue with God creating a multiverse, as it doesn’t remove God’s role, it just changes the strategy. If anything, one could still ask “why does this multiverse exist with its laws of multiverse-generation?” and a theist could say “because God chose that as the method.” There’s even an interesting alignment: a doctrine of God’s omnipotence could imply He could create other worlds with other laws (as Newton conjectured​ todayinsci.com, and as some medieval scholars debated “Could God make a world with different physics?”). Multiverse just says maybe those other worlds do exist. For human meaning, though, a multiverse might diminish the sense of uniqueness of our cosmos, which can conflict with a theological narrative that often places significance on this universe (and Earth, etc.). However, theology has adapted before (no longer is Earth the physical center of creation, for instance). So if empirical evidence of a multiverse grew, theology would grapple with it but likely find a way to see it still as part of God’s plan (perhaps each universe is like a separate creation, or the multiverse is one creation with many chambers). Philosophically, the multiverse idea raises the issue of testability – it’s more of a speculative extension of science (some even call it metaphysics rather than physics, since other universes might be unobservable). It also brings back a bit of anti-realism about laws: if what we considered fundamental can change in another universe, then what is a “law of nature” in the absolute sense? Perhaps only a meta-law (like the string theory landscape’s rules) is truly fundamental, or perhaps nothing is strictly fundamental and it’s all a grand natural variety. This can either inspire awe or nihilism: awe at myriad possibilities, or a sense that laws are “just one random draw”. Theologically, some might respond that a multiverse just pushes design up one level (God designed the multiverse). Philosophically, one could say it bolsters a contingent view of laws (they can be otherwise).

Determinism and Free Will Revisited (in a Multiverse context): Interestingly, one interpretation of quantum physics – the Many Worlds Interpretation – posits a constantly branching multiverse where every quantum outcome happens in some branch. This restores determinism at the multiverse level (the wavefunction evolution is deterministic, but it produces many non-communicating branches which to an inside observer look probabilistic). If that’s true, then even “chance” at the fundamental level might be an illusion – all outcomes occur, just we see one. Such an idea again challenges free will (some proponents say every choice you seem to make, you also make the opposite choice in another branch – all possibilities happen). It’s a dizzying implication that straddles science and philosophy. Most people don’t think in those terms because it doesn’t affect our experienced reality (we experience one branch). But it shows how the notion of law and determinism can vary with interpretation even within physics.

Ethical and Existential Implications: If the universe follows laws, does that make it impersonal and cold? Some fear that a law-bound universe leaves no room for meaning, whereas others find meaning in the elegance of laws themselves. Many scientists have almost a spiritual reverence for laws of nature – Einstein spoke of “cosmic religious feeling” when contemplating the laws. Philosophers like Spinoza equated God with the lawful order of Nature (“Deus sive Natura”), finding that a kind of pantheistic meaning. Theologians of course locate meaning in the source of the laws (a personal God). Thus, whether natural laws imply no purpose or a grand purpose depends on interpretation. A strict materialist might say: the laws just are, and we humans have to make our own purposes in a indifferent cosmos (Camus and existentialists often took that route). A theist would counter: the very fact that we can rationally understand the universe hints that it was intended for us to engage with – reinforcing a meaningful relationship between Creator, creation, and creature (us).

In closing, examining the laws of nature from these three perspectives reveals a rich tapestry of ideas. Scientifically, we see the progression from simple to sophisticated laws and the unification of physics under symmetry and mathematics, raising questions about why those structures exist at all. Philosophically, we analyze what it means for something to be a law, and whether laws are discoveries or inventions, necessary or contingent – grappling with how laws connect to truth and reality. Theologically, we place laws in a context of divine creation and providence, considering them as expressions of God’s will or the cosmic order, and reconciling them with miracles and moral values. There is both consonance and dissonance among these views. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, all three realms – science, philosophy, theology – feed into the conviction that the universe is ordered. This shared conviction has been a driving force for human knowledge: scientists seek laws trusting nature isn’t random, philosophers assume logic applies to the world, and theologians see the handiwork of a rational God. Whether one subscribes to one perspective or synthesizes elements of all three, pondering the origins of the laws of nature inevitably touches on profound questions: Why is there order instead of chaos? Why do these patterns prevail and not others? Those questions remain at the frontier of human understanding, inviting further inquiry in laboratories, in metaphysical debates, and in contemplation of the divine. As our knowledge expands – from Newton’s clockwork to quantum uncertainty to possible multiverses – the sense of wonder only deepens that our universe, in all its complexity, continues to dance to a knowable tune, a “music of the spheres” whose composer many are still trying to discern.

To an enlightened Muslim the Quran puts all these three domains into a united whole.

This line of reasoning leads us to Al Ghazali:

The Nobel in Physics 2022 Also Goes to Al Ghazali

Quantum Entanglement, Ghazali’s Occasionalism, and God’s Continuous Sustenance of the Universe

Does Al-Ghazali’s Occasionalism Naturally Follow From the Quranic Omniscience and Omnipotence of God?

Ghazali’s Occasionalism, The Miracle of Light and the Crown Verse of the Quran

Sources:

  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Laws of Natureplato.stanford.edu (discussions on what laws are, realism vs. anti-realism).
  • BritannicaNewton’s Laws of Motion (note on replacement by quantum mechanics/relativity in 20th century)​britannica.com.
  • Isaac Newton, Opticks and correspondence – quotes on God’s role in establishing nature’s laws ​todayinsci.comtodayinsci.com.
  • René Descartes – Discourse on Method, Part V (hypothesis of God creating matter and laws, then “letting nature run”) ​literature.org.
  • Immanuel Kant – Critique of Pure Reason (Kant’s claim that understanding is the law-giver of nature) ​plato.stanford.eduplato.stanford.edu.
  • Plus Magazine (plus.maths.org) – “Who made the laws of nature?” (Barry Loewer and George Ellis on governing vs. descriptive laws)​plus.maths.orgplus.maths.org and William Blake’s Newton as “divine geometer”​ plus.maths.org.
  • Paul Davies – The Guardian, “Yes, the universe looks like a fix…” (quote about scientists treating laws as given and not questioning their origin)​azquotes.com.
  • Elliott Sober – Definition of Deism (God creates laws and then is hands-off)​ azquotes.com.
  • Bible Hub – Commentary on John 2 (miracles and natural laws, God sustains laws but can act beyond them) ​biblehub.combiblehub.com.
  • Quran 35:43 – “No change will you find in the way of Allah” (consistency of divine law in nature)​ aboutislam.net.
  • Wikipedia – Ṛta (Hindu concept of cosmic order)​en.wikipedia.org.
  • Mario Livio – The Equation That Couldn’t Be Solved (on Noether’s theorem linking symmetry and conservation laws)​ goodreads.com.

2 responses to “The Question That the Atheists Evade: Where Did the Laws of Nature Come From?”

  1. we don’t know *yet* where the laws come from. We may never know. That doesn’t mean your imagniary friend exists. curious how you cultists can never show any evidence for your imaginary friends at all.

    Liked by 1 person

Leave a reply to clubschadenfreude Cancel reply

Trending