Epigraph:

بَدِيعُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ ۖ وَإِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُن فَيَكُونُ

He is the Originator of the heavens and the earth, and when He decrees something, He says only, ‘Be,’ and it is. (Al Quran 2:117)

Have they been created from nothing, or are they their own creators? Have they created the heavens and the earth? In truth they put no faith in anything. (Al Quran 52:35-36)

Written and collected by Zia H Shah MD, Chief Editor of the Muslim Times

Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), the eminent Persian polymath of the Islamic Golden Age, formulated a distinctive cosmological argument for the existence of God, known as the “Proof of the Truthful” (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn). This argument is notable for its innovative approach, intertwining metaphysical principles to establish the necessity of a first cause or Necessary Existent.

Essence and Existence Distinction

Central to Avicenna’s exposition is the distinction between essence (māhiyya) and existence (wujūd). He posited that for contingent beings—entities whose existence is not necessary—essence and existence are separate; their essences do not inherently entail existence. This separation implies that the existence of such beings requires an external cause to actualize their potential existence. This perspective underscores that contingent beings cannot account for their own existence independently.

Contingency and Necessity

Avicenna categorized beings into three types:

1. Necessary by Itself (Necessary Existent): A being whose existence is intrinsic and does not depend on any external cause. Its essence entails existence, making its non-existence impossible.
2. Impossible by Itself: A being whose existence is inherently contradictory or inconceivable, such as a square circle.
3. Possible by Itself (Contingent Existent): A being whose existence is neither necessary nor impossible; it can either exist or not exist.

For contingent existents, their existence must be actualized by an external cause. This leads to a causal chain, which, according to Avicenna, cannot regress infinitely. Therefore, to terminate this chain, there must be a Necessary Existent that imparts existence to all contingent beings without itself being caused.

The Necessary Existent

Avicenna argued that the Necessary Existent possesses the following attributes:

• Unity: As the ultimate cause, the Necessary Existent must be singular, as positing multiple necessary existents would imply distinctions that negate their necessity.
• Simplicity: It is devoid of composition, as any composite entity would depend on its parts, contradicting its necessity.
• Immutability: Change implies potentiality, which is absent in a being whose existence is fully actualized.
• Causality: It serves as the ultimate cause of all contingent beings, directly or indirectly imparting existence to them.

These attributes align with classical theistic conceptions of God, leading Avicenna to identify the Necessary Existent with the divine.

Influence and Legacy

Avicenna’s cosmological argument significantly influenced both Islamic and Western philosophical traditions. His distinction between essence and existence was pivotal in later metaphysical discussions, notably impacting Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence. Avicenna’s integration of Aristotelian philosophy with Islamic theology exemplifies the rich intellectual synthesis characteristic of the Islamic Golden Age.

Critiques and Discussions

Subsequent philosophers have scrutinized Avicenna’s argument, particularly the feasibility of an actual infinite regress and the nature of the Necessary Existent. Debates continue regarding the argument’s classification as cosmological or ontological, given its reliance on metaphysical principles rather than empirical observation. Nonetheless, Avicenna’s exposition remains a cornerstone in the philosophy of religion, offering a profound approach to understanding the necessity of a first cause.

In summary, Avicenna’s cosmological argument presents a compelling case for the existence of a Necessary Existent, grounding the existence of contingent beings in a singular, immutable, and necessary cause, which he identifies as God.